

STATINTL

CIA Helms Related

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**NOMINATION OF RICHARD HELMS TO BE AMBASSADOR
TO IRAN AND CIA INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
ACTIVITIES**

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF RICHARD HELMS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ON HIS NOMINA-
TION TO BE AMBASSADOR TO IRAN AND CIA INTERNA-
TIONAL AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES

FEBRUARY 5 AND 7 AND MAY 21, 1973

[The February 7 hearing was held in Executive Session and classified
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[COMMITTEE STAFF NOTE : Mr. Helms also appeared on March 6, 1973, in Executive Session.
That transcript has not been published.]

(II)

CONTENTS

	Page
Hearing days:	
February 5, 1973-----	1
February 7, 1973-----	17
May 21, 1973-----	57
Statements by—	
Helms, Richard, nominee to be Ambassador to Iran :	
February 5, 1973-----	2
February 7, 1973-----	20
Helms, Richard, Ambassador to Iran, May 21, 1973-----	57
Insertions for the record :	
Biography of Richard Helms-----	1
"CIA Discloses It Trained Police from 12 Agencies," article by David Burnham, from the New York Times, February 6, 1973-----	17
Letter to Hon. Edward I. Koch, House of Representatives, from John M. Maury, Legislative Counsel, CIA, dated January 29, 1973-----	18
"Fourteen City Policemen Got CIA Training—Learned How To Analyze and Handle Information," article by David Burnham, from the New York Times, December 17, 1972-----	19
"4 Watergate Defendants Reported Still Being Paid," article by Seymour M. Hersh, from the New York Times, January 14, 1973-----	27
Exchange of correspondence between Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Ambassador Richard Helms, concerning exchange during Ambassador Helms' testimony, dated November 16 and December 1, 1973-----	46
"CIA's Involvement Appalling," article by Carl T. Rowan, from the Washington Star-News, May 11, 1973-----	59
"Watergate Case Called Broad Plot," article by Martin Schram, from the Washington Post, January 7, 1973-----	60

(II)

NOMINATION OF RICHARD HELMS TO BE AMBASSADOR TO IRAN AND CIA INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES ¹

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1973

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright [chairman], presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, McGee, Aiken, Pearson, and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

* * * * *
The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mr. Helms to be Ambassador to Iran.

[Mr. Helms' biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF RICHARD HELMS

Position for which considered: Ambassador to Iran.
Present position: Director of Central Intelligence.
Office address: Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.
Born: March 30, 1913, St. Davids, Pennsylvania.
Legal residence: Maryland.
Marital status: Married.
Family: Wife: former Cynthia McKelvie.
Home address: 4701 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015.
Education: B.A. 1935, Williams College.
Language ability: French, German.
Experience:
Nongovernment:
1935-37: Staff Correspondent in Europe, United Press.
1937-42: Member, Business Staff, Indianapolis Times Publishing Co.
Military, 1942-46: United States Naval Reserve: (1) Headquarters Eastern Sea Frontier, (2) Office of Strategic Services.
Government:
1947- : With Central Intelligence Agency.
1965-66: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
1966 to present: Director of Central Intelligence.
Awards: Career Service Award, National Civil Service League, 1965.
Clubs: Chevy Chase (Maryland).

WITNESS' BACKGROUND

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Helms, we are very pleased to have you this morning. Would you for the record just state what you have been doing the last 10 or 15 years?

¹ The testimony of James Keogh, nominee to be Director of USIA, and Daniel Moynihan, nominee to be Ambassador to India, who were also heard, appears in a separate volume.

**STATEMENT OF RICHARD HELMS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, NOM-
INEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO IRAN**

Mr. HELMS. I was working for the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad for it to come out at last. This has all been classified.

I think this is the first time you have ever appeared before this committee in open session, isn't it?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All these years.

Mr. HELMS. In all these years.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you sure we were wise in having them in executive session?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been Director of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Six and a half years, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been with the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Since it was founded in 1947.

The CHAIRMAN. You must be the senior member of the CIA.

Mr. HELMS. I think I am, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess you are.

Seniority is a very questionable principle, I understand from the press.

Senator McGEE. Just sometime.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Helms, personally I regret seeing you leave the CIA because I believe in seniority and experience, I think it has some value. I have a feeling that you know more about the CIA than you do Iran. Do you think that is a fair statement?

Mr. HELMS. I think that is a fair statement, Mr. Chairman.

CIA OATH

The CHAIRMAN. Are you under the same oath that all CIA men are under that when you leave the Agency you cannot talk about your experiences there?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, I feel bound by that.

The CHAIRMAN. You feel bound by that, too?

Mr. HELMS. I think it would be a very bad example for the Director to be an exception.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be very useful, though. It would be very helpful.

WITNESS' KNOWLEDGE OF IRAN

Tell us about Iran then. You are going there. [Laughter.]

You haven't taken an oath not to tell the committee about Iran?

Mr. HELMS. Well, Mr. Chairman, you know as much about Iran as I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Well—

Mr. HELMS. I hope to inform myself so that the next time I appear before the committee I will know a great deal more than I do today

and maybe I can have some constructive and helpful statements to make.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been studying Iran, haven't you, from the CIA point of view for a long time.

Mr. HELMS. Oh, yes, sir.

BUILDUP OF IRANIAN ARMED FORCES

The CHAIRMAN. While we are on this subject, I have been rather startled to hear in recent months about a relatively enormous buildup of their armed forces. I think I saw the other day that Iran has spent about \$2 billion on armaments in the last 3 or 4 years. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. HELMS. I have not looked into those exact figures. I had understood that the purchase of arms in this country would perhaps come to \$2 billion but I do not know what has been spent in recent times. It is my understanding that the Iranians are in the process of modernizing their armed forces but the extent of this, and so forth, I frankly have not gotten to, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, it is their business if they want to spend money on arms. The question arises what do they expect to do with it? After the experience between India and Pakistan, it troubles me very much to see friendly countries begin to arm like this. The immediate question arose in my mind of what they intend to do with it. Do they have their eyes on their neighbors or do any of their neighbors have their eyes on them. What is there in that area that seemed to justify that kind of rather unusual expenditure for armaments.

I was not aware of any tension there that seemed to threaten Iran. It had not occurred to me that Iraq, a relatively small country, nothing like as powerful or as rich as Iran, is about to attack it.

Mr. HELMS. It is my impression that Soviet arms have been going into Iraq and into Syria and I think that may be what is concerning the Iranian Government, plus the fact, as you know, the British have withdrawn from the Persian Gulf and I would assume the Iranians were interested in being strong enough to protect their interests there.

The CHAIRMAN. My impression is that the arms in Syria and Iraq are more related to the Israeli war than to possible attack upon Iran.

Mr. HELMS. I think that is quite true, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an ongoing problem in that area which only emphasizes the importance of our trying to bring about some settlement of that war.

I don't know, Mr. Helms, whether there is anything that we should ask you about this morning since you do not wish to talk about your experience in the CIA.

Senator Symington, do you have any questions?

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would first say I have been around this town a long time, and believe Director Helms has established a reputation which may well have saved the Central Intelligence Agency from a good deal of additional criticism because of the respect of all of us for him as a person and the way he has operated.

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE MEMBERS' MEETINGS WITH SUBCOMMITTEE
ON CIA

I would ask a question or two about the operation. I believe I have been on the armed services subcommittee of CIA since he first took office. Perhaps at my suggestion, because at times this agency so clearly involved foreign policy, a group of the senior members of the Foreign Relations Committee by invitation met with that subcommittee for some years. Later that was abolished. Do you know why?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I have no idea.

OPERATION OF CHAIN OF COMMAND

Senator SYMINGTON. Under the Kennedy letter your people of the Central Intelligence Agency report to the Ambassadors in question?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And if their work was not satisfactory to the Ambassadors, it was handled.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I congratulate you in at least one instance where it was handled.

The Ambassadors go through the State Department, do they not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. How is it possible for the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington to report directly to the President—I am talking organization now—at the same time their man in the field reports to the Ambassador who, in turn, reports to the President.

I do not quite see the nature of the chain of command.

It is no secret that the CIA has been running a major war in Laos, directing it, but it is a fact that until this committee had Messrs. Pincus and Paul look into it, and later Messrs. Lowenstein and Moose, the conduct of said war not only was handled without the approval of the Congress, but without the knowledge of the Congress. This was because of the degree of the secrecy under which your agency operates, as well as your agency's budget.

How can you have a chain of command in a country, where, in effect, our Ambassador in that country directs the war, reports to the State Department, but you do not report to the State Department. You operate the war and report directly to the President. It really is the President's Army so far as Laos is concerned. I do not understand how it operates. Would you comment?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, the only comment that I can make on it is that in the end Ambassadors report to the President as well, and what has been done in this area has been done under the aegis of the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State sits on that body so that I think that it is there that these things come together. I grant you the logic of the organizational arrangement is open to question, but I think in the end it gets worked out in the National Security Council mechanism.

SHIFT IN CIA RESPONSIBILITIES

Senator SYMINGTON. Our former subcommittee counsel Roland Paul, has just written a book in which he develops what happened, all later

declassified by State. It is a complicated story. I have great respect for Dr. Schlesinger, knowing him as a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee; but he has a long way to travel before he understands fully the operation you have run in the CIA.

The other day, unfortunately, the first head of the CIA died, a friend of mine, who came from the same town. At the time he became the head, we discussed it at length, when the National Security Act was formed. At that time I was in the Pentagon. As I understood, it was going to be an agency to gather intelligence, not an agency to operate wars in secrecy without the knowledge of the people or the Congress.

Do you know when this shift came, when the CIA took on these additional responsibilities. This is the last time we will have the privilege of seeing you in this role. Could you give us the benefit of your knowledge as to when all this new responsibility started, when the change occurred in the original concept of the agency?

Mr. HELMS. Well, it was certainly after he left, sir, and I apologize, but I do not remember the exact date; it was sometime between 1947 and 1950. I think that Admiral Hillenkoetter was the director at the time.

Senator SYMINGTON. The change was to operate more in the military field?

Mr. HELMS. I think it was a question, not so much of that, it was an additional function that was given to the agency which came on rather strong during the Korean War.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I think this a very fine appointment, and believe the administration is fortunate to have Mr. Helms go to Iran.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Senator Symington.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pearson.

Senator PEARSON. I do not have any questions. I just wish you well, Mr. Helms. I am not a great student of that part of the world, but when one reads the newspapers and thinks about some of the events, this must be I think a very important assignment and a very challenging one. So in your tour there I wish you the very best of luck.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Senator Pearson.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGee.

COMIC STRIP, "PLURIBUS"

Senator MCGEE. It is rather unusual, I think, when a new Ambassador quickly becomes the subject of a comic strip. I suppose you followed Pluribus, which has some great plug lines in there.

How about the head of the CIA becoming ambassador?

Well, the fellow says, I hope I never get an invitation from him.

Why is that?

Because I would have to memorize and then swallow it.

[Laughter.]

It looks like the head of the CIA is going to be a very handsome ambassador. Don't he look great in that cutaway coat?

Well, the other fellow says, That ain't him, stupid. He is the briefcase.

[Laughter.]

And the tailor was bemoaning the fact that he can't repair the new ambassador's gear because, have you tried to make a cutaway out of a trench coat.

I think it is flattering they would pay this much attention. But it does focus on the importance of, as Senator Pearson has indicated, your new role.

INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF AREA

You alluded to the Persian Gulf and the other events that are taking place around there. Would it be fair if we interpret your particular background, coming from where you do, as a conscious decision to place greater importance on what takes place in that part of the world?

Mr. HELMS. I think that is fair, Senator McGee. I do not think there is any question but what that part of the world is going to become increasingly important. It has been important all along, but will become increasingly important as our energy problems proliferate, and as we become more and more dependent for just plain oil on the countries in that part of the world.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator McGEE. I would join my voice with those who have applauded your leadership where you have been. I think that has been refreshing and it has enhanced the credibility of the CIA and its role.

It has also, I think, been a great tribute to your leadership in that role. We hate to lose you there. I guess I would have to confess, without knowing all the other details, that I would sleep better if you were still there, but that is no reflection on your successor. It is simply the fact that we liked your candor with the committee and that you were as helpful as you could be and were honest enough to say "I don't know" when you did not know.

I must say that I have no misgivings about the astuteness of your performance where you are headed now. I think it is a very important area, and if you have to leave us here we are glad to have you there.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Senator McGee.

Senator McGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. I have no questions to ask. I am sure we will miss Dick Helms. But bringing up his relations with the Congress, he has proved he is a real diplomat and I hope he gets along as well over there as he has with the Congress.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

HELPFULNESS OF WITNESSES' MEETING WITH SUBCOMMITTEE ON
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Senator PERCY. Mr. Helms, this committee has established a subcommittee to study and conduct hearings into the role of multinational corporations in the conduct of American foreign policy. Would it be helpful to these hearings to meet with you before you leave? Your advice and counsel in this area would be extremely valuable to the committee. What would you suggest?

Mr. HELMS. I do not think that I have anything to contribute, Senator Percy, that could not very easily be acquired from any of my

associates, my former associates. I am no longer Director, as you know. I ceased to be on Friday, so I am actually a free man at the moment. But I think that I would have nothing to contribute that would be of any particular significance to the committee.

Senator PERCY. So, if we have questions, it would be best to go directly to the new Director.

Mr. HELMS. I think so, sir, yes. They have the records.

Senator PERCY. Fine.

QUESTION OF IRAN AND OIL CONSORTIUM

I think we are all very much interested in the Shah of Iran's position on the oil consortium question following his announcement January 23, that his government will not extend the present agreements which expire in 1979.

Could you give us any feeling as to the attitude of the Shah on this and what brought about this decision on his part?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I had understood, sir, without certainly having communicated with anyone in the Iranian Government, I had simply understood that there was a feeling in Iran that the arrangements that the oil companies had made with the Arab States were more favorable than the ones they had with Iran, and this was an effort to equate them. But I am not tutored enough in the precise details and pricing mechanism and all the rest of it to know how this would come out.

Senator PERCY. Can you give us a feeling as to the significance of the oil question for Iran; what percentages, for instance, of their gross national income and foreign exchange earnings come from oil?

Mr. HELMS. It must be the large part of it.

Senator PERCY. How do you view this question in the context of Iran's relations with the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries.

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry, sir, I do not understand that.

Senator PERCY. How do you view the question of changes in their oil-producing arrangements in the context of Iran's relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries? What impact does this have on East-West relationships?

Mr. HELMS. I would have thought that it would not have any impact on them. It is my understanding these are simply arrangements between the consortium and the Iranian Government which does not have any effect on anything else.

Senator PERCY. As the world's second largest petroleum exporter, what impact, if any, would an Iranian takeover of production have on the continued steady supply of oil in the United States and other industrialized countries?

Mr. HELMS. Well, it is my understanding that the issue here is not that the Iranians intend to stop the flow of oil; it is simply a proposal as to who was going to have certain ownership and who was going to have certain functions in this. But there is nothing, as far as I know, in any of the statements of the Shah of Iran that indicates that there is any intention to cut off the oil or to stop the flowing. It is simply a question of the arrangements under which it is going to be sold.

Senator PERCY. With the U.S. companies having about a 40 percent interest in the consortium, how would you assess the potential

economic impact on the United States if the consortium agreement were ended?

Mr. HELMS. Well, if I understand this correctly, the question here is who is going to handle the oil from the time it leaves the wellhead to the ports.

Back in 1951, if I understand correctly, the Iranian Government nationalized the oil holdings in Iran. Then 2 or 3 years later, an arrangement was made with the consortium and some other arrangements were made so that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., which it was known as at that time, would be compensated from this, and those are the arrangements that have run through and are due to stand as they are until 1979 in any event.

The question that the consortium and the Iranian Government are now working on is what happens after that.

Senator PERCY. What role does the U.S. Government and our own embassy have in this whole matter?

Mr. HELMS. I just do not know, Senator Percy. This is something I have to find out.

Senator PERCY. Is this a case where the primary responsibility rests with the oil companies themselves and they come to the U.S. Government for assistance, or does it relate so directly to our national energy crisis and future needs that the Government must assume the initiative itself?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think this is the question by the administration right now as to how this energy crisis is going to be dealt with and this is only one small facet of it.

IRAN'S SECURITY POSITION AND NEED FOR U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator PERCY. In another area, the Iranian Prime Minister was reported by Iranian radio as telling a group of students recently that Iran is militarily the strongest nation in the Middle East. How do you assess Iran's security position today and its need for military assistance from the United States?

About \$492,000 in security assistance has been programed for fiscal 1973.

Mr. HELMS. Well, I had understood, and I obviously have to learn a great deal more about these things, but I thought the Iranians bought what military equipment they needed from the United States and paid for it. And as far as I know, there is nothing in the picture that would require them to ask for more military assistance from the United States than they have, in the past.

IRANIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Senator PERCY. Finally, there has been a tremendous program of economic development carried on in Iran, and I was deeply impressed with it in my visits to that country.

What kind of progress do you see being made, and in what ways can we, as a Nation, contribute toward this progress consistent with our overall needs?

Mr. HELMS. Well, it is my impression, and I assume it corresponds with yours, that the Shah has made a great effort to improve the lot of his people, to develop industry, to encourage foreign investment in

an effort to build his country up and make a better life for the people of Iran, and from all that I have seen and understand, he has had great success with this so far, and there does not seem to be any reason why this should not progress satisfactorily in the future.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I would simply like to state that in my 6 years in the Senate, Richard Helms has been a superb public servant. I have never gone to his agency for impartial and factual information without getting it. Judgments were left to us, but the facts as known were presented forthrightly. Some of the finest briefings I have had around the world were from Agency personnel, who reflect the very high standards and high quality that Richard Helms and his predecessors have built into the agency.

Mr. Helms, I appreciate your past assistance and I look forward not only to voting enthusiastically for your confirmation, but also to improved and strengthened relationships between the United States and Iran, which is a fine nation with a great potential for further progress.

I think as the President's representative there, you should contribute immensely.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Senator Percy.

CIA'S CONNECTIONS WITH MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Helms, Senator Percy raised a question about the multinational corporations, which is a study that has begun, but we have not had any open sessions. One of the cases which was widely publicized last year alleged that the CIA had a great deal to do with and was very close to one of those corporations, specifically the ITT.

Would you care to clarify that situation?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, the agency has connections with all kinds of companies and corporations in the United States for purposes of the acquisition of information and things of this kind, and I do not think—it would be not correct at all to say that its relations with ITT were any different than they were with any other corporation.

The CHAIRMAN. That raises a very serious question. I had hoped that it was unique, and that you did not have that kind of relations with all of the others. You are saying you have similar relations with all of the others?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I am sorry if I—

The CHAIRMAN. It sounded that way.

Mr. HELMS. If that was the intention, if that is what came through with you, this was not what I intended. I am not entirely sure, if you feel that its relationship with ITT on the part of the agency that is different from that of relationships with other American companies, then I am not sure what we are talking about, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the reports which came out, I think, last spring, in the so-called Anderson Papers, indicating that there was a very close relationship between ITT and the CIA or, to put it another way, the CIA was using ITT for purposes of espionage, collecting data.

I did not intend to raise this. Senator Percy prompted me to bring this question up, and since you are here I might as well ask you about it.

You are familiar with the Anderson Papers?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, but the agency was not using ITT for espionage purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Gathering of information maybe? Is that a better way to put it?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I have no doubt in the course of discussions between members of the Embassy and ITT and Anaconda and various other companies that information was exchanged back and forth, I have no doubt of that, but this hardly qualifies as espionage.

The CHAIRMAN. I must say it is hard to say what espionage is.

Ellsberg, as I understand it, is being prosecuted for espionage, but it is hard for me to see it is espionage, too. It is very difficult. These semantics have become impossible. All I meant was gathering information.

What do you mean by espionage?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, espionage, in the definition that we give to it, is the hiring of an individual to acquire information without anyone knowing that the individual is (a) acquiring the information or (b) what he represents.

FORMER CIA MEN INVOLVED IN WATERGATE BUGGING

The CHAIRMAN. That reminds me of another matter you might want to clarify and comment on.

It seems that several of the people involved in the bugging of the Watergate were former CIA men.

Mr. HELMS. Former, yes, sir. They had all retired, they had left. I have no control over anybody who has left.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you do not. I am just asking you whether it is true that they were former CIA men.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, Hunt was, and McCord was.

The CHAIRMAN. They were both former CIA. It was clear, I think, in the paper that they were no longer in your employ.

Mr. HELMS. They had been, both been retired at least 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Two years.

CIA AND NATIONAL STUDENTS ASSOCIATION

Finally, in this respect some years ago we heard quite a bit about the CIA and the National Students Association. All of that has been cleared up—or has it?

What is the present status?

Mr. HELMS. It has totally been cleared up, even including student headquarters which have been taken over by them, and there are no liens on it or anything.

The CHAIRMAN. It is all cleared up?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

CIA DISENGAGEMENT FROM RADIO FREE EUROPE

The CHAIRMAN. You formerly financed, I believe, to a great extent, 90 or 95 percent, Radio Free Europe. Did you not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been publicized, has it not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, that we are no longer involved with Radio Free Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. You are completely disengaged from Radio Free Europe?

Mr. HELMS. Totally.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no personnel or anybody there. You have nothing to do with it?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

VALUE OF CONTINUING RADIO FREE EUROPE

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. I wondered if you would care to give me your views about the value of Radio Free Europe under present conditions. I mean recognizing it was created in 1950, 1951 under very different conditions.

Do you think that the continuation of it today serves any useful purpose to this country?

Mr. HELMS. I realize, Mr. Chairman, that this is a matter on which honest men may disagree. I happen to feel that Radio Free Europe provides people in the countries around the Soviet Union, particularly those other Communist countries which are associated in the Warsaw Pact with the Soviet Union, with the type of straight information and the discussion of events not only inside their country but on the outside that they get in no other way.

I think it has contributed, therefore, to the expansion of the amount of information available to these people, and since I think that we who live in a democracy believe in the free dissemination of information, I think this is a net good as far as those countries are concerned, and I think that both of these organizations, Radio Free Europe, for the so-called Soviet satellite countries, and Radio Liberty for the Soviet Union, contribute valuably in this respect.

U.S. DEVOTION TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. You say we are a democracy devoted to freedom of information. I was under the impression that there have been a considerable number of moves recently, and the morning paper indicates that there is a great difference of opinion about that here, such as the incarceration of newspapermen who do not respond to the grand juries, and the effect of the threats of Mr. Whitehead on those who do not behave. Are you sure that is an article of faith?

Mr. HELMS. I have no comment on that.

INFORMATION PROVIDED BY RADIO FREE EUROPE

The CHAIRMAN. But coming back to that, you say it is a good thing for these to have information. That is information in accordance with the judgment of USIA, or formerly the CIA. You judged what was good for them when you were running it, in any case, did you not? So to you truth was whatever was said by the administration, whatever it was, Johnson administration, Kennedy administration.

If the President gave a speech, that was information. That was what you gave them?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think this is worth \$38 million a year to do that?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, in addition to that, they were receiving information about things going on in their own country which was not available to them in their own newspapers and their own radio.

The CHAIRMAN. Things we thought they ought to know?

Mr. HELMS. Things we learned about.

The CHAIRMAN. That you thought—

Mr. HELMS. That we thought would be useful. They were, after all, facts; I mean it was not innuendo or things of this kind. They were events, developments.

PURPOSE OF RADIO FREE EUROPE

The CHAIRMAN. And the purpose was to stir up trouble, so that hopefully they would throw out their Communist government, was it not?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, that has not been a purpose—

The CHAIRMAN. That was its original purpose?

Mr. HELMS. Ah, but that has been changed rather dramatically in recent years, and it was not the purpose, at least since 1956, to my certain knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is not the purpose of changing their government, what is the purpose? What do you seek to achieve?

Mr. HELMS. I would think the purpose, sir, was to cause an evolution in the thinking of those countries to bring harmony into the world, bring them to our way of thinking.

The CHAIRMAN. Change their government?

Mr. HELMS. Not necessarily. One can modify their government within the strictures—

The CHAIRMAN. Change of government policies?

Mr. HELMS. Well, yes, sir.

WHAT CAN RFE DO THAT VOA CAN'T?

The CHAIRMAN. What can the RFE do that the Voice of America cannot do? Can it reach anybody that the Voice of America cannot reach?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I believe that the listenership of RFE has been established as being a considerable one. The USIA and its Voice of America is an American governmental institution. When Radio Free Europe was established, it was an effort to get a radio and a type of broadcast which would be wider in its spectrum.

The CHAIRMAN. But it was a governmental institution, too, was it not?

Mr. HELMS. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. It was a Government institution, too, was it not?

Mr. HELMS. Guided by the U.S. Government; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You financed it?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you guided it while—

Mr. HELMS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. By deception you made them think it was private and, therefore, you think you developed a different attitude toward it. So you are playing upon the fact that you created a false impression in their mind that this was a free and independent agency and, therefore, you think that we should continue to support it because there are still those benighted people who think it is a private and independent agency.

Mr. HELMS. Well, there are poor, benighted people in this country who think a lot of the broadcasts from the Communist world are unofficial, clandestine even though, as advertised as such, they certainly are not.

PAYING FOR BOTH VOA AND RFE QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection to its being continued if the Europeans will pay for it. I do not see why we should pay for both the Voice of America and RFE. RFE costs approximately \$38 million and we are spending \$200 million on USIA, and about \$50 million of that is for the Voice of America.

I do not see the justification for doing it twice. It is like the overkill on the atomic bombs. If we can kill them once, I would think that ought to be sufficient. If we can give them the President's speeches once, that ought to be enough. I do not know why they have to have it twice.

WHY NOT SET UP RADIO FREE CHINA?

I think the CIA spent about \$500 million on it, during the course of its life. Having spent as much as you did, if I were you I would try to justify it in any case. But if this is all such a good thing, why do we not set up a Radio Free China to inform those poor benighted natives?

Senator AIKEN. We had one, did we not?

Mr. HELMS. I have often wondered.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you not have one?

There was one, I believe, in Korea that was capable of broadcasting into China, was there not?

Mr. HELMS. I do not know anything about that one. I have heard of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Radio Free Korea, something like that, and I used to see these pamphlets.

WOULD WITNESS RECOMMEND STARTING RFE TODAY?

Do you think if we were starting all over today without this background of having created this audience of true believers who think this is a source of objective truth, would you recommend we start a Radio Free Europe today if it was not already in being?

Mr. HELMS. I must confess, Mr. Chairman, that is something I had never thought about.

The CHAIRMAN. Think about it a minute. What would you think?

Do you really think you would, in view of the change in our attitude, the President's change toward Russia and the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt, and all the other things?

Mr. HELMS. I think it would be pretty difficult to do, let's put it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. I know it would be difficult. Do you think it would be wise to do it if you could?

Mr. HELMS. Well, there are so many practical difficulties in connection with it, I doubt you would get it done even if it were wise.

NET GOOD FROM RFE AND RL

But I do think, I want to repeat what I said a few moments ago; I think that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the way they have been conducted in the last 10 years here, have been a net good and if they cost \$38 million, I think it was worthwhile having \$38 million.

You look at it, you just a moment ago said that with the changes in the world and different attitude on the part of the Soviet Union, Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and all of these things, there are some forces that have been at work in the world to create these conditions, and I am not at all sure Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have not contributed to bring these things about.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you get that arrangement? What is the connection there?

Mr. HELMS. The connection is that the cold war, after all, was played by two sides. It takes two to dance, and certainly the Soviet Union was fairly hard-nosed in times past.

You just said this morning you do not think they are as hard-nosed now. Certain events conspired to change attitudes inside nations and between nations, and I think that if you were to look over the programming of Radio Liberty and such things in years past, you would find that this has all been in favor of just this kind of an evolution.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that is a result of Radio Free Europe?

Mr. HELMS. I do not say it is a result of that individually. I say it is simply one factor in these developments.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I yield.

SPENDING BY SOVIET UNION AND ALLIES TO JAM RFE

Senator PERCY. Mr. Helms, can you tell us how much the Soviet Union and its allies have spent or spend a year to jam Radio Free Europe?

Mr. HELMS. More than twice what Radio Free Europe costs.

Senator PERCY. Do you think that because they are spending twice as much for jamming as we are spending to transmit, that there must be certain liberalizing pressures that have been brought about by Radio Free Europe? Do you think that they feel pressures on them as a result of these broadcasts to do certain things that they might not be inclined to do otherwise?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think it is perfectly true they do not like these broadcasts. I mean they have made that clear on various occasions.

DESIRABILITY OF BROADCASTING FACTUAL INFORMATION

Senator PERCY. I have seen the transition in Radio Free Europe programming and have participated in broadcasts from Munich. There seems to be no attempt that I have seen to transmit the old, cold war type of information or to ferment something, but simply to give factual information.

For instance, it is not wise for all Eastern European nations to have full information about an accord that has been reached between Chancellor Brandt and East Germany; that there is now access back and forth; that West Germans can visit family members in East Germany, and that there is a remarkable change in general?

Mr. HELMS. I think that is true and if I didn't make it clear in what I said earlier, the broadcasts have been designed in the last 10- to 15-year period to bring about what we would hope to be an evolution in the manner of thinking of the Eastern European countries.

Senator PERCY. I understand that when the President's arrival in Peking was announced, indicating a dramatic change in policy toward the People's Republic of China, less than a minute was devoted to this by Radio Moscow. Was it not desirable for Radio Free Europe to be able to transmit daily broadcasts as to what the President was actually doing in the People's Republic of China and the nature of his visit?

Mr. HELMS. I would have thought so.

Senator PERCY. When we have a space achievement, is it not good for us to have the attention of Eastern European peoples on such accomplishments?

Mr. HELMS. I think so.

Senator PERCY. Is there any other way of their getting information?

Mr. HELMS. Not that I know of, except through VOA and these radios.

Senator PERCY. As the chairman knows, I had the personally very unhappy responsibility during my first week on this committee to have to oppose the chairman's position on this. I collected the signatures of 66 Senators on a resolution of support for Radio Free Europe. We have a division of opinion in the Senate on the value of these programs, and I am following with great interest the Commission that was established, headed by Dr. Milton Eisenhower, to respond to the chairman's suggestions that there be a greater sharing of responsibilities and costs of operating Radio Free Europe. I am thoroughly sympathetic with his attitude on this, but I also feel we have a great responsibility ourselves. In the end, we benefit tremendously from providing true information and, through the power of knowledge, having liberalizing forces exerted in Eastern Europe that make possible new accommodations to lessen the tensions and bring us, as the President has said, to an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.

CONTINUING INSTITUTION SUPPORTED

I would just want to say that I respectfully agree with the Chairman about burden-sharing, but I also believe that it should be a major responsibility of ours to see that this institution continues.

Thank you.

GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE IN PUBLIC BROADCASTING AND PRESS

The CHAIRMAN. I guess we have spent enough time on this. I wish that this great enthusiasm for information that the Senator expresses could be applied to the domestic scene and our own public broadcasting and our own television stations and our own newspapers could be encouraged to tell the truth, too, and not be under the kind of wraps that this Administration is seeking to put on them.

Senator PERCY. If I may say so, I served as Chairman of the Ford Foundation Adult Education Commisison for 2 years and we put \$20 million into starting educational television. I have expressed my own view that there seems to be too much government intervention in public broadcasting. I objected to Firing Line, Bill Buckley's program, being taken off, as the removal of this program would represent undue government influence in public broadcasting which I think should be left as free as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but it isn't. As I understand, the Administration is asking for \$46 million for Radio Free Europe for 1974. A while ago I said \$38 million is the request for the current year. So they are expanding it at the same time they are liquidating our own domestic broadcasting, what you might call, Radio Free America. Supposedly, the public television was supposed to bring objective news to the people, and now they are liquidating that and, as you know, the President vetoed the bill.

It seems very odd to me we are so interested in taking the truth to the benighted people of Eastern Europe but denying it to the people of the United States, which is a very odd posture, I think, for us to put before the world.

Thank you very much, Mr. Helms.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very glad to have you here and we wish you well.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, sir.

* * * * *

[Whereupon at 11:45 a.m., the Committee adjourned, subject to the call of the chair.]

[EXECUTIVE SESSION]

NOMINATION OF RICHARD HELMS TO BE AMBASSADOR TO IRAN AND CIA INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1973

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright [chairman], presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, Pell, Aiken, Case, Javits, and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The Foreign Relations Committee is meeting this morning in executive session with Mr. Richard Helms, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Ambassador-designate to Iran for further discussion of questions which have been raised by members of the committee, as well as other Senators, subsequent to the public hearing at which Mr. Helms appeared on Monday.

The meeting this morning was called in the first instance because of a story in yesterday's New York Times headlined: "CIA Discloses it Trained Police from 12 Agencies."

This story in turn was based on a letter of January 29 from Mr. John M. Maury, legislative counsel to the CIA, to Representative Edward R. Koch, responding to an inquiry which Mr. Koch had made of the CIA regarding an earlier New York Times story of December 17.

The two newspaper stories and Mr. Maury's letter will be placed in the record at this point. Copies are also available for members of the committee.

[The information referred to follows:]

[From the New York Times, Feb. 6, 1973]

C.I.A. DISCLOSES IT TRAINED POLICE FROM 12 AGENCIES

(By David Burnham)

The Central Intelligence Agency has acknowledged training policemen from about a dozen city and county police forces in the United States on the handling of explosives, the detection of wiretaps and the organization of intelligence files.

The acknowledgement that the C.I.A. has trained policemen from approximately 12 domestic police agencies in the last two years was made by John M. Maury,

legislative counsel for the C.I.A., in a letter to Representative Edward I. Koch. Mr. Koch, a Manhattan Democrat, said that the training activities of the C.I.A. violated the existing law and should be investigated by Congress. He called the matter to the attention of Representative Chet Holifield, Democrat of California, chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, and Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Democrat of North Carolina, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.

Mr. Koch on Dec. 28 had asked Richard Helms, the recently retired Director of Central Intelligence, about the agency's domestic activities after it was disclosed that 14 New York policemen had been trained in the handling of political intelligence files last September.

Responding to Mr. Koch's inquiry, the C.I.A.'s legislative counsel wrote on Jan. 29 that fewer than 50 policemen, "from a total of about a dozen city and county police forces, have received some kind of agency briefing in the past two years."

The counsel, Mr. Maury, said that the training sessions "have covered a variety of subjects such as the procedures for the processing, analyzing, filing of information, security devices and procedures, and metal and explosives detection techniques."

In a statement prepared for insertion in today's Congressional Record, based on both Mr. Maury's letter and an earlier telephone conversation, Mr. Koch described the training as involving "the handling of explosives and foreign weapons, as well as audio control measure techniques."

The Representative said Mr. Maury had explained that "audio control measure techniques" involved the detection of wiretaps and bugs" in which foreign interests are involved."

'NO COST TO RECIPIENTS'

Mr. Maury said that the C.I.A. "briefings have been provided at no cost to the recipients." He added, "Since they have been accomplished merely by making available, insofar as their own duties permit, qualified agency experts and instructors, the cost to the agency is minimal."

In his request to Mr. Holifield for an investigation by the House Government Operations Committee, Mr. Koch said that "since the C.I.A. is barred by statute from participating in law-enforcement activities in the United States, I consider their disregard of the law most serious."

Mr. Maury, however, in his letter to Representative Koch, said that "we [the C.I.A.] do not consider that the activities in question violate the letter or the spirit" of the law. The National Security Act of 1947, which authorizes the establishment of the C.I.A., provides that "the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement or internal-security functions."

Mr. Koch, in his statement for The Congressional Record, said that the C.I.A. had provided him with the names of some of the jurisdictions whose policemen had been trained but asked him "to keep the specific locations confidential because the agency pledged this confidentiality to those police departments."

Though Mr. Koch said the request for secrecy "makes it even more incumbent that the C.I.A. be prohibited from any training of this nature," he did not disclose the locations in his statement. Mr. Koch, however, did make them available to the House and Senate committees he asked to investigate the training activities.

An independent and reliable source has told The Times that in addition to the 14 policemen from New York, the C.I.A. has acknowledged training police officials in Boston, Washington, D.C., Montgomery County, Md., and Fairfax County, Va. It could not be determined where the balance of the jurisdictions are situated.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., January 29, 1973.

Hon. EDWARD I. KOCH,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. KOCH: This is in response to your letter to Mr. Helms of 28 December 1972, regarding a New York Times story describing some briefings which the Central Intelligence Agency has provided to the New York Police Department, and to your request during our telephone conversation on the same subject on 23 January 1973.

Regarding the first question in your letter, I do not have a precise figure but I can assure you that less than fifty police officers all told, from a total of about a dozen city and county police forces have received some kind of Agency briefing within the past two years.

These briefings have covered a variety of subjects such as the procedures for the processing, analyzing, filing and retrieving information, security devices and procedures, and metal and explosives detection techniques.

These briefings have been provided at no cost to the recipients. Since they have been accomplished merely by making available, insofar as their other duties permit, qualified Agency experts and instructors the cost to the Agency is minimal.

All of these briefings have been conducted in response to the requests of the various recipients. The Agency intends to continue to respond to such requests on matters within its competence and authority, and to the extent possible without interfering with its primary mission.

Regarding the Agency's authority to conduct such briefings, the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253, as amended) specifically provides that "the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions." We do not consider that the activities in question violate the letter or spirit of these restrictions. In our judgment, they are entirely consistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-351, 42 U.S.C.A. 3701 et seq). In enacting that law it was the declared policy and purpose of Congress "to assist State and local governments in strengthening and improving law enforcement at every level by national assistance" and to "... encourage research and development directed toward the improvement of law enforcement and the development of new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime and the detection and apprehension of criminals" (42 U.S.C.A. 3701). By the same law Congress also authorized the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to use available services, equipment, personnel and facilities of the Department of Justice and of "other civilian or military agencies and instrumentalities" of the Federal Government to carry out its function (42 U.S.C.A. 3756).

The identities of the individual police forces which have attended these briefings have, by mutual agreement, been kept confidential and I would therefore appreciate your treating the information I gave you in our conversation regarding these identities accordingly.

I trust the foregoing information is responsive to your interests, and I will be glad to discuss the matter with you further if you so desire.

Sincerely,

JOHN M. MAURY,
Legislative Counsel.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 17, 1972]

FOURTEEN CITY POLICEMEN GOT C.I.A. TRAINING—LEARNED HOW TO ANALYZE
AND HANDLE INFORMATION

(By David Burnham)

Fourteen New York Policemen—including First Deputy Police Commissioner William H. T. Smith and the commander of the department's Intelligence Division—received training from the Central Intelligence Agency in September.

A spokesman for the C.I.A., Angus Thuermer, confirmed that the 14 New Yorkers had been given training but denied that the agency had regular instruction programs for local police officials.

Mr. Thuermer acknowledged, however, that "there have been a number of occasions when similar courtesies have been extended to police officers from different cities around the country."

In response to an inquiry, Mr. Thuermer said he was not able to determine how many police officials or how many departments had come to the Washington area to receive agency training.

"I doubt very much that they keep that kind of information," he added.

Mr. Thuermer scoffed when asked whether the agency's training of policemen—some of whom are responsible for collecting information about political activists—violated the congressional legislation that coated the C.I.A. to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security, "provided that the agency

shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal security functions."

Twelve of the New York policemen—one captain, three lieutenants, five sergeants and three detectives—received four days of training from the C.I.A. in a facility in Arlington, Va., beginning last Sept. 11, according to the Police Department.

Commissioner Smith and Deputy Chief Hugo J. Masini, commander of the Intelligence Division, attended one day's training, on Sept. 13.

Commissioner Smith said during an interview that in connection with the reorganization of the department's intelligence work, "we decided we needed some training in the analysis and handling of large amounts of information."

Mr. Smith said the department had decided that the C.I.A. would be the best place for such training. "They pretty much set this up for us," he explained. "The training was done gratis, only costing us about \$2,500 in transportation and lodging."

Both the International Association of Chiefs of Police, a professional organization that does police efficiency studies and runs training seminars on a variety of law-enforcement subjects, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation said they were not equipped to provide instruction on the storage, retrieval and analysis of intelligence information.

One branch of the Police Department's Intelligence Division, the security investigation section, is the subject of a pending suit in Federal court here. The suit, filed by a group of political activists, charges that the surveillance and infiltration activities of the security section violate "the rights of privacy, free speech and association granted and guaranteed" the plaintiffs "by the United States Constitution."

The present reorganization of the security section—and the part of the Intelligence Division that collects information on organized crime—is being financed by a \$166,630 grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a branch of the Justice Department. As of October 13, a police roster indicated that there were 365 policemen assigned to the intelligence Division.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition to that item which appeared in the papers, Senator Ervin, who is chairman of the Government Operations Committee, and is interested in the operations of the CIA, if any, in its relation to the recent Watergate incident, has requested that I inquire about some questions that had been raised in other articles.

SWEARING IN OF WITNESS

I think, Mr. Helms, in view of the nature of these questions, it would be appropriate that you be sworn as a witness, which is customary where we have investigative questions. Would you raise your hand and swear. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HELMS. I do, sir.

QUESTION OF KOCH LETTER

The CHAIRMAN. We will start with the question of the Koch letter. That was the first item mentioned. You are fairly familiar with that, I take it?

STATEMENT OF RICHARD HELMS, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO IRAN

Mr. HELMS. The letter, I am, yes, sir.

What is involved here, and I want to say that I am glad that I have an opportunity to come before you to discuss this because, frankly,

what is involved here is nothing but what we regard as a public-spirited act and it started in the following fashion.

About 4 years ago or so I was having dinner with the police chiefs of four or five major cities. I was doing this because in various ways in connection with our investigations of our personnel and work and so forth these police associations or organizations have been helpful, so I thought it would be a friendly thing to have them to dinner.

In the course of our dinner conversation, which ranged over a wide number of things, I was rather appalled to learn that in almost all of these police departments there were no intelligence files. In other words, if a criminal had a record in the 32d precinct and was arrested two or three times and was picked up next in the 15th precinct there was nothing in police headquarters to indicate that the man had ever been arrested before. And many of these police chiefs agreed this was a bad situation.

So, I said, "Well, at least there is one thing we know how to do in the Central Intelligence Agency and that is how to set up intelligence records and files and methods of keeping these files, and, as an individual American citizen who is interested in law and order and decency in his community, if there was any way that we could help to instruct you as to how these files are indeed set up I would be glad indeed to have a man available."

I heard nothing more about this until about 2 months later one police chief, that is, the gentleman from Chicago, said he would be interested, so I was able to put a man, who understood about files and how you make records track and so forth, in touch with them and he helped them establish a system for keeping this information.

As the years have gone on, it has been the consistent policy of mine, and I say mine is when I was Director of the Agency, that anything we invented or devised or were able to do in the Agency that I thought would be helpful in the field of law enforcement we have turned over to the FBI, and in more recent times Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the LEAA.

For example, some time ago in connection with a problem, and a recurring problem, in the Vietnamese war, where certain individuals were Vietcong at night and supposedly law-abiding South Vietnamese citizens in the daylight, our technicians devised a nontoxic spray which when sprayed on a man's hand as soon as the spray dries and the hand is subjected to ultraviolet light, if that hand has been in contact with metal any time in the preceding 24 hours, it will show this. Each metal has a distinctive color under the ultraviolet, some red, some purple, some gold, and so forth; so it was possible to tell that that fellow had had a handgun in his hands during that period.

In other words, we thought since this worked in Vietnam—we had a chance to test it in hundreds of cases—the police organizations might find it useful. After all, if they had picked up in a few hours the fellow who had shot Senator Stennis and he didn't have a gun on him, you would have been able to tell he had a gun in his hands during a preceding period, and about the size of the gun.

We also developed a system where treating a cloth with chemical and in wiping off a man's hands you can tell whether he had dealt with explosives or not. It seemed to us, it seemed only proper that the

domestic law enforcement agencies be given the benefit of it, and we have given——

QUESTION IS PROPRIETY OF ACTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think anybody questions your capacity to do all these things. It is the responsibility, in view of what we thought was a restriction upon the CIA's operating domestically. I thought your responsibility was through the FBI. They conduct a very thoroughgoing school, as you know, with formal graduations every year, for these police departments. Whatever you would have to contribute, I would have thought would have been given through the FBI.

Mr. HELMS. Well, it has been, sir. But in the case of the—I was just going to come to the case of the New York policemen.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the only question. It is not your very sophisticated methods. It is whether or not it is proper for you to directly become the mentor of our police. Somewhat like the idea of USIA propagandizing the United States.

Mr. HELMS. Oh, no, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They make some pretty good films, but they are not supposed to be shown to the American people.

CASE OF NEW YORK POLICEMEN

Mr. HELMS. Let's take the case about the New York policemen. The first deputy commissioner of the New York police came to the agency and said that on advice of a lawyer from the Ford Foundation who was advising him—I believe the man's name was Kerstetter—that the agency has the best files and retrieval system in the U.S. Government.

CIA FILES AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM

The CHAIRMAN. The FBI does?

Mr. HELMS. The CIA does.

The CHAIRMAN. Yours is better than the FBI?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. On what system?

Mr. HELMS. I beg pardon?

Senator CASE. Best files on what?

Mr. HELMS. On files of individual names. After all, we maintain espionage files for the U.S. Government, so we have to have records of all of these individuals, and this is a system of storing the information and then being able to retrieve it and the retrieval is the more difficult part and some years ago we got into a terrible problem about this because we were having difficulty in getting the cards and files because there were so many of them. With the coordination of the IBM, we devised a brandnew system which does not exist any place else in the U.S. Government, so far as I am aware, for storing and retrieving this kind of personnel information.

The CHAIRMAN. And the FBI does not have a comparable one?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They used to pretend they did. You are supposed to call them up and they are supposed to produce a voluminous record

instantaneously on nearly everybody. I don't know whether Mr. Hoover would agree with you or not. Did he ever agree with you that yours was better than his?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall ever discussing it.

DOMESTIC RESPONSIBILITY OF CIA

The Chairman. The narrow point I want to discuss, which is raised by Mr. Koch, is what is the domestic responsibility of CIA? Are you supposed to keep records on domestic criminals and domestic—

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; these are counterespionage files, but files and records can be kept with various names and in various ways.

The Chairman. The very narrow question is should you train police officers when the FBI overtly does it. I think everybody assumes that is the agency to do this. We didn't think CIA was supposed to do this.

Mr. HELMS. I quite agree, and we don't train police officers. We conducted a seminar for these men for 3 days and told them how you set up files and how you go about the method of retrieval, and that was all that was involved.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. HELMS. That is all that was involved.

The Chairman. All right.

CHIEF OF RADIO FREE EUROPE POLISH DESK

There are one or two other questions. Do you know who the chief of the Polish desk of Radio Free Europe is and has been during the last year?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I don't.

The Chairman. Does anybody?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know his name.

The Chairman. Who in the CIA, would know about this? Who is familiar with the personnel?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know that anybody is any more because we have—

The Chairman. Who was last up until—

Mr. HELMS. Well, it was a fellow named Richardson over there.

The Chairman. What is his first name?

Mr. HELMS. John, I believe.

The Chairman. John Richardson?

Mr. HELMS. I think he is the one.

The Chairman. How do I identify him? Is that all I need?

Mr. HELMS. I would think that the sensible thing to do actually would be to ask somebody to call Mr. Karamessines and he could come up with this. He is in charge of that area and find someone, if Richardson is the correct one—

The Chairman. You wouldn't know who that was?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; I don't.

EUGENIO ROLANDO MARTINEZ

The Chairman. There have been several articles, one in the New York Times on January 14, the Washington Post on January 15, and

Washington Post on January 7. You may be familiar with these. They are all very much the same. I will read to you from the Hersh article of January 14, 1973, and I will put it in the record.

"One member of the Watergate team, Eugenio Rolando Martinez, was an active employee of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of the break-in and kept a diary. He was stricken from the CIA's payroll within a day of his arrest and the diary was subsequently found by Federal investigators in the trunk of his car parked at Miami International Airport."

Do you know who Mr. Eugenio Rolando Martinez is?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know him personally, sir. Mr. Martinez was never an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. He was on a retainer of \$100 a month at that time, seen occasionally by a representative of the Agency. His role was simply to identify to us, from those legal and illegal immigrants from Cuba, those individuals whom he thought might be of interest for informational purposes. He simply was to identify them and we took it from there. It was a very loose kind of arrangement in which he reported in from time to time. And it is indeed true as soon as it was found out he was involved in the Watergate thing we simply turned him off and have not talked to him since.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you describe him again? He was not an employee but on a retainer? What do you call him, a consultant or what?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; in this case I think you can say that this was a fiduciary relationship, but he was not an employee on the rolls of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you describe it? He was employed to provide and give services?

Mr. HELMS. Let me step back just a minute so we are talking about the same thing. When we refer to a CIA employee, we refer to those who are actually hired by the Central Intelligence Agency or on our rolls in Langley and are considered to be employees of the Government Agency.

Then in doing our work in various parts of the world we are in contact with various people with whom we set up a fiduciary relationship, either for purposes of espionage or whatever the case may be. So there is a distinction between a man who actually is on the payroll there and is directly under my control and those that form the network that we run in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. It is somewhat like this committee. We have what you call consultants whom we pay so much a day or week to do certain things, but, they are not on the regular rolls of the committee. Is that true?

Mr. HELMS. That is not a bad analogy.

The CHAIRMAN. This is what I meant when I said we have those kind of people.

That clarifies his relationship and you did cut it off as soon as you heard about the break-in.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

FELIPE DE DIEGO

The CHAIRMAN. What about Felipe De Diego? Do you know him?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a similar relationship?
Mr. HELMS. No.

REINALDO PICO

The CHAIRMAN. Did a man named Reinaldo Pico?
Mr. HELMS. No.
The CHAIRMAN. These are all mentioned in the same story.
Mr. HELMS. Yes; I realize that.
The CHAIRMAN. You are probably familiar with them.
Mr. HELMS. I am not entirely, sir, because I think I may have been away at the time that particular article came out.

BERNARD L. BARKER

The CHAIRMAN. De Diego, 43, is a real estate salesman who was employed in the Miami real estate office of Bernard L. Barker, one of the Watergate defendants.

Was Mr. Barker ever an employee or a consultant?

Mr. HELMS. During the Bay of Pigs he was one of the Cuban derivatives who was involved in that operation and it is my recollection that all lines with him on the part of the Agency were eliminated some time in the middle sixties. As a matter of fact, we found out he was involved in certain gambling and criminal elements and we didn't like the cut of his jib and we cut him off.

The CHAIRMAN. So that is some time in the middle sixties.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

FRANK STURGIS

The CHAIRMAN. And Frank Sturgis, was he an employee?

Mr. HELMS. Never.

The CHAIRMAN. In any capacity?

Mr. HELMS. I am sure of that.

VIRGILIO R. GONZALES

The CHAIRMAN. Did I mention Virgilio R. Gonzales?

Mr. HELMS. You didn't, but he was not either.

The CHAIRMAN. He has never been in a similar position?

Mr. HELMS. No.

JAMES W. M'CORD

The CHAIRMAN. And James W. McCord?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, he was actually an employee of the Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Up until when?

Mr. HELMS. Up until 2 years, 2 or 3 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. But since then he has had no relationship?

Mr. HELMS. None whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. He hasn't been on a retainer?

Mr. HELMS. Of any kind.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody can interrupt.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why did he leave the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Retired, sir. He had served his time and he just left of his own free will and on his retirement.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did he get a pension when he retired?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. HELMS. Regular civil service retirement. It is no special pension.

The CHAIRMAN. How long had he served?

Mr. HELMS. Many years. I think he must have been there 15 or 20 years.

E. HOWARD HUNT

The CHAIRMAN. Was E. Howard Hunt, Jr., an employee?

Mr. HELMS. He also had been an employee of the Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. In a similar situation?

Mr. HELMS. He also, but my recollection is that he resigned rather than retired. I am not sure exactly. It was one or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. About when?

Mr. HELMS. About 2, 2½ years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. He had no relationship to the CIA since then?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

G. GORDON LIDDY

The CHAIRMAN. What is G. Gordon Liddy's relationship with the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Never?

Mr. HELMS. Never under any circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. He never has been. I see.

Mr. HELMS. Never.

MR. ST. GEORGE AND MR. STURGIS

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a Mr. St. George? Are you familiar with him?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I don't know him.

The CHAIRMAN. The article says, "Mr. St. George and Mr. Sturgis are controversial figures in their own circles, where they have mixed reputations."

Mr. St. George has never been an employee of the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Not to my knowledge, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No one other than the first man we just mentioned—

Mr. HELMS. Martinez.

MARTINEZ ONLY CIA EMPLOYEE INVOLVED IN WATERGATE

The CHAIRMAN. Martinez. No one in the employ of the CIA in any capacity was involved in the Watergate other than Martinez.

Mr. HELMS. That is a correct statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the New York Times, Jan. 14, 1973]

4 WATERGATE DEFENDANTS REPORTED STILL BEING PAID

(By Seymour M. Hersh)

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13.—At least four of the five men arrested last June in the Watergate raid are still being paid by persons as yet unnamed, according to sources close to the case.

One of the defendants, Frank A. Sturgis, acknowledged that payments continued after his arrest but also said that his funds had been sharply reduced in the last few months. Another closely involved source said that payments to the four men now ranged from \$400 a month up.

Mr. Sturgis mentioned his cutback in funds during a meeting in Miami nearly two weeks ago, before the start of the trial, now under way, in which he and six others are accused of attempting to plant eavesdropping devices in the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate complex here.

The trial has been recessed until Monday amid indications that some of the defendants may try to plead guilty. One defendant, E. Howard Hunt Jr., already has.

Mr. Sturgis's statements on the financial arrangement of the arrested group were corroborated later by a source close to the defense.

The conversation with Mr. Sturgis was one in a series by The New York Times with Federal investigators, political figures and defense lawyers, all familiar with various aspects of the Watergate case.

MAJOR POINTS LISTED

Among other points made by more than one of those interviewed were the following:

High officials of the Committee for the Re-election of the President have acknowledged privately that they are unable to account for \$900,000 in cash raised for President Nixon's 1972 campaign—far more than the \$235,000 mentioned in court as the cost of the activities of the Watergate group.

A Nixon supporter working in the Democratic Headquarters, apparently either recruited or infiltrated by the intelligence team, taped open the latches on the doors leading to the basement of the Watergate offices, allowing the five men to enter the building.

One member of the Watergate team, Eugenio Rolando Martinez, was an active employe of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of the break in and kept a diary. He was stricken from the CIA's payroll within a day of his arrest and the diary was subsequently found by Federal Investigators in the trunk of his car parked at Miami International Airport.

These same sources provided, in interviews over the last two months, further details of the intelligence operations that were described in court this week by Earl J. Silbert, the chief Assistant United States Attorney who is prosecuting the case.

The Times sources said, for example, that the Republicans had planted an undercover agent in the campaign staffs of Senator Edmund S. Muskie and Senator George McGovern, the two leading candidates for the Democratic Presidential nomination.

Mr. Silbert told the court that the Republican team had recruited Thomas J. Gregory, a 20-year-old Utah student, as a spy, first on the Muskie staff and then on the McGovern staff.

The New York Times information was obtained after it was learned two months ago that Andrew St. George, a free lance writer with close connections with anti-Castroites in Miami was circulating an outline to New York publishing houses of what he described as the experiences of Mr. Sturgis.

ALLEGATIONS CHECKED

In checking on the allegations in the book outline, The Times talked on a number of occasions with its author, Mr. St. George, and with Mr. Sturgis.

Their statements were subsequently checked, wherever possible, with others who might have knowledge of the events.

Some of the allegations were corroborated in these independent checks. Some allegations were denied. Still others were neither corroborated nor denied.

One allegation in the St. George outline was that the bugging had extended to Democratic Senators' offices on Capitol Hill, and that former Attorney General John N. Mitchell had been kept informed of the intelligence group's activities. This allegation was supported by Mr. Sturgis but not independently corroborated by other sources.

Sources were reluctant to talk about specific aspects of the intelligence operation because the trial judge, Chief Judge John J. Sirica, had forbidden those concerned with the trial to discuss the case publicly.

REPUBLICAN AIDE REPLIES

DeVan L. Shumway, director of public affairs for the Republican campaign committee, told that this report would appear in *The Times*, described the allegations in connection with the committee as "outrageously false and preposterous."

Mr. Shumway's statement added:

"If *The Times* chooses to publish these unsupported statements, it will be a serious act of journalistic recklessness and irresponsibility. Mr. John Mitchell has authorized me to say that he joins fully in this statement."

The campaign press aide was asked specifically to respond to the allegation that the Republicans were unable to account for more money than previously known, to the assertion that Mr. Mitchell knew more than has been disclosed about the extent of the political intelligence activities and to the allegation that some funds—initially from the Republicans—were still being used to pay the Watergate defendants.

Mr. St. George signed a contract last month with Harpers' Magazine Press for a book based on Mr. Sturgis's life experiences, including his activities for the political intelligence team. Mr. St. George has also negotiated a contract with the National Broadcasting Company calling upon the Watergate defendant to provide in a television interview a first-hand account of the intelligence operation. Mr. Sturgis said that the contract was for \$8,000.

A spokesman for Harper & Row, which is affiliated with Harpers' Magazine Press, confirmed that a contract had been signed with Mr. St. George for what was termed "under \$5,000." The work is tentatively titled "Inside Watergate," the official said.

An official at N.B.C. also acknowledged that a contract with Mr. Sturgis was signed early this month but said that less than \$8,000 was involved.

Mr. St. George was given a "finder's fee" of about \$1,000 for delivering Mr. Sturgis to the network, the official said. The contract calls for Mr. Sturgis to be interviewed on the network's "First Tuesday" monthly news show, after the trial.

Both Mr. St. George and Mr. Sturgis are controversial figures in their own circles where they have mixed reputations. While some praise Mr. St. George's intelligence and his passionate devotion to his work, others describe him as a journalist who sometimes confuses fact and fantasy.

While there are many in the Miami area who have denounced Mr. Sturgis as a fabricator, there are obviously those who thought him reliable enough to join the intelligence team.

Mr. St. George about 45 years old, lives in Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., with his wife and two children. He has written and reported about the anti-Castro Cuban community in Miami since the late nineteen-fifties. Mr. St. George talks constantly about Fidel Castro, the Premier of Cuba.

Once a free-lance photographer who worked for *Life* magazine, Mr. St. George became—as did Mr. Sturgis—a friend of Mr. Castro in the early days of the revolution. He won two awards in 1959 for his exclusive photographs of the Cuban leaders.

Over the next few years, however, his fortunes waned, and he became involved in a number of abortive projects—including an alleged attempt by a Cuban exile group to invade Haiti. He sold his account as exclusive television property to the Columbia Broadcasting Company in 1967. The invasion never took place.

Mr. St. George's contacts in Latin America apparently remained firm during these years, however, and enabled him to come up with a world journalistic beat in 1968—the diaries of the slain revolutionary, Ernesto Che Guevara.

HAS NO STEADY JOB

Mr. Sturgis, 48, is a native of Norfolk, Va. He has no steady job but has been heavily involved in anti-Castro, anti-Communist activities since the Cuban revolution. Mr. Sturgis contended in a recent meeting that he had once served as a Vice Chief of Staff for the Cuban Air Force under Mr. Castro. He said that he fell out with Mr. Castro over the Premier's leftward drift.

Since the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, for which Mr. Sturgis says that he helped to train Cuban guerrillas in Guatemala, he has been linked to a number of highly publicized exploits, including an airborne propaganda leaflet raid in 1962 over Cuba that he later said during a court hearing never took place.

Mr. Sturgis was arrested and jailed a few years later, for the alleged hijacking off the coast of Mexico of a ship that he said he planned to use for a commando raid on Cuba.

Mr. Sturgis said that he had never seen the outline for the book that Mr. St. George presented to the New York publishers. But he said that there had been many meetings between them, and that he knew that Mr. St. George was preparing a book about him.

In the outline, Mr. Sturgis is depicted as joining the political surveillance group in the late summer of 1971 and working directly for Hunt, a former Central Intelligence Agency official who was then serving as a consultant to the White House on narcotics traffic.

Hunt is said by the prosecutor to have recruited some members of the political intelligence team.

A DRUG INVESTIGATION

Mr. St. George's book outline also asserted that Mr. Sturgis worked for months under Hunt's direction in an undercover investigation of alleged illicit drug traffic in Mexico, Panama and Paraguay. He was then recalled to Washington, according to the outline, where he began assisting Hunt in an extensive investigation into the background and activities of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, with special emphasis on the death of a young woman in an automobile accident at Chappaquiddick, Mass.

The outline quotes Mr. Sturgis as saying that he joined the political surveillance operation, known as S.O.G., or Special Operations Group, sometime in early 1972.

The New York Times has been told by a source close to the defense that Mr. Sturgis gave basically the same account of his recruitment and of the drug investigation to one of the Watergate defense lawyers. The Times has also been told that at the time of his arrest, Mr. Sturgis was carrying a false passport and other false documents that he believed had been prepared by the C.I.A. at Hunt's request.

Hunt had served for many years as a counter-intelligence expert for the agency and was said by sources close to the defense to have often worked with his wife, Dorothy, while on operations for the agency.

Mrs. Hunt, a former employe of the Spanish Embassy here, was killed in the crash Dec. 8 of an airliner in Chicago. She was later found to have been carrying \$10,000 in cash and to have \$200,000 worth of flight insurance.

HIGH-RISK OPERATION

Counter-intelligence is one of the most clandestine and high-risk operations of the Central Intelligence Agency and involves the close observation of men and women said to be agents in the United States of the Soviet Union and other nations.

In another interview, a legal source with close connections to the financial arrangements inside the Committee to Re-elect the President reported that Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., the campaign treasurer who resigned shortly after the Watergate break-in, has said that the committee cannot account for \$900,000 in cash contributions.

"That's the amount he says the books just won't jibe with," the source said. This account was supported by a source close to the defense.

The \$900,000 is far greater than previous estimates of the cash available for a Republican fund that the prosecution contends was involved in intelligence

work. Assistant United States Attorney Silbert, in his statement to the court this week, said that \$235,000—most of it apparently in \$100 bills—had been given by Republican officials to George Gordon Liddy for the intelligence operation, although his investigators could account for only \$50,000 of it.

Mr. Sloan, a pending witness in the Watergate trial, said that he was unable to discuss any aspect of the case in view of the court's ban on outside discussion.

In corroborating Mr. Sturgis's statement that four of the five men seized in the Watergate were still being paid, a source close to the defense said that the payments had been made without interruption since the arrests.

"They're not getting big money," said another source, who complained that the persons responsible for "parceling it out" were stingy.

In addition to Mr. Sturgis and Mr. Martinez, the other men arrested at the Watergate are James W. McCord Jr. of suburban Washington, a former F.B.I. and C.I.A. agent who was working as a security official for both the Republican National Committee and the Committee to Re-elect the President, and two Miami men—Bernard L. Barker and Virgilio R. Gonzales.

All had been active in anti-Castro and anti-Communist activities in Florida since the Cuban revolution.

FUND CUTBACK REPORTED

Mr. Sturgis indicated during a meeting that he was angry because of a cutback in funds, and because of an insistence on the part of those dispensing the money that he deal through Mr. Barker—known as "Macho" to the Watergate intelligence team.

The four defendants from the Miami area—Mr. Barker, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Sturgis and Mr. Gonzales—are said to be receiving monthly cash payments of \$400 and up. None of those interviewed knew whether a similar financial arrangement had been worked out for the fifth defendant, Mr. McCord.

While he has cited no evidence, Mr. Sturgis apparently believes that the funds are coming, in part, from accounts activated by the still-operating Committee to Re-elect the President through a variety of intermediaries.

Other money, said by Mr. Sturgis to come from right wing businesses and individuals, is also reportedly available.

Another source—not a defendant—who is receiving cash payments said in an interview that the men being paid did not know who was responsible for putting up the money and, if they did know, would not say.

"The sources say if you're going to embarrass us, you won't get a dime," this man said. "In that sense, we have to be very, very sensitive."

Another source, who knows the defendants, complained about the limited amount of cash that he said was being given to the Miami men and said that those responsible were "not doing what they should be doing."

"Everything is supersecret," he said. "All the money has to go through several washings before we get it. They're afraid that the word might get back."

THE "BIG PARANOIA"

"Their big paranoia is that somewhere along the line it would be found out that they were feeding money to us."

At least one cash payment was reportedly made by Mr. Barker to Henry B. Rothblatt of New York, the attorney for four of the five Watergate defendants. Mr. Rothblatt refused, in an interview, to discuss the source of his "fee," as he put it.

Federal investigators with detailed knowledge of the case suggested in subsequent interviews that any traceable connection between the Republican re-election committee and the Watergate defendants had been severed, and funds—even if they had stemmed from cash accounts once in the control of the Republicans—had long since passed into the control of those unknown men still paying the Watergate group.

According to conversations with Mr. St. George and Mr. Sturgis and substantiated by another source close to the defendants, the Watergate break-in followed this scenario:

The plan for the entry was simple. An inside man, who was said to be on both the Democratic and Republican payrolls, was to tape a number of door latches on the bottom, or basement, level of the building so the intruders could gain quick entry. Once inside, they were to be aided by keys made by Mr. Gonzales, a locksmith.

He had made casts of at least one lock in the sixth-floor area of the Democratic National Committee offices during an earlier illegal entry. The Washington police disclosed that they had found a key to the Democrats' office hidden in an ashtray by an elevator on the sixth floor and theorized that an insider had placed it there.

The inside man did his job, but an alert guard noted the tape and pulled it off. The Watergate five retaped the doors. One source asked about this detail, said that it was Mr. McCord who decided to go ahead with the entry, although the four others believed that the mission had been compromised.

When the suspicious guard returned a few moments later to the basement level of the building to double-check the doors, he found them retaped and telephoned the police. Meanwhile the five men had begun their operations inside the Democratic offices.

In an interview with The Los Angeles Times, Alfred C. Baldwin Jr., a former F.B.I. agent who was working with the political intelligence team, said that he had been assigned as a lookout at the motel across the street from the Watergate early June 17.

He saw the police pull up, he said, and relayed a warning to one of the security men. Mr. Baldwin said that he was then told that his contact was unable to reach the men on the sixth floor. The police arrived about 15 minutes after they had been summoned by the guard.

At this point, another factor came into prominence. Mr. Barker's reputation for being stingy.

Mr. Barker had served as a paymaster for the C.I.A. during the Bay of Pigs invasion and was said to be proud of his reputation for being careful with money. He was said to walk out of restaurants if the menu seemed too expensive.

He was also said to be a patron of an all-night 15-cent hamburger stand in Miami. On the night of the Watergate break-in, he boasted that he had paid only 39 cents for the tape used to secure the door latches.

SAVED ON BATTERIES

Once the men had gained access to the Watergate complex without, they believed, being spotted, Mr. Barker turned off the batteries on his walkie-talkie. He explained later that he did it "to save the batteries." He thus did not hear Mr. Baldwin's advance warning.

Mr. Barker's alleged deficiencies as an "operative" that night still rankle Mr. Sturgis, who when interviewed referred repeatedly to his colleague, now a Miami real estate man, as "that idiot."

One of the bizarre aspects of the case is the C.I.A. connection of those involved. The name for the political operations conducted by Hunt—Special Operations Group—is identical with that given by the C.I.A.'s clandestine services—the so-called "dirty tricks" department—to its covert paramilitary operations.

In addition, nearly all of the seven indicted men had some connection with the C.I.A., either as an agent or as a contract employee hired for specific operations.

In his outline, Mr. St. George alleged that Mr. Martinez was still on the C.I.A. payroll at the time of the Watergate break-in, a statement that was subsequently confirmed by Federal sources. Officials also confirmed that a diary kept by Mr. Martinez—who is known as "El Practico" to his colleagues—had been found by F.B.I. agents and was in the Government's possession.

NOT ON WITNESS LIST

Mr. Sturgis indicated that he thought much potentially damaging information about his group's extensive operations had been provided to the Government both by the Martinez diary and by Felipe De Diego, a sixth member of the Watergate group who was granted partial immunity by the prosecution after his interrogation last year by the F.B.I. in Miami.

Mr. De Diego is known to have stayed at the Watergate Hotel on three occasions up to the day of the break-in. The prosecution's witness list, made available on the first day of trial last Monday, did not include Mr. De Diego.

Allegations in the St. George outline about wider bugging than that mentioned in the Watergate indictment were corroborated in general by Mr. Sturgis, but he refused to discuss any specifics.

"I'm not going to be a stoolie," he said. "If I'd wanted to have done something and make some money, I would have gone to McGovern."

The Times was unable to find any independent confirmation for the allegations. However, the prosecutor, Mr. Silbert, said in court that the intelligence team made

two attempts to plant a listening device in the McGovern headquarters but was unable to do so. He did not mention any attempt to bug any other Senator or Representative.

The only public complaints about telephone service on Capitol Hill since the Watergate break-in came from Representative Bella S. Abzug, Democrat of Manhattan, and Senator Muskie.

Another source close to the four other Watergate defendants acknowledged that in a series of interviews the activities of the intelligence team had been more expensive than was previously known, but he emphatically denied any bugging efforts other than the eavesdropping on the Watergate headquarters.

He described the St. George account in the book outline as "absolutely absurd."

"They never got to tap McGovern," this source went on "They tried but blew it, and it didn't work out." The attempt allegedly took place after Senator McGovern's victory in the Wisconsin primary in early April, the source said.

In his Los Angeles Times interview, Mr. Baldwin told of an attempt to bug a McGovern campaign office near the Capitol.

SECURITY FOR CONVENTION

Another source, who said that he had heard full accounts of the political intelligence operations from the defendants, asserted that extensive surveillance operations involving Senators Muskie and McGovern—both Presidential aspirants—had been carried out in addition to the placing of informers in each man's campaign offices.

The source also said that another of Mr. Sturgis's assertions—that he had traveled to California and other places, such as Atlanta, on behalf of the Republicans—was accurate. But he refused to say why the trips to the West Coast and elsewhere had been authorized.

The prosecution in the Watergate trial said that the group had been interested in making the Republican convention hall in San Diego secure. The convention was eventually moved to Miami Beach.

There were indications from a number of sources, including Mr. Sturgis, that many of the intelligence group's operations were prompted by a belief that the Cuban Government was attempting to contribute cash—through various conduits—to the McGovern campaign in return for a promise of a liberalized party platform on Cuban-United States relations.

These operations, the sources said, seemed to have no immediate connection with the Republican campaign committee.

Surveillance of political opponents, and even placing informers among them, is not necessarily illegal and has been a standard operating technique in many political campaigns.

Mr. Silbert told the court this week that Mr. Liddy, a former White House aide and re-election campaign counsel, had been placed in charge of various intelligence activities after a meeting with Jeb S. Magruder, a former Justice Department official who was then deputy director of the committee.

The prosecutor did not mention Mr. Mitchell in his opening remarks to the jury, and he was not listed as a prosecution witness although he testified before the grand jury investigating the case last year.

The prosecutor also did not mention any White House official as being responsible for the Watergate break-in.

The St. George book outline said that Mr. Mitchell had been informed of the operation. Subsequently, Mr. Sturgis stated in a conversation his belief that Mr. Mitchell had a role in the operation, saying, "Mitchell kept pushing and pushing" the Watergate team. But he offered no evidence for his belief, and no other source checked by The Times would confirm the report.

"IN CHARGE OF OPERATIONS"

Mr. Liddy, a White House aide who later became counsel to the re-election committee, was described by Mr. St. George in the book outline as being "in charge of operations on a day-to-day basis."

"He was the chief control officer and arranged all payments of money," Mr. St. George said.

Mr. Liddy was dismissed by the Republican committee after refusing to answer questions asked by F.B.I. agents about the Watergate affair.

The prosecutor, Mr. Silbert, told the court that Mr. Liddy and Hunt had been given the job of mounting an intelligence operation for the committee.

As for the operations group itself, Mr. Sturgis confirmed a report that duties had been refined to the point where Mr. McCord was responsible for electronic eavesdropping, Mr. Sturgis was responsible for photographing documents, Mr. Gonzales was utilized as a locksmith and Mr. Martinez and Mr. Barker were responsible for security.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that there is anything else on this. Does anybody else have any questions on this?

HEROIN PRODUCTION IN GOLDEN TRIANGLE

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question of Mr. Helms, if he would be prepared to answer, on a different subject.

The CHAIRMAN. We are coming to the other one.

Senator JAVITS. It is really irrelevant and I am going to go in a minute.

Mr. Helms, could you tell us anything about the situation surrounding this so-called golden triangle of Laos, Thailand, and Burma in respect of the production of heroin. We are in real trouble there. We tried to dam the flow in Turkey and we apparently are shooting at the wrong target. We are now told that 70 percent of the heroin production of the world, and a minimum of a third of what gets into this country comes out of this outlaw territory.

Mr. HELMS. Senator Javits, I don't think those percentages are correct, you know. I don't know exactly what the right ones are and I realize honest men disagree and the figures are hard to get, but I just don't believe those figures about the golden triangle.

Senator JAVITS. You don't.

Mr. HELMS. Certainly they produce opium up there and it is a most difficult place to police or get information in because it is controlled by brigands and outlaws and ragtag members of a former Chinese army, and so forth, but I think it has been really quite significantly exaggerated, the effect that it has had on the drug traffic in the United States, quite frankly.

Senator JAVITS. You do. Is there any way that we could test it out, run it through something to find out where we stand?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has the best estimates on this, and all the information that we have been able to collect we have turned over to them.

Senator JAVITS. You have.

Mr. HELMS. And they are the kind of repository for us.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

ACTIVITIES OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION OFFICES

Senator CASE. The question has been raised if you are not training police on a regular basis what do your separate domestic operations division offices do in the headquarters downtown. You also have a number of others around the country.

What do they do?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, that is what we call the domestic contact service. You will recall that back even as far as World War II when Americans returned from overseas, from trips they had taken for one purpose or another, they were interviewed by Army intelligence, Navy

intelligence, by State Department officers, and others. After the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, this business of interviewing American travelers was vested in one place, that was domestic contact service. In other words, Army intelligence was taken out of it; Navy intelligence was and State Department was. And it was agreed to have this done by this domestic contact service of the Agency as an item of common concern for the whole Government so there was only one office in these cities that was approaching people for this kind of information. It is simply a device whereby if the President of some steel company in New York travels to the Soviet Union and returns and has seen certain metallurgical plants in the Soviet Union it is of interest to this Government to know how big those plants are, what they do, and all the rest of it. And individuals from this office who go to see that gentleman and interview him about it. There is no pressure involved. There is no payment of money. There is no effort to twist anybody's arm. We simply are giving them an opportunity as patriotic Americans to say what they know about this.

OPERATIONS AMONG EMIGRE GROUPS

Senator CASE. Another activity at least did exist and I wonder if it still does, the operation of your agents among European emigre groups in this country.

Mr. HELMS. No, sir that has been dropped.

Senator CASE. That was the *Juri Raus* case. There was a lawsuit about that.

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Senator CASE. In which this activity, I think, was brought out.

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Senator CASE. Do you have other groups beyond the Eastern European ones where these things have operated, Cubans, for instance?

Mr. HELMS. I think in the past we have done with some Poles and Cubans and so forth. That has been pretty well dropped off so far as I know.

Senator CASE. China, Vietnam and the Middle East?

Mr. HELMS. No.

PEOPLE WHO GO TO HANOI

Senator CASE. What about some of our far out boys who go out to Hanoi, you know, the various people who have made a rather active shuttle operation between here and Hanoi for the past 15 or 20 years, some more than others, of course. Do you operate in that area?

Mr. HELMS. I must say, sir, I can't honestly say that many of them have been very cooperative.

Senator CASE. But surveillance of them in this country is not your function?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

SIZE OF DOMESTIC ACTIVITY

Senator CASE. Then generally this kind of domestic activity is not very, very, very big now, is it?

Mr. HELMS. Oh, no, sir; and this police training thing I think has been blown out of all proportion. It was simply an effort and, frankly—

Senator CASE. You wouldn't know that unless you had a chance to tell us.

Mr. HELMS. You are talking to the right individual, sir, because I was the one who thought this would be helpful to these people.

You know, this can be stopped today without the slightest difficulty at all, but somehow or other, under the Omnibus Crime Control Act, when we read this, it seemed to us that the desire was to have the utmost possible collaboration among all individuals that could contribute to law enforcement.

WITHDRAWAL OF FBI LIAISON OFFICER FROM FBI

Senator CASE. I so fully agree with that I want to ask you something on the reverse of this thing. It was gossip for some time, I guess never denied really, that Mr. Hoover got annoyed with the CIA and broke off relationships with it. Is that true?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, what happened—

Senator CASE. What did happen and did that mean that the information, the knowledge, the expertise, the sophistication the chairman spoke of, were no longer available to the FBI?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; what happened was this: Mr. Chairman, may I have your indulgence for a moment to explain this because I can't do it in one sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. You are the one who said you were in a hurry to get away; so you had better keep it short for your own sake.

Mr. HELMS. I will do my best. For many years the FBI has had what they referred to as liaison officers who have worked in the State Department, in the Pentagon, in the CIA, and in various other agencies of Government. In other words, an individual, who we will say is John, each day would go from the FBI to this particular place, in this case the CIA, and do whatever business there there is to be done. Mr. Hoover always "liased" on the other fellow's playing field; nobody "liased" down on his playing field. He became irritated with me because I would not oblige a member of the Agency to inform him which one of his agents in Denver, Colo., had given our man some information. I saw no reason to put my fellow in this position. Mr. Hoover could very well have investigated his own office and asked his own employees who had talked to a fellow from the CIA, but in any event he declined to do it and I stood my ground, at which point apparently in a fit of pique he simply said, "Well, my liaison officer isn't coming over to the CIA any more."

But we continued to handle all this information by mail. Then gradually it broke down pretty rapidly, and although the fellow never came over officially holding his forelock each day, the conduct of business between the two agencies went on as they had before.

And nowadays, with Mr. Gray, there is absolutely no problem at all. As a matter of fact, I was yesterday given a farewell lunch by the Director of the FBI which is simply new in history.

CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Senator CASE. Your relationship with all Government agencies then is—

Mr. HELMS. I believe it to be good, sir.

Senator CASE. Is good and active?
Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S 1963 MEMORANDUM TO USIA DIRECTOR

Senator CASE. There was a memorandum given to me, which is a memorandum to the USIA Director in 1963 from President Kennedy directing that the USIA coordinate with the CIA. It wasn't strange that Mr. Keogh didn't know about that when he was here. He wasn't active in it. It is a general broad policy of the USIA and its activities.

Mr. HELMS. Well, we have always coordinated with them, sir; within my memory. It has been largely in the field of policies having to do with propaganda and things of this sort. In other words, let me put this in a simple frame of reference, that if the USIA has any business with the CIA and vice versa we have a well-established liaison channel to conduct the business.

Senator CASE. That would be a reasonable thing.

This interests me, not so much just for the matter of the relationship between the USIA and the CIA but the frankness and the clarity with which the propaganda operation of USIA is stated here. I think it would be much better if we talked about it openly in these terms and not covertly. That is to say, the object of this agency is to encourage constructive public support for a global peaceful world and to identify the United States as a strong democratic nation qualified for leadership in world affairs, and must head off attempts to frustrate the efforts of the United States. This is to be a Government-wide operation except for the Defense Department, which makes a lot of sense, but this isn't the namby-pamby public opinion of this outfit which is supposed to operate here in the ether and I wish they would be more frank about everything, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

CIA INTERPRETATION OF OMNIBUS CRIME BILL QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. The thing that bothers me, though, is that the basic law, the National Security Act, says "the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." That is pretty clear.

Mr. Maury, I take it you argue from the fact that later in the omnibus crime bill the very general language regarding the use of other civilian or military agencies and instrumentalities gives you a hunting license to do anything you would like, overriding the prior specific language. I don't believe the Congress had in mind when they passed the omnibus crime bill that it would include the CIA, because every one had assumed CIA did not operate domestically.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is a false argument.

Mr. HELMS. If I may humbly say so, I think that you drive this a bit too far. We have never enforced any laws. We have never arrested anybody. We have never done anything that infringes on this prohibition against subpoena powers and law enforcement. These were simply techniques we have turned over to these people.

NECESSITY OF KEEPING DEMARCATION LINES STRAIGHT

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. The point is keeping these lines straight. It is a little like the argument we have between the executive and the legislature. It isn't exactly analogous, but the Johnson administration argued that because Congress passed aid programs for Southeast Asia it created a climate in which the engagement in that war and defending South Vietnam was acceptable in place of a declaration of war. This was one of the many arguments. They had a lot of them, but they said the aid program showed an approval of their policy in South Vietnam.

I had always thought and understood that CIA did not have anything to do with police. If you start in teaching them and becoming their patron, and you are much more sophisticated and better than they are, they soon become part of your organization. I don't think that has happened, but I don't think it ought to happen either and I don't think you ought to go down that line.

Mr. HELMS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that if it is the desire of this committee or of any Senator that this be entirely stopped, I will simply report this to the new Director and, I imagine, it will be stopped immediately. We get nothing for this.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree, except for the adulation and admiration of the people with whom you deal.

It is a little like the Pentagon. They go to great trouble to cultivate all the leaders in every community. This is an ongoing program. They organize a meeting of all the prominent citizens of my State and others, take them out, show them the *Forrestal* and give them the red carpet treatment. These citizens all come back and write their Senators about what a wonderful organization the Navy is. You know that has been going on for 20 years. It is almost impossible to do anything about their appropriation for anything else they want because they have built a constituency, and you could build one too. I don't think it is a good idea to fuzz up those demarcations. The FBI ought to be enough.

There was one other thing I forgot a moment ago. The Polish man was writing to his friends here from Munich, asking them to be sure in both platforms there would be a statement advocating the retention of Radio Free Europe. He says in one letter: "Furthermore one should exert force on the American Polonia"—by that they mean the American Polish constituency—"and on wide masses of American people to prevent Mr. Case, whose term in office ends on January 3, 1973, from being reelected to the Senate. The stupidity of Ministers Fulbright and Case should be implanted in American public opinion as extensively as possible. Some people tend to overlook the danger of the deceiving gestures of the regime toward Polonia"—that is the Polish Government toward the American Poles—"and Mr. Fulbright is ready to render services to that regime in the first place."

This goes on and on. It is very contrary to your view that all they are interested in is spreading information.

Mr. HELMS. When was that letter written, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. There are three letters here. I have them here both in Polish and in English. The one I read from is dated September

29. This is just before the election in 1972. It is written from Radio Free Europe to one of Senator Percy's Polonia constituency in Chicago. There is much more to it, but it clearly evidences that they are not interested in education. They are not interested in truth.

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I can only say we had no control over that organization whatever well over the last year and this did not occur during my watch.

The CHAIRMAN. These people are all holdovers. They are largely the same people you had all these years; they were trained by you.

Mr. HELMS. I don't know whether this gentleman was there or not.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess I can find out from Mr. Richardson, but it reminded me of this same thing, this fuzzing up the functions and opportunities for becoming involved in other things.

I would hate to see the CIA become involved in domestic controversy and involved in any of these training programs.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I have done my level best during my period as Director to avoid just exactly that. I couldn't be more keenly aware of it.

The CHAIRMAN. But, Mr. Maury's letter, I mean, talking about briefing and so on when you really are training them. It ought to be clear. If the Congress wants you to do it, all right. I just think that they ought not to want to do it because it is too big an agency.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions when my turn comes around.

The CHAIRMAN. I am through with this subject.

Senator PERCY. I have further questions on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

CIA ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

Senator PERCY. I think we must judge this in today's context. Five years ago this wouldn't have caused the concern that it does now. We can't overlook the fact that Watergate has created special interest in intelligence and bugging and so forth. I can say that when it was discovered in Chicago that the Army was gathering intelligence on civilians, following people, and covering public meetings at which prominent persons such as Senator Stevenson were present, there were expressions of outrage from members of Congress, the general public, and the press. This is the content in which all this falls; so I would like to ask first if you believe in the 1947 statute which states that the CIA shall have no police, law enforcement, or internal security functions. Do you believe in the underlying basis for that law?

Mr. HELMS. I believe in that 100 percent.

Senator PERCY. I can see that there is some conflict with the crime in the streets law, which says national assistance shall be provided. But I would think that whatever technology CIA has in this field would also be available to the FBI, and I would strongly recommend that you pass on to your successor at the Agency the feeling that I would much sooner see this done through the FBI, so the CIA really has no direct relationships of that type in briefing sessions or training sessions, because once getting started in such a program it could grow.

Mr. HELMS. Senator Percy, I will convey that to the new Director and I am sure he will abide by it. We have no desire whatever to get

into these things, and now I have heard the desires of this committee, I will certainly convey it and I would rely on the —

Senator SYMINGTON. If the Senator would yield, I would support the position of the Senator from Illinois.

Senator PERCY. Just for the clarity of the record, as I understand your testimony, this was a gratuitous offer on your part to law enforcement officials, but I would like to ask whether at any time any request was made of the Agency or of you personally by anyone else in the Federal Government for this kind of service?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Senator PERCY. So it was a gesture on your part?

Mr. HELMS. And I am the one who did it. You are talking to the right man.

Senator PERCY. So such assistance can be provided more appropriately by the FBI, or just as well, and there will be no problem of public policy involved.

I want to see the name of the CIA protected, and I want to prevent this small program from growing into something much larger. It should be cut off cleanly and sharply. The statute of 1947 must be the guideline, and certainly there is no compulsion from Members of Congress to interpret the Crime in the Streets Act as saying that every agency, including the CIA, should be involved.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, I have the message.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, that finishes my questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything more on this?

Senator SYMINGTON. Not on this.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to go on to the multinational?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

APRIL 1947 TESTIMONY CONCERNING CIA PURPOSES

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Helms, as you know, Mr. Acheson wrote a book once called "Present at the Creation." I was in the Pentagon at the time your Agency was created.

Mr. Forrestal said before the House in April of 1947, "The purposes of the Central Intelligence Authority are limited definitely to purposes outside of this country except the collation of information gathered by Government agencies."

Based on what Senator Percy just said, you agree that is your mission, correct?

Mr. HELMS. I do, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then, Congressman Brown said, "Is that stated in the law?"

Mr. Forrestal said, "It is not."

Congressman Brown, "Then that could be changed in 2 minutes and have the action within the United States instead of without, is that correct?"

Mr. Forrestal said, "He could only do so with the President's direct and specific approval."

Then Congressman Brown said, "I know, but even then it could be done without violation of law by the President or somebody who might write the order for him and get his approval and without the knowledge and consent or direction of the Congress."

"Do you think it would be wise for the Congress of the United States to at least fix some limitation on what the power of this individual might be or what could be done or what should be done in all these safeguards so that the rights of the citizens may be protected?"

Mr. Forrestal said, "I think it is proper to explore what you need for protection, and I am completely in agreement about the dangers of sliding and abrogation of powers by the Congress."

In fact, that is what we are talking about today.

Then Congressman Lanham asked Dr. Vannevar Bush, "Do you feel there is any danger of the Central Intelligence Division becoming the gestapo or anything like that?"

Dr. Bush said, "I think there is no danger of that. The bill provides clearly that it is concerned with intelligence outside of this country, and it is not concerned with intelligence on internal affairs and I think this is a safeguard against its becoming an empire."

AUTHORIZATION OF CIA TO PERFORM NSC DIRECTED FUNCTIONS

Now, going over to the law itself, and I can remember well when it was passed, September 18, 1947. It authorized the CIA, the fifth point was, to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

On the other hand, the National Security Council is an advisory body to the President, is it not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Therefore, it would be what in effect the President directed, correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S 1963 STATEMENT CONCERNING CIA

Senator SYMINGTON. We had quite a day yesterday, in commemoration of President Truman, who said in 1963:

I never thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peace-time cloak and dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role I would like to see the CIA be restored to its original assignment as the intelligence arm of the President and whatever else it can properly perform in that special field and that its operational duties be terminated or properly used elsewhere.

We have grown up as a nation respected for our free institutions and for our ability to maintain a free and open society. There is something about the way the CIA has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historic position, and I feel that we need to correct it.

My knowledge of the relationship between Admiral Souers being first head of the CIA, makes me believe he would not have made that statement unless it was agreed to by the admiral.

MR. DULLES' STATEMENT CONCERNING APPROVAL OF CIA ACTIONS

For instance, Mr. Dulles stated in the "Craft of Intelligence,"

The facts are the CIA has never carried out any action of a political nature, given any support of any nature to any persons, potentates or movements, political or otherwise, without appropriate approval at a high political level in our government outside the CIA.

The only person that could be, based on the setup, is the President, correct?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think, Senator Symington, that I am not sure which questions you are asking me, but on that latter point, as you well know there has been a committee at a high political level established to clear these operations and that does not include the President, and obviously one of the reasons for this is that under our system of government, which is not like the parliamentary system where a Prime Minister coming out on a moment's notice, there has to be some kind of a circuit breaker for the President in a whole series of matters, and this committee was devised for that purpose.

Senator SYMINGTON. You are talking about the special group?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S COMMENT

Mr. HELMS. And as far as President Truman's comment is concerned I recall vividly when that was made in 1963 and we were all stunned, because the document signed off by the National Security Council which put the agency in some of these matters was done during President Truman's administration.

COMMITTEE'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING CIA FOREIGN ACTIVITIES

Senator SYMINGTON. It is incredible to me, has been for many years, that this committee does not know of your activities in foreign countries with which we are not at war. It not only doesn't make any sense, but, it has resulted in heavy loss of both money and respect. I think I was the one who got Senator Russell to agree to invite Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, and Hickenlooper to sit in with the Armed Services CIA Subcommittee of which I was and am a member.

LAOTIAN SITUATION

Take the Laotian situation. Never has this country conducted an extended war with heavy contracts with outside private firms; a war directed by the Ambassador who was the satrap, the boss, you might say, of the whole military show. But none of us knew anything about it. I was dismayed, tried to get some information.

Walter Pincus went out to Laos and came back with a startling story. Then Jim Lowenstein and Dick Moose went out and found out a lot more we didn't know. So the whole operation was totally clandestine, a heavy utilization in a war of funds of the taxpayers, not only without the approval of the Congress but literally without its knowledge, including me, on a subcommittee supposed to be the regulating committee.

There is no use in laboring the past and you are going to go to Iran, but we are going into some hearings which could be fundamental to our future.

CORPORATE ASSISTANCE IN CIA INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

As the head of the main Intelligence agency, with the premise you are interested in gathering intelligence, not operating, you and the agency have a right to ask any corporation in the United States to

help. I would have no criticism, but don't think that corporation, in turn, should use that request as a means for getting an advantage over its competition.

If I were running a company and was asked to help the CIA with information to help the security and prosperity of the United States, I would be honored, but would never trade on that fact to get more profit for my stockholders or an advantage over competition. I think that is going to be the guts of some problems to be developed in these hearings.

This is my personal opinion. There is Dr. Schlesinger, for whom I have respect, without reservation, after working with him as chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee, but he is new; so who is the one who knows of relationships developed in various countries with the Central Intelligence Agency, corporate relationships?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, this is more difficult than it seems on the surface, and I frankly don't see any substitute for calling the Director, whoever he may be. He can bring the right people along with him to the hearing, if required, if he is not familiar with all the facts, but the Domestic Contact Service has dealings with companies in this country. The other parts of the agency have dealings with foreign governments, and so forth, outside the country and, therefore I honestly don't think there is any substitute for asking him, with obviously some guidance from you as to what you wanted to discuss, and he would bring the right people with him.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I understand it, he will probably come before another committee of which I am a member—

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON [continuing]. For confirmation. Would you tell him at least one member of that committee would be interested in knowing details of the relationships of the Central Intelligence Agency with corporations. Asking corporations to help you is a very logical and constructive thing to do, but I worry about some of the recent stories that have been developed, whether or not they are true or not is what we want to find out, about the fact that this gave corporations an advantageous position, you might say.

This is the type of problem I would hope the Church subcommittee gets into, relationship with multinational corporations. Would your advice be to have Mr. Schlesinger come up and discuss frankly with this committee the problems we are talking about this morning?

Mr. HELMS. I would think so, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

IRANIAN COUP

Senator CASE. You were with the Agency at the time of the Iranian coup?

Mr. HELMS. At the time of what, sir?

Senator CASE. Coup in Iran.

Mr. HELMS. You mean many years ago?

Senator CASE. Involved in it.

Mr. HELMS. I knew about it.

Senator CASE. You didn't run it, did you?

Mr. HELMS. No, but I knew about it.

Senator CASE. Your involvement is not the kind of involvement that would cause you any problem now?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I don't think so, Senator Case, because I understand when the agreement of my appointment was requested, it was given in 48 hours, which was about as fast as you can obtain these things.

Senator CASE. I don't mean in the present Government, but in the total picture of the country.

Mr. HELMS. This I don't know, sir.

Senator CASE. You don't know about that?

Mr. HELMS. No.

WHITE HOUSE REQUESTS TO LEARN ABOUT ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

Senator CASE. On another matter, back to the CIA, if I may, I expect the President can ask the CIA to do anything he wants it to do. Of course, whether the CIA does it or not, I suppose, depends upon many things.

It has been called to my attention that in 1969 or 1970 the White House asked that all intelligence agencies join in the effort to learn as much as they could about the antiwar movement, and during this period U.S. Army Intelligence became involved and kept files on U.S. citizens.

Do you know anything about any activity on the part of the CIA in that connection? Was it asked to be involved?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall whether we were asked, but we were not involved because it seemed to me that was a clear violation of what our charter was.

Senator CASE. What do you do in a case like that?

Mr. HELMS. I would simply go to explain to the President this didn't seem to me to be advisable.

Senator CASE. That would end it?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think so, normally.

Senator CASE. OK.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

AVAILABILITY OF TRANSCRIPT

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, we have a quorum actually, with Senator Symington here, of the Multinational Subcommittee, and I would ask that the staff make this transcript available to Senator Church and the other members.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be available.

Senator PERCY. Because I think Mr. Helms is in a unique position to help us.

NEED FOR ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

I happen to agree with Senator Symington that we need economic intelligence information. Certainly if we had known more about crop conditions in the Soviet Union, we might have bargained more prudently in the recent trade negotiations. The criticism has been made that we were not as aware of the desperate need or, if we were, we didn't use the information effectively. Maybe the agency provided it.

Mr. HELMS. I think it is the latter.

Senator PERCY. In other words, the agency did provide adequate information to the Agriculture Department and others negotiating.

In the energy crisis, information about energy sources and related matters would be tremendously valuable to our country, so I don't question the need for economic intelligence, and the need for the agency to work with corporations.

PROTECTING NATIONAL INTEREST IN MULTINATIONAL HEARINGS

Among my considerations in the multinational hearings, and I expressed this to the staff and to Senator Church, is that we not do anything that could hurt the national interest.

The hearings are public, and I favor doing as much in public as we conceivably can, but we would be naive to think that it is in the national interest to go public with every last bit of information available to us. In some areas, I think, we have to be concerned.

I would appreciate your judgment as to what type of information, in public hearings, could possibly be harmful to the national interest and national security as we press companies for information.

PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND U.S. CORPORATIONS

Also, can you describe for us in the broadest sense, Mr. Helms, what you feel the proper relationship should be between the CIA and American corporations in the gathering of economic intelligence information?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir; I think that it is essentially what it is today.

Now, I must underline that in asking the president of a company to provide information, one establishes sometimes a relationship that the president of the company would prefer to maintain as confidential, the extent to which he is providing the information, the kind of thing he is providing, for the simple reason that I think in some cases it might interfere with the attitude of foreign countries toward his employees, whoever they may be, or whatever they are doing in whatever country is concerned, and one of the reasons for this Domestic Contact Service of ours does maintain this confidentiality is that the companies want it this way. It isn't that it concerns us so much, but they are the ones who dictate the terms under which they are prepared to collaborate.

I don't honestly think that any of them get any particular advantages out of this because it is pretty much of a one-way street. There is very little that we do for these companies that is of much use to them. We don't go around giving them extended briefings about the condition of the world or anything of this kind, so that we are really beholden to them in that sense.

I mean there is no quid pro quo there.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION IN MULTINATIONAL HEARINGS

And so if in these hearings the extent of the information being provided by a given company is a matter on the public record, it may very well be that they will just not want to continue this kind of a relationship. I have to say that. I can't speak for any particular company. I have never discussed this with any individual myself in the

context in which you are speaking this morning, but you asked for my opinion and that is my opinion.

Senator PERCY. When the chief executive officers of companies or officers of companies are called before us and sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, when they are asked under oath to describe their relationship with the CIA, where is the dividing line between serving the public interest by gaining information and hurting national security and the national interest by putting them in the position, in public testimony, of revealing things they never felt they would be obligated or required to reveal.

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I think you have answered your own question, they wouldn't like it.

Senator PERCY. I need a more specific answer, on the record, for the guidance of our committee members as to what, in your judgment, is in the national interest, how far we should go and should not go in not only good taste but to protect and continue to keep available sources of information to the CIA.

Senator CASE. Would the Senator permit one intervention at that point?

Senator PERCY. Of course.

Senator CASE. One of the understandings we have with the subcommittee, although we haven't started our hearings, is that they shall first be private so that the testimony adduced or attempted to be adduced would be looked at before we decided to go public. Is this in your judgment a wise precaution in the light of the concern expressed by the Senator?

Mr. HELMS. A very wise precaution, Senator Case, in my opinion.

Senator CASE. That is one of the things.

Senator PERCY. I think that is very helpful.

COUNTRIES DOING EXCEPTIONAL JOB IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
AREA

Could you tell us the countries that, in your judgment, Mr. Helms, do an exceptionally good job in this area. As I understand it, Great Britain has always used private companies around the world for their intelligence gathering. Japan is exceedingly sophisticated in this area. If Japanese corporations and British corporations were called for public testimony, would this dry them up as sources?

Mr. HELMS. Immediately I would have thought.

Senator PERCY. What other countries, in your judgment, do an exceptionally good job in this area of economic intelligence gathering through trade missions and company representatives abroad?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think you have mentioned two of the principal ones. I think Israel has very good information on what is going on in the world at large in this area. I wouldn't be surprised if the French and the Italians and the Germans were quite sophisticated at this. I am just giving you an offhand judgment here because I have never attempted to analyze it and, quite frankly, countries are much more jealous of their economic and trade information than they are almost of their military information.

Senator PERCY. In your judgment, if the corporations of Japan, Great Britain, Italy and Israel, were required in public hearings to

reveal that they gathered intelligence for their governments, it might damage the intelligence gathering of those nations.

Mr. HELMS. Senator Percy, there is no question about that.

COMPENSATION AND QUID PRO QUOS

Senator PERCY. When we come down to quid pro quos and compensation and walking in the shoes of a corporation head, as certainly Senator Symington and I can, I would say that a company has a responsibility, if it does not throw an undue economic burden on its stockholders, to cooperate in this area with their Government. If the cost involved were extraordinary, then I would feel that the company executive would have a right to say, "This is too costly for our company and our stockholders to bear."

Is there any means for the CIA to compensate companies for extraordinary costs or have you found them all ready, willing and able without compensation of any kind to provide such information?

Mr. HELMS. Senator Percy, as far as I can recollect, and as far as I am aware, we have never given any money to any American companies to do any of these things. This is not to say that the Government couldn't make funds available but it's not been the practice in the past.

Senator PERCY. Could you then, for the record, categorically state that there are no quid pro quos, that there has never been to your knowledge any offset for intelligence gathering or whatever other activities the CIA has asked companies to do?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Senator PERCY. And specifically, in the case of ITT, has any call ever been made by anyone connected with the agency to any other agency of Government on behalf of ITT to relate what they may have done in the national interest and to convey to any Government official in another agency involved in a decision affecting ITT that this company was exceptionally cooperative with CIA?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. There never has been a cent of money, to the best of my knowledge, ever go to ITT from the CIA for such purposes.

[Additional information follows:]

NOVEMBER 16, 1973.

Hon. RICHARD HELMS,
American Ambassador, Tehran.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I am writing to you at the request of Senator Percy about a portion of your testimony on February 7, 1973, in Executive Session before the Foreign Relations Committee. According to the transcript of that meeting, the following exchange took place:

"Senator Percy. And specifically, in the case of ITT, has any call ever been made by anyone connected with the agency to any other agency of government on behalf of ITT to relate what they may have done in the national interest and to convey to any government official in another agency involved in a decision affecting ITT that this company was exceptionally cooperative with CIA?"

"Mr. Helms. No, sir. There never has been a cent of money, to the best of my knowledge, ever go to ITT from the CIA for such purposes."

Since there is some question as to the responsiveness of the reply, Senator Percy has requested that you be given another opportunity to review this particular exchange before the transcript is published.

I hope to hear from you on this matter at your earliest convenience. Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

CARL MARCY.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Tehran, Iran, December 1, 1973.

MR. CARL MARCY,
Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MARCY: This is in response to your letter of November 16, 1973 on behalf of Senator Percy concerning lines 19 and 20 on page 51 of the transcript of an executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee on February 7, 1973.

In the light of Senator Percy's request, I believe that in lieu of the statement appearing on those lines, the following should be substituted: "Mr. Helms. No, sir, not to my knowledge."

This is responsive only to the specific question asked. The other point which I was attempting to emphasize and which now will be dropped is, I believe, adequately covered in other responses to Senator Percy's questions which appear immediately before and after this exchange.

I note from your letter that the words "for such purposes" have been added at the end of line 20 as requested in my June 6, 1973 communication to Chairman Fulbright through Assistant Secretary Marshall Wright. May I assume correctly from this that all of the other changes suggested in the June 6, 1973 communication have been made?

Please convey my sincere appreciation to Senator Percy for his interest. Also, I hope the delay in your receipt of this letter has not caused any inconvenience, but I was in Washington when your letter arrived here on November 26, 1973.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD HELMS.

Senator PERCY. Then putting the shoe on the other foot, has there ever been an implication of any kind of reprisal against a company if it does not cooperate, that it might not get licenses, that it might not get its OPIC guarantees, that it might not be awarded defense contracts? Has there ever been any implication of any kind of reprisal against a company if it did not cooperate with the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; absolutely not. As I said earlier today, these relationships are totally voluntary.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you let me ask a question in context?

Senator PERCY. I would be happy to.

OVERTHROW OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you try in the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the Government of Chile?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. So the stories you were involved in that war are wrong?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. I said to Senator Fulbright many months ago that if the Agency had really gotten in behind the other candidates and spent a lot of money and so forth the election might have come out differently.

REASON FOR TALK ABOUT ITT AND CIA

Senator SYMINGTON. Why is there all this talk about the ITT and the CIA working together down there against a duly elected government?

Mr. HELMS. There were a lot of conversations between members of the Agency and members of ITT about political conditions in Chile, about the possibility of a Communist-Socialist government coming into power. As you well know, sir, the American companies have access to us, as they do to other people in the U.S. Government, and ITT was talking to a lot of people in the U.S. Government in those days and they didn't like the trends that were going on down there and were consulting with a host of people, including the Agency—a lot of this came out in the Anderson papers—but there was no exchange of money between us. We didn't collaborate with ITT except to exchange this information back and forth about the course of events.

There was, as I recall it, one occasion on which ITT asked one of our officers what they might do down there, what techniques they might use to sort of head off these eventualities. It was a conversation about this. To the best of my knowledge, the suggestions were never carried out. Nobody did anything about it. It was simply a conversation.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION AND "THINGS OF THIS KIND"

Senator PERCY. In response to the question from Chairman Fulbright on Monday, you said the Agency has connections with all kinds of companies and corporations in the United States for purposes of the acquisition of information and things of this kind.

Could you elaborate a little bit as to what things of this kind are?

Mr. HELMS. I am afraid that all of us go off at the mouth a little bit and I was just trying to round off the sentence.

Senator PERCY. In other words, you were strictly limiting yourself to the relationship between companies—

Mr. HELMS. And the acquisition of information.

Senator PERCY. And the acquisition of essentially economic information or any other information.

Mr. HELMS. Different kinds of information, that is what I meant by "of this kind." In some cases it might be economic. In some cases it might have to do with metallurgy. In some other cases it might have to do with monetary affairs. I was simply trying to indicate that I was not making the thing so narrow that it was simply the information that they might care to give us. That is all.

CONNECTIONS WITH CORPORATIONS AND COMPANIES ABROAD

Senator PERCY. When you said corporations in the United States, you were not implying that you had no connection with corporations and companies abroad?

Mr. HELMS. Oh, no, sir; we see them abroad as well, of course.

LEVEL OF DECISIONMAKING ABOUT CIA-CORPORATE AFFAIRS

Senator PERCY. At what level are decisions made about CIA-corporate affairs? What is the policy of CIA? Do CIA representatives always, as an unbreakable rule, go to the chief executive officer, or do they go to whichever officer they feel is the appropriate one?

For instance, if a company has an international trade subsidiary, it may not be necessary to go the domestic parent route, but you could go to the subsidiary at whatever level you feel is adequate to give you authority and direction.

Mr. HELMS. That is correct, sir. It has been my own feeling that one should start with the chief executive officer normally because it is not fair to these companies to set up a relationship with somebody down the line that the chief executive officer does not know about or at least has not indicated that this other man is your point of contact.

Senator PERCY. At what level is it decided by the CIA that contact should be established with a given company? Is it a decision from the station chief, the headquarters, the director, the National Security Council?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I don't know that, frankly, it is all that clear, but it has been my own policy when I was Director of the Agency to encourage that they do this at the top of the company to begin with.

EFFECT OF PUBLICIZING CIA-CORPORATE RELATIONSHIPS

Senator PERCY. Finally, people in the Third World seem almost paranoid about the CIA, and they often use the name of the Agency as sort of a scapegoat for everything that happens. I would like to see everything possible done to protect us against this because it is not in our national interest to have the image of the CIA as an Agency that overthrows governments, meddles in the internal affairs of countries, and so forth.

In your judgment is it going to make it harder for American companies to do business abroad and do what they essentially are designed to do—to make earnings for their stockholders, employment opportunities for employees, provide for balance-of-payments offsets through their operations—is it going to be more difficult for them to operate abroad if there is developed a much closer link publicly between CIA and corporations abroad, taking into account the feeling of nationalism that is running through many countries now.

Mr. HELMS. I think that is true, sir, if you are going to publicize these relationships are close and that will obviously make it difficult in certain of these countries where there is this xenophobia that you speak of.

Senator PERCY. Do you think this could increase suspicions toward Americans and American companies abroad?

Mr. HELMS. Well, to the extent that you identify an individual company, which then makes an identifiable target, then it makes it more difficult for the company. "All Americans abroad" is a pretty wide statement and I don't think it makes that much difference, but if somebody wants to make a demonstration and they find out company X has collaborated with CIA it is more easy to demonstrate in front of their headquarters and burn it down than others.

CONFIRMATION OF NSC EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Senator PERCY. I would like to have your personal judgment on a matter and, if you would like to have this off the record or you would rather not comment, don't hesitate to say so.

There is a bill before Congress now, reported out unanimously by the Government Operations Committee, and which may be referred to this committee, for confirmation of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. It has been my feeling that if we can have confirmation proceedings for the Director of Central Intelligence, and for every Ambassador, that the statutory position of Executive Secretary of the National Security Council should also be subject to confirmation.

Do you have a personal opinion on this?

Mr. HELMS. I do not, Senator Percy. I don't know enough about it.

[Laughter.]

Senator PERCY. I will accept your evasion of the question.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY WATERGATE DEFENDANTS

The CHAIRMAN. I was not sure I finished with the statement about which Senator Ervin asked me. Four of the Watergate defendants have been said to be receiving monthly cash payments of \$400 and up. None of these interviewed knew whether a similar financial arrangement had been worked out for the fifth defendant, Mr. McCord. That, if it was paid, was not paid by the CIA or was it?

Mr. HELMS. It was not.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not paid by CIA.

Mr. Martinez was not paid \$400 a month. You said \$100 a month.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Over a period of years.

Mr. HELMS. I have forgotten how long he was doing this.

The CHAIRMAN. That was stopped as soon as you heard about his involvement?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

ACTIVITIES OF MR. MARTINEZ

The CHAIRMAN. Was Mr. Martinez qualified in electronics surveillance?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not what he was doing.

Mr. HELMS. I doubt it. At least our relationship with him had nothing to do with that.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it you expected him to do for you?

Mr. HELMS. We expected him to give us the names of Cubans who came out of Cuba recently, either legally or illegally, who might be individuals who had information about what is going on in Cuba that would be useful to us.

PLOTS AGAINST PRESIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. Did you hear from him or any other source about any plot on the part of Castro or others to disrupt or endanger the President in his campaign?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with that? You had no knowledge of that?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

WITNESS' WILLINGNESS TO TESTIFY

The CHAIRMAN. The Democratic conference passed a resolution saying, "That committee reports to the Senate on all Cabinet designees and such other appointees as deemed appropriate should contain evaluation of their commitment to respond to committee requests to appear and testify before duly constituted Senate committees." If requested, would you appear before duly constituted committees of the Senate?

Mr. HELMS. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought that would be your answer, but I have to ask you that.

NECESSITY OF CAUTION ABOUT DISCLOSURE OF CIA CORPORATE RELATIONS

I think you have covered the questions on these multinational corporations. If I understand it correctly you think there should be very great caution about public disclosure of individual corporations' relations with the CIA. Is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. Chairman, if it is possible to handle these matters concerning the CIA in executive session I would most strongly encourage the committee to do so because I think otherwise, to use a phrase that is familiar to all of us, this will tend to open a Pandora's box.

INFORMATION GATHERING FROM CORPORATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Has this practice been very widespread? Have you made use of a great many or only a few? ITT it seemed to me was a special case in that it was in a peculiarly effective position to be of use since it was in the communications field. My own thought was that perhaps this was a very rare occurrence.

Can you say whether it was or not?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, the communications aspect of it has played no role in it.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought that was why ITT might be very close to you.

Mr. HELMS. No. Sure, they are in the communications field, but we don't have any business with them on the communications.

The CHAIRMAN. We thought that, having internal communications, they might be of particular use to the CIA.

Mr. HELMS. This might have been the case, sir, and I would like to say, I must say, I would like to right here stop because I don't know whether we ever have had any conversations with them about communications. You know our communications linkup is in one part of the Agency, and I have no idea. Maybe there are certain circuits of the ITT that some of our communications go over. I just don't happen to be familiar with them.

The CHAIRMAN. It was sort of a logical thing. I was not surprised about it.

Mr. HELMS. No, sir—

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, all people do it. But what good would an ordinary corporation do you? I wouldn't think you would need say, an oil company in Venezuela to give you information. You could get it as easily as they could. What peculiar knowledge would they have about that or in Iran or in Saudi Arabia?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, an oil company, they have, for example, in Venezuela have, a great deal of information about whether the Government is tending, what they are likely to do with the price of oil, questions of how much they are prepared to let us have, and so forth, which are matters of intense interest these days.

The CHAIRMAN. They are interesting, but they are not very secret. I mean this is sort of public knowledge.

Mr. HELMS. Well, they are to those companies.

The CHAIRMAN. Really.

Mr. HELMS. They really are. I mean getting information out of the oil companies about those rates and what is likely to happen and so forth is one of the hardest jobs we have.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't suppose getting information of that kind was a matter of great difficulty.

Mr. HELMS. It turns out to be. For example, there is another problem which is one of the things that is dogging us these days. What are the oil reserves, in fact? I mean how much oil is there under the ground in Venezuela, how many years are they going to be able to pump it out at their current rates? The oil companies are very jealous of the estimates they make about this. They don't share them with each other and they don't share them much with anybody else. Yet this is what is basic to the whole energy question.

AMOUNT AND ACCURACY OF OIL INFORMATION

The CHAIRMAN. There is extensive literature on this. I have been overwhelmed with it recently. They pretend to know.

Mr. HELMS. But I don't think you will find all those figures are all that accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think those estimates are accurate?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. I have reason to believe that based on my recent efforts to learn about oil these things are not that accurate. I agree with you there is an overwhelming amount of information, but I am not sure it is that accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. This is very interesting. For example, it is estimated, I think, that the reserves of the countries on the Persian Gulf, where you are going, are, I think, 351 billion barrels of oil. Do you have any idea whether that is accurate or not?

Mr. HELMS. Well, you see that is just exactly the point. This is what they are believed to be. Yet one can find first-class oil geologists who say that the amount of oil in Iran, for example, is not as much as it is believed to be. Then there is the question of improved technology. Can you get more out of the ground than you are able to get now?

The CHAIRMAN. Those are legitimate differences of opinion. It isn't a question of secrecy there. You have a difference of opinion even here. Geologists estimate—de Golyer is supposed to be the best in this country—and they rely on them. If you go to get a loan from a bank and they say, "Well, they have the best estimate," that is a matter of their judgment. It isn't a question of espionage or secrets.

Mr. HELMS. Sir, may I go off the record for a moment?

[Discussion off the record.]

FINDING OUT TRADE SECRETS

The CHAIRMAN. Have you devoted any effort to trying to find out these trade secrets? Has that been one of your responsibilities?

Mr. HELMS. In my new capacity I am trying to find out what the score is.

The CHAIRMAN. I meant before in your old capacity.

Mr. HELMS. We have been trying to make estimates about the petroleum reserves because that is part of our job.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered if it had been given to you as one of your jobs.

Mr. HELMS. Well, I am just saying that I happen to know since we were able to acquire the information that it is not being shared and they are different.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I can understand that.

Do you have any questions?

Senator AIKEN. No. I do have a question as to what we did yesterday. I understood we voted out all the nominees for embassies, if there were no objection, after Mr. Helms' appearance this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. If that isn't what we did, to be on the safe side I had better move to report all of them out favorably.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I certainly have no objection to that.

Let me see if I have one more question before we close.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have a couple before we close.

MR. MARTINEZ' DIARY

The CHAIRMAN. I was thinking particularly of Senator Ervin's questions. I don't know whether I have covered them all, particularly about Mr. Martinez. You didn't get his diary. The CIA didn't see that. Who has that?

Mr. HELMS. I think the police picked that up so far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't know anything about the diary?

Mr. HELMS. I not only didn't know anything about the diary, but I somehow recollect in the back of my—well, I had better not say anything about it. This is on the record and maybe my recollection is faulty and, therefore, I had better not say it.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything you would have would be appreciated, particularly by Senator Ervin.

Mr. HELMS. My recollection simply was this diary was found by the police. I thought it was in his automobile, but I am not entirely sure.

The CHAIRMAN. It says here it was found in the trunk of his automobile.

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. My point was the CIA didn't have it.

Mr. HELMS. No.

WATERGATE DEFENDANTS' CONNECTIONS WITH CIA

The CHAIRMAN. This is what I want to tie down without any doubt. You mentioned two of these defendants had been former agents who had been out at least 2 years.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With the exception of Martinez none of the others had ever had any connection with the CIA, to the best of your knowledge.

Mr. HELMS. Except for Barker who was cut off in the midsixties. I testified to that earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought Barker and Hunt—

Mr. HELMS. No, Barker had had a relationship, you remember, I said at the time of the Bay of Pigs and had been continued on for a time, but it had been cut off in the midsixties.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HELMS. The record will show that earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

But recently he had had nothing to do with you.

Mr. HELMS. No, no.

The CHAIRMAN. I forgot. Did you testify that he was a regular agent or one of these consultants?

Mr. HELMS. He was a consultant type.

CIA CONSULTANTS

The CHAIRMAN. He was a consultant type. You had after the Bay of Pigs a considerable number of these consultants, didn't you?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you still have?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. This has been cut way back now.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that cut way back?

Mr. HELMS. It is a very minor effort.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that is all.

Did you have another question?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would like to go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

DID ANYONE INVOLVED IN WATERGATE WORK FOR ITT?

The CHAIRMAN. One question I forgot to ask. Did any of these people involved in the Watergate whom we have mentioned work for the ITT?

Mr. HELMS. I don't happen to know.

The CHAIRMAN. You wouldn't know that.

Mr. HELMS. I don't happen to know, Mr. Chairman, honestly I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Thank you very much.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this opportunity to come back and at least straighten out some of the things.

CIA AND WATERGATE

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is very healthy that you get something definitely on the record particularly in view of your leaving. I think I have covered it. You remember that famous instance in which we

didn't ask Sullivan about Laos and when we asked why he didn't tell us he said we didn't ask him about it.

Is there something that I should have asked you about that I didn't to which you ought to reply?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, let me in an effort to sort of close this, about this, Watergate business, you have asked all the relevant questions. I have no more information to convey and I know nothing about it. Honestly, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. And your people other than that one man who was a consultant—

Mr. HELMS. We had nothing to do with it, honestly we didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Other than the training that these operatives gained from their experience with you over the years.

Mr. HELMS. Could I go off the record a minute?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

REPORTING OF NOMINEES

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that on the motion of the Senator from Vermont all six of the nominees will be reported favorably today, without objection.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

CIA INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES

MONDAY, MAY 21, 1973

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright [chairman], presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Symington, Pell, Muskie, Humphrey, Aiken, Case, Pearson, Percy, and Griffin.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please.

OPENING STATEMENT

The Foreign Relations Committee this morning is meeting to hear further testimony from Mr. Richard Helms, Ambassador to Iran, and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I wish to make it clear at the outset that the hearing is being held in public session at the specific request of Senator Symington and Mr. Helms. The hearing is a followup of two executive sessions the committee held with Mr. Helms in February and March, at which time domestic activities of the CIA were explored. Subsequent developments have made it desirable to clarify the record which was made at that time.

Mr. Helms, we are very pleased to have you. I want to make it clear that while I had announced last week that this would be an executive session, it was changed on very short notice this morning to an open session. I want everybody to understand the circumstances.

That is correct, is it not?

STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. HELMS, AMBASSADOR TO IRAN

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to say anything in opening before we start questioning?

DECISION TO HOLD HEARING IN OPEN SESSION

Mr. HELMS. I do not think so, Mr. Chairman. I simply felt that, after I had read stories in the newspapers that convict me of some wrongdoing before I had ever appeared before the committee, that perhaps it would be better to have it in open session so that I could state myself.

rested in the Watergate. 'Why,' I asked myself and my friends for months, 'would anyone call the CIA Director in the wee hours of the morning after some arrests in a burglary unless the CIA was involved?'

I will put the whole column in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Star-News, May 11, 1973]

CIA'S INVOLVEMENT APPALLING

(By Carl T. Rowan)

Several days after the Watergate burglary of last June 17 my wife and I went to a screening party at the Motion Picture Association headquarters here. We chanced to sit beside Richard Helms, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and his wife Cynthia.

The pre-film conversation turned to Watergate.

"This Watergate thing is so ridiculous that if you wrote it as fiction the publisher would laugh you out of his office," Cynthia said.

Helms laughed and, in the course of a brief discussion, dropped one comment that, as my close friends know, has bothered me ever since.

"Cynthia and I had been up late and had just fallen asleep when they telephoned me to tell me that these fellows had been arrested in the Watergate," he said.

"Why," I asked myself and my friends for months, "would anyone call the CIA director in the wee hours of the morning about some arrests in a burglary unless the CIA was involved?"

But I just couldn't write about that remark. I couldn't prove CIA involvement in Watergate, and I didn't want to believe the CIA was involved in this kind of political crime. So the most I could bring myself to write was this, on August 6, 1972:

"The previous employment of several of those involved in 'the Watergate caper' and recent strange revelations of big money floating into bank accounts out of nowhere have aroused some serious misgivings that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved. But for what reason? Not partisan political purposes surely."

I guess I wasn't cynical enough or mean enough to put my larger suspicions into print. I truly regret that bit of cautiousness.

Well, the chilling truth is now out. The CIA has become involved in political crime as ordered by the White House and that is a sinister development that overshadows everything else that has gushed forth from this cesspool we call Watergate.

E. Howard Hunt, the convicted Watergate burglar and ex-CIA agent (and who knows when if ever he became an "ex" agent?), has testified that the CIA provided cameras, disguises, false papers and other assistance when he and G. Gordon Liddy burglarized the office of the psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg, now on trial in connection with the Pentagon papers.

The New York Times has reported that the CIA role was approved by Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., Helms' deputy and now the Marine Corps commandant.

How can I interpret Helms' comment at that movie party in the light of these recent disclosures?

I can only conclude that the CIA was up to its armpits in the dirty work masterminded by Hunt and Liddy, in the *Ellsberg* case but also in the Watergate crime. I can only conclude that this vast organization with all its secret money, all its capacity for eavesdropping and other dirty tricks, was turned into an apparatus for perpetuating the power of Richard Nixon and his cronies.

You can bet that this kind of corruption of the purpose of the CIA was not taken lightly by Helms (and do not believe for a moment that Cushman approved this frightening gambit without Helms' knowledge). I can damn well guarantee you that the CIA became involved only on direct orders from the President, or orders from Haldeman or Ehrlichman, claiming to speak directly for the President.

In either case, no presidential assistants or appointees such as Helms would undertake so serious a violation of the intended role of the CIA without assurances of presidential knowledge and approval.

So that old campaign button finally speaks the truth: "Nixon's The One."
There is a question that hounds us all, and the answer is almost unspeakable except in private surroundings. When a president is riding the top of the world, hogging the glory and the headlines with reelection virtually assured, why resort to such malevolent police state tactics--it defies national explanation.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in fact called by the Agency the night of the break-in in Democratic Headquarters?

Mr. HELMS. I do not recall any more, Mr. Chairman, whether the call that I got from the Director of Security of the Agency was the night that the break-in occurred or the subsequent night. In any event, the call that I got was not in the wee hours of the morning. It was in the course of the evening, I forget what time, maybe 9:30, 10 o'clock, and the call was pursuant to a standing policy that we had in the Agency for a long time, and that is that when anyone on active duty or in some way connected with the Agency was involved in a major episode, an accident, an event of some kind, that I was to be informed of this and it was a perfectly routine thing in which he called up and said some men had been caught breaking in at the Watergate, and among them was James McCord, who had once been an Agency employee.

WITNESS' FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF BREAK-IN

The CHAIRMAN. How did the Agency first learn of the break-in in the Watergate? Do you know?

Mr. HELMS. I read it in the newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. No one called you, as far as you know, or called the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. As I said a moment ago, Mr. Chairman, it could have happened the night that the break-in took place or it could have happened the next night, I do not honestly remember which night it was.

DID CIA HAVE CASE OFFICER MONITORING WATERGATE TEAM?

The CHAIRMAN. In a column dated January 7, 1973, Mr. Martin Schram of Newsday, stated, and I quote:

Federal investigators have obtained a daily diary that was being written by one of the Watergate defendants, Eugenio Martinez. Existence of the diary, written without the knowledge of his codefendants, indicates that the Central Intelligence Agency—or at least the CIA case officer—may have been monitoring the activities of the Watergate team.

Did the Agency have a case officer monitoring the Watergate team?

Mr. HELMS. Not to the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 7, 1973]

WATERGATE CASE CALLED BROAD PLOT

(By Martin Schram)

The Watergate burglary and espionage mission at Democratic Party headquarters was part of a widespread project in which documents were photographed in the Embassy of Chile and several liberal Democratic senators were kept under electronic surveillance, according to a source close to the defendants.

The operation at the Embassy of Chile, 1736 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., involved three men, the source said. One pulled documents from the files, one

photographed the documents, and one placed them back in the files. Embassy officials have said that last May their chancery was burglarized and the files of their ambassador and political chief were searched.

The source, a person well acquainted with the activities of the Watergate defendants, made the information available on the condition that his name not be used.

Among the senators whose activities were in some way allegedly monitored were Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), and Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho). This source also said that Sol Linowitz, former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States, was kept under similar surveillance.

While Newsday was able to confirm some of the source's statements through officials close to the investigation, allegations concerning the surveillance of senators neither could be confirmed nor denied.

The seven defendants in the Watergate case go on trial Monday in the U.S. District Court here.

It also has been learned that:

Federal authorities have traded down and questioned two men who had been involved in Washington with the Watergate group but who had not been caught at the Democratic headquarters scene June 17. The two men, who have not been indicted, are Felipe de Diego, a Cuban exile and Bay of Pigs veteran now living in Miami, and Reinaldo Pico, who fled to Venezuela after the Watergate break-in and is believed still there. Pico was questioned by U.S. officials in Venezuela.

Federal investigators have obtained a daily diary that was being written by one of the Watergate defendants, Eugenio Martinez.

Existence of the diary, written without the knowledge of his codefendants, indicates that the Central Intelligence Agency—or at least a CIA case officer—may have been monitoring the activities of the Watergate team. Martinez has continued to do work for the CIA in the years following his part in the Bay of Pigs affair, according to a well-informed defense source in the case. The source says that Martinez confessed to his fellow defendants that he had been keeping the diary, at the urging of his current CIA supervisor, after it was seized by federal officials.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl J. Silbert declined to say whether Martinez' diary would be introduced as evidence in the Watergate trial, which opens Monday.

De Diego, 43, is a real estate salesman who was employed in Miami real estate office of Bernard L. Barker, one of the Watergate defendants.

De Diego, who was granted immunity by the grand jury investigating the case, said he told the grand jury and the FBI that he had come to Washington last May with Pico and the four Watergate defendants from the Miami area (Baker, Martinez, Frank Sturgis and Virgilio R. Gonzales). He said that he believed he and his friends were waiting to see someone from the government—he did not know who—and that when no one showed up, they flew back home to Miami.

While in Washington, de Diego maintained, he never met James W. McCord Jr., E. Howard Hunt Jr. or G. Gordon Liddy, the other three Watergate defendants. McCord, the former security consultant for the President's re-election committee, was arrested inside the Watergate on June 17 with the four defendants from Miami.

While de Diego said he had no knowledge of any sub rosa activities by the group while he was in Washington last May, other defense sources said the group was quite busy during that period.

During the weekend of May 13-14, the chancery of the Embassy of Chile was burglarized.

One source close to the Watergate defendants says now that these defendants were behind the burglary at the embassy.

The Watergate team's activities last spring, the source said, also included the electronic surveillance of Sens. Mansfield, Church and Fulbright and former OAS ambassador Linowitz. All three senators said yesterday they had no indication they had been monitored. Linowitz, a liberal Democrat, could not be reached for comment.

HOW CIA WAS INFORMED OF BREAK-IN

The CHAIRMAN. Was it either the FBI or the White House that informed the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. Informed them about what, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. The Watergate break-in?

Mr. HELMS. As I said just a moment ago, it was my impression we learned about it from the newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you were not called late at night? In other words, Mr. Rowan's article was wrong?

Mr. HELMS. No, I was called one evening by the Director of Security, Mr. Howard Osborne, to tell me that some men had been caught in a break-in at the Watergate in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters, and that involved in this was one of the employees of the Agency; a Mr. James McCord.

I did get that call, sir. I say that I did and I told you a minute ago as to why it was a matter of policy that I be informed about these, such matters.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would you be informed about such domestic matters? I mean it was not really within the purview of the CIA's responsibility, was it?

Mr. HELMS. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have a lot of—the Central Intelligence Agency has a few thousand employees in the Washington area, and they are getting into difficulties of one sort or another, as all human beings get into difficulties, and the agreement I had with the Director of Security was if any of them got into difficulty, I was to be informed.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF DANIEL ELLSBERG

The CHAIRMAN. When was the CIA first contacted with a request for a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg?

Mr. HELMS. It is my recollection it was the latter part of July, 1971.

The CHAIRMAN. Who requested this profile and to whom did he speak at the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. David Young of the White House staff requested the profile and he spoke to the Director of Security, Mr. Howard Osborne.

The CHAIRMAN. Howard who?

Mr. HELMS. I believe the reason he did this was sometime before Mr. Young had told me that he had been given a new assignment, he had been assigned from Dr. Kissinger's office to Mr. Ehrlichman's staff to be in charge of classification procedures, security leaks, and associated matters; that he wanted to find out from various agencies of the government, including the CIA, how we guarded our materials, how we classified our papers, and how we did various other things in this general field and I, therefore, put him in touch with the Director of Security, Mr. Osborne, so that he would be able to get this information on a direct line.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you personally authorize the preparation of the Ellsberg profile?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, with great reluctance, I did. I was consulted about this and I remonstrated about it. In fact, I talked to Mr. David Young about it and said we were in no position to write any such profile, that we did not have any information on Dr. Ellsberg, we knew nothing about him, and that it would be a very difficult thing to have to undertake. And he said while he was on Dr. Kissinger's staff he had seen personnel profiles, particularly on Fidel Castro, that had been written

by some doctors in the Agency, that he felt this was the only agency of government that was capable of undertaking such a job, and that, under the circumstances, he would undertake to provide the information based on which the profile might be written.

I again pointed out to him this would be a most difficult thing to do, and I did not really see any reason why we should become involved in it, and he said this was a matter of a study of the Pentagon papers leaks and various other leaks, that it was a multifaceted approach and he felt it very important, and Mr. Ehrlichman did, that this be undertaken.

So I reluctantly said "All right, let's go ahead and try it."

AUTHORIZATION FOR SUCH A STUDY

The CHAIRMAN. What provisions of your CIA charter do you think authorized such a study?

Mr. HELMS. The only provision that I believe would cover this is in the National Security Act of 1947. There is a charge put on the Director of Central Intelligence to—giving him, he is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and since it is very difficult to protect sources and methods from disclosure unless you know who is doing the disclosing, it is a thing in which we have been involved over the years with no investigative powers, with no real tools to do the job; it has been a very difficult charge but, nevertheless, it is still on the books, it is still on the statutes.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, is that intended to cover domestic action here in the United States or actions abroad or actions unrelated to the investigative funds of the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Well, Senator Case, I have given the actual language of the law as specifically as I can remember it, and it does not seem to have any limitations on it, either domestic or foreign, it just says unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Chair yield?

The law states:

"* * * And, provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure* * *"

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have advice of legal counsel with regard to this authorization?

Mr. HELMS. Not that I remember, Mr. Chairman.

PROFILE PREPARED ON COMMANDER LLOYD BUCHER

The CHAIRMAN. Has the Agency prepared such a profile for other United States nationals?

Mr. HELMS. I was told this past week that the only other time on which such a profile was prepared was on Commander Bucher at the time of the Pueblo incident.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the only one?

Mr. HELMS. That is the only one as far as I am aware.

BREAK-IN OF DR. FIELDING'S OFFICE

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently there were two profiles prepared, according to the Krogh affidavit. The first psychological profile was delivered before Hunt and Liddy went to California on August 25, Krogh's affidavit also stated that this first CIA profile "provided no useful information, but that a psychological profile could be put together with information derived from Dr. Fielding's files."

Did the CIA inform Krogh that to put together a profile it would be necessary to have the Fielding data?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say right now that the first time that I ever heard that Dr. Ellsberg had a psychiatrist was when I was in Shiraz, Iran, a week ago Sunday when I read an English language newspaper that a break-in had been made in the office of the psychiatrist of Dr. Ellsberg. I never knew he had one, let alone the fact that there had been a break-in in the office.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are saying the CIA did not inform Mr. Krogh that they needed Fielding's statement; is that right?

Mr. HELMS. Definitely not, because the existence of Dr. Fielding, as far as I was aware, was a secret, I never heard of Dr. Fielding until last week.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the Chair will yield, you may not know it, but there might be other people in the Agency who went around your back on this one as they did on other things, because of their relative proximity to the White House staff. Is that possible?

Mr. HELMS. Anything is possible, Senator Symington, except I would like to say that I have not been informed of anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency who knew anything about the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office or of Dr. Fielding's existence until comparatively recently when these confessions were made.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Krogh's affidavit states that when they returned from this first trip to California, Hunt delivered film, on August 26, to the CIA agent, who met him at Dulles Airport at 6 a.m. on August 26, and asked for immediate processing of the film. That is Krogh's affidavit.

Do you know, was the film processed by the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. I have learned since that the film was processed, and I have also learned that the photograph was of an unidentified building.

The CHAIRMAN. It was processed in the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

TERMINATION OF ASSISTANCE TO E. HOWARD HUNT

The CHAIRMAN. According to General Cushman's affidavit on August 27—that is 1 day after this film was delivered to the CIA for processing—the cooperative arrangement between the Agency and Hunt was terminated. Was it the discovery of the contents of the film that led to the termination of the relationship with Hunt?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the contents of the film were in the latter part of August. I know that the termination of assistance to Hunt came about in the following fashion:

I received a memorandum stating that Mr. Hunt had requested the services of a secretary who was stationed in Paris, France; he wanted her brought back from Paris to Washington and assigned to him. In

addition, he was requesting some other assistance from the Agency which seemed to me to be quite unnecessary, so I spoke to General Cushman and I told him that I thought this had gone too far, that we were being used in this situation, and that I did not see any reason for it to continue and that I wanted him to call Mr. Ehrlichman and have it stopped.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say that when General Cushman says in his affidavit that the relationship of Hunt was terminated because his requests became too extensive, he was not being completely candid?

Mr. HELMS. General Cushman was not being candid?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HELMS. I do not quite understand the thrust of the question.

The CHAIRMAN. General Cushman says, according to his affidavit, that the relationship of Hunt was terminated because his requests became extensive—too extensive.

Mr. HELMS. Well, that was the reason.

The CHAIRMAN. It was the reason?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you aware on August 27 that Liddy was casing the premises of Dr. Fielding's office?

Mr. HELMS. I was not, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not.

The Agency was aware that Liddy and Hunt were preparing to commit a crime, were they not?

Mr. HELMS. They were not, to the best of my knowledge. I never heard anybody in the Agency mention any such thing. As a matter of fact, in the context at that time, no crimes had been committed. To the best of our knowledge, no crimes were contemplated, nobody had given us the slightest indication that anything underhanded was afoot.

FILM TURNED OVER TO JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Why was the film turned over to the Justice Department?

Mr. HELMS. Subsequently, because all of the information connected with this was turned over to the Justice Department.

The CHAIRMAN. It was turned over, I thought, quite soon after it was processed, was it not?

According to the Krogh affidavit, it was turned over to the Justice Department, the assumption being that is what you usually do—

Mr. HELMS. I thought this material was turned over in October.

The CHAIRMAN. In October 1971?

Mr. HELMS. No. October 1972.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, we had the witness under oath before the Armed Services Committee and that information was not turned over until the summer of 1972.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know to whom it was delivered at the Justice Department?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir; the Attorney General, and Mr. Henry Petersen, the Assistant Attorney General.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Attorney General sign a receipt for the delivery of the film?

Mr. HELMS. I have no idea, sir. The material was turned over in his office and then Mr. Petersen took custody of it and took it back to his

office; in other words, he left the Attorney General's office and I do not know what happened to it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is customary on the delivery of such documents that someone makes a receipt, is it or is it not the practice?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think when the material is delivered by our courier, it is true. I hand-delivered this and I was accompanied by the General Counsel of the Agency and I turned it over to Mr. Kleindienst and Mr. Petersen at that time. Under those circumstances, probably one would not have asked for a receipt. As least I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. You hand-delivered it yourself?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

WHAT PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWED

The CHAIRMAN. Did you already state you did not know what was in the film?

Mr. HELMS. By that time I did know, yes. This was, I believe, on October 24, 1972, that this material was turned over.

The CHAIRMAN. By that time, is it then fair to conclude that you knew or suspected that Hunt and Liddy were involved in a domestic crime?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, you would have to look at the photographs. I have just said, to the best of my knowledge these photographs were of an unidentified building and I did not know what it was and nobody was ever able to identify it to me.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the chair yield?

In sworn testimony by the various people before the Armed Services Committee, nobody thought they could find out what the photographs really actually showed.

COMMITTEE HEARING OF FEBRUARY 7, 1973

The CHAIRMAN. What has puzzled me a little about these developments is based upon the hearing we had on February 7.

We will start up where we were asking you about several people, first about McCord, then we passed to Hunt's retirement on regular civil service retirement, with no special pension. I will read the next part:

The CHAIRMAN. How long had he served?

Mr. HELMS. Many years. I think he must have been there 15 or 25 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Was E. Howard Hunt, an employee?

Mr. HELMS. He also had been an employee of the agency.

The CHAIRMAN. In a similar situation?

Mr. HELMS. He also, but my recollection is that he resigned rather than retired. I am not sure exactly. It was one or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. About when?

Mr. HELMS. About two, two and a half years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. He had no relationship to the CIA then?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is G. Gordon Liddy's relationship to the agency?

Mr. HELMS. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Never?

Mr. HELMS. Never, under any circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. He never has been. I see.

Mr. HELMS. Never.

Leading to the feeling that there had been no connection, no relationship whatever, subsequently there were one or two other questions I will refer to a little later along that line.

PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, are we going to have any rule about time? I have a hearing at 2 o'clock this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. I will yield to the Senator now if he wishes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will we be under the 10- or 20-minute rule?

The CHAIRMAN. Whatever the committee likes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I have a few questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I will yield to Senator Sparkman at this time.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not want to go out of turn.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, could I suggest a 10-minute rule be used this morning?

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Case might like to ask some questions.

Senator CASE. On this point, it does seem to me we should divide the time fairly, but still, this is a matter which relates in large part to previous testimony by Mr. Helms. In light of subsequent events, this requires an orderly development of the situation, and only, I think, the chairman can do that. I would think the chairman ought to be allowed as long as he thinks is necessary and then the time be equitably divided among the rest of us.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact several members have to—

Senator SYMINGTON. I just want to know what the ground rules are. Mr. Levinson is apparently in this in detail. He is the ITT investigation counsel; are we going to have any ITT questions?

The CHAIRMAN. No; I did not call this for ITT. I was under the impression, as the Senator from New Jersey stated, but we will proceed now to go in order in the usual manner for not over 10 minutes.

Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief.

KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIONS REGARDING DR. ELLSBERG AND DR. FIELDING

Mr. Helms, I was not here for the first part of your questioning, but I have followed with interest the questioning since I have been here.

The thought that entered my mind was the same one that Senator Case suggested a few minutes ago, and that is why the CIA was called on to do these things.

I think it has been explained by what you said and the excerpt from the law which Senator Symington read. Now I understand that you say—and I want to ask if I did understand it correctly—that you say you knew nothing about the action that was going on so far as Dr. Ellsberg and Dr. Fielding were concerned; is that right?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. You had no knowledge of it?

Mr. HELMS. Absolutely none, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you say that you did not even know Dr. Fielding or know anything about him until some time after?

Mr. HELMS. Until last week, Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Until last week. And you had no connection whatsoever?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

EQUIPMENT MR. HUNT RECEIVED FROM CIA

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, you did have a connection, as I understand it, with placing some equipment, whatever it may have been, or making it available in connection with security leaks around the National Security Council; is that right?

Mr. HELMS. This occurred in July or the end of July 1971 when Mr. Hunt came to the Agency to get some equipment. I believe that these were equipment consisting of a wig, and a tape recorder, and a camera, all of them things that he could have acquired in the public market, and also some that is called pocket litter, I believe, which is the kind of stuff that if one finds it in a suit of clothes, you assume it belongs to Senator Sparkman rather than Senator Symington.

None of the equipment had anything to do with burglaries so we could not judge from the request of the kinds of equipment that there was anything underhanded going on, and we were providing a facility to him at the request of Mr. Ehrlichman made on General Cushman.

Senator SPARKMAN. And that was in 1971?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I had seen something in the paper about it. So far as you know, it had no connection with these things that happened in 1972?

Mr. HELMS. I just do not know any more, sir. All I know is that if we put ourselves back in the time frame of July 1971, no underhanded things had occurred that we were aware of, nobody dreamed that the White House was going to be undertaking burglaries and so forth, and therefore there was no cause to assume that these things were going to be misused.

SECURITY LEAKS

Senator SPARKMAN. I have read somewhere, there has been so much about all of this that it is hard to keep up with all of it, but I read somewhere, I believe, that these taps that were made in connection with leaks in our security—there were leaks, were there not, and they were suspected as coming from the National Security Council?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, there were leaks and nobody seemed to know where they were coming from.

The first leak, of course, was the Pentagon papers and then there were some leaks about the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation talks, which were supposed to be secret, and there were various other leaks from time to time about weapons systems, and so forth, and this whole connection of affairs had caused the White House to be quite exercised about how so much information was getting out into the public.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you understand that Dr. Henry Kissinger was very much concerned about it and that he was interested in having these leaks checked into and stopped, insofar as possible?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; Senator Sparkman, that was my distinct impression at the time.

Senator SPARKMAN. And that is the only thing that you had any connection with insofar as these taps and so forth were concerned?

Mr. HELMS. To the best of my recollection, sir.

You know, there are a lot of days, weeks, and months that went on in here, and I know there were many considerations about these leaks and I know that the U.S. Intelligence Board Security Committee, which was established to carry out the statutory provision that I spoke about a moment ago, was constantly keeping records on this and seeing if there was any way to find out which elements of the Government these leaks were coming from, so there was a lot of ongoing work of this kind, but I do not recall any other specific incidents of the kind that I think you have in mind.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIA AND FBI

Senator AIKEN. Let me say, first, that if we had reason to believe that an organization in a foreign country hostile to the United States had designed to undermine the U.S. Government and also had connections with people living in the United States, who were collaborating with them, would that be of concern to the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. Well, it would be of concern to the CIA to the extent that we had picked up this information overseas and would turn it over then to the FBI if we found that overseas there were certain connections between foreign agents and Americans.

Senator AIKEN. The CIA concern would be with the foreigners who perhaps had designs on the U.S. Government?

Mr. HELMS. That is our responsibility—

Senator AIKEN. The American collaborators would come under the observation of the FBI, is that right?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

ALUMNI OF CIA

Senator AIKEN. As the head of the CIA, would you feel responsible for the operations of all the alumni of that organization?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, we are not responsible for the operations of any alumni of the organization. When they retire or resign from the Central Intelligence Agency, they go back into society just as any other individual does.

Senator AIKEN. And some of them undertook to set up in business for themselves?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; they did.

AVAILABILITY OF CIA INFORMATION

Senator AIKEN. And specializing in protective devices for congressional committees or others; do you think that all the information available to the CIA should be made public?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Well, you are rare.

Mr. HELMS. I beg pardon?

Senator AIKEN. You are unusual.

I agree with you, however, that it should not be made available to the public, all of them.

RELATION BETWEEN UNITED STATES, IRAN

My final question is this:

If given an opportunity, could you tell us anything about the relations between the United States and Iran? If given an opportunity, I mean.

Mr. HELMS. I would be glad to speak about it if I were given an opportunity.

Senator AIKEN. You have been there?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. If I had my way, you would be given a chance to tell us something about our relations with Iran.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REASON FOR OPEN HEARING

May I say again that the reason I asked for this open hearing was because I felt, after reading the papers, it would appear Mr. Helms was convicted before he even came before the committee.

TELEPHONE CALL TO WITNESS ABOUT BREAK-IN

For the record, as I understand it, the break-in occurred in the very early morning hours, in the early morning hours of a day in June and it was in the papers the next morning. Therefore, presumably you were called after the break-in, but before the papers came out. Unless you were, you got the information out of the papers; correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

I am sorry that I do not recall the specific evening on which I got this telephone call, but I simply do not and all I know was that it was at a time in the evening somewhere between 9 and 11 o'clock because, although the Rowan column which the chairman has read into the record says it was the wee hours of the morning, I know that it was not the wee hours because I was watching the television at the time, and have a custom of going to bed at least by 11 o'clock.

Senator SYMINGTON. A good habit. [Laughter.]

WHY MR. EHRLICHMAN MADE REQUEST OF GENERAL CUSHMAN

Do you know why Mr. Ehrlichman, when he wanted a wig and a voice changer, went around you and notified General Cushman he would like to get said wig and voice changer?

Mr. HELMS. I have no idea, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. In General Cushman's affidavit, he said Mr. Ehrlichman he knew was an honorable man for 10 to 12 years; so perhaps it was because he knew General Cushman well, but the fact is that he did not come to you as the head of the agency; he went to your deputy, did he not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

ACTIONS OF GENERAL WALTERS

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, do you know why, when Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman instructed you and General Walters—who took General Cushman's place—to come over to Mr. Ehrlichman's office, Mr. Haldeman instructed only General Walters to go to see FBI Acting Director Gray?

Mr. HELMS. I do not know, sir. I thought it odd at the time.

Senator SYMINGTON. After General Cushman found out what was going on, found out the demands of Mr. Hunt, he notified Mr. Ehrlichman he could no longer agree to his demands; correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. At that time he was reporting to you what was going on, correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Also, when General Walters found out the nature of the request Mr. Haldeman was asking him to make to Mr. Gray, he said before he got through he would not continue with the operation; correct?

Mr. HELMS. That is what he told me at the time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think that inasmuch as both General Cushman and General Walters worked for the President for some years as a member of his staff, that they thought they might have more influence with him?

Mr. HELMS. I honestly do not know.

WHETHER PRESIDENT WAS ANGRY WITH WITNESS

Senator SYMINGTON. Various newspapermen were asking us around this town some weeks ago, "Why is it, do you think the President is so angry with Dick Helms?" Do you know anything about that?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I do not.

In fact, to be a bit more responsive, if the newspapermen were asking the question, I did not know at the time that he was said to be angry with me.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you leave the Agency under your own volition?

Mr. HELMS. Well, the President and I had a conversation about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. That conversation I presume you would consider executive privilege?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Properly so.

WITNESS' ROLE IN UNVEILING BURGLARY

Mr. CHAIRMAN. For the record, there are many papers that have been produced in the classified hearings we have had in the Armed Services Committee on this matter. We have received a classified paper; so I cannot put it in the record.

As a result of a covering letter written for the record by Mr. Helms, it would appear he had much to do with the unveiling of this unfortunate burglary, and the fact the American people now know about it. I would hope eventually that the memorandum could be made part of the record and known to the public.

The author of the paper, which is highly restricted, is going to come shortly before the Armed Services Committee in executive session. We hope at that time to find out more about the efforts of the White House staff to, in effect, take over a great deal of operations which up to this time, we thought were the proper domestic functions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I am glad we are having this hearing in open session. In due course, Ambassador Helms will go back to his post. Then it would be difficult for him to defend his good name from such attacks as this one in the press. That is why I now take the liberty of mentioning this particular document which only came to our committee, and did not come from Mr. Helms, Saturday morning.

Thank you.

QUESTIONS WAIVED

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think, along the line of my earlier comment, that I will waive questions until after the chairman has finished his development of the main purpose of the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Muskie?

Senator MUSKIE. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I feel the same way Senator Case does and I would like to have the chairman have full opportunity to develop the line he wishes to develop.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pearson?

Senator PEARSON. I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Muskie?

Senator MUSKIE. I have the same view of it.

I would like to see the chairman develop what he is developing as the basis for questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy?

HIGHEST AUTHORITY INFERRED AS BEHIND CIA REQUEST

Senator PERCY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. With full respect for Senator Case's position, I would like to ask a few questions because I did participate in the questioning of Mr. Helms before.

I would appreciate clarification of a certain number of points. However, I would be happy to yield to the Chair if it would help the continuity for you to proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. No, you did the questioning and you had some very pertinent questioning.

Senator PERCY. Thank you. Mr. Helms, could you clarify for us exactly the highest authority either that you know of or that was inferred stood behind the request of the CIA to engage in this Watergate activity?

You have mentioned Mr. Ehrlichman's name. Was that a direct request from Mr. Ehrlichman or through someone else?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, Senator Percy, there were—there are two or three different episodes involved here and I have to direct myself to the specific—

Senator PERCY. Let's separate them into the two then, the break-in of the Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, and the alleged attempted cover-up of the Watergate break-in.

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, I can put them in this kind of order.

The request to General Cushman to give some equipments to Mr. Hunt for a purpose which was never identified was conveyed from Mr. Ehrlichman to General Cushman.

The personality profile requests to be done on Dr. Ellsberg was conveyed from Mr. David Young, who was working for Mr. Ehrlichman, to the director of security of the CIA, Mr. Osborne.

Mr. David Young said that he was backed up in this request not only by Mr. Ehrlichman but by Dr. Kissinger, who were interested in getting on with this job of investigating the security leaks.

As far as the meeting of the 23d of June was concerned, when General Walters was asked to go to see Acting FBI Director Gray, that took place among Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, General Walters, and myself, and Mr. Haldeman, who was the President's Chief of Staff, was giving the directions, conducting the conversation.

Senator PERCY. Was there any inference at that time they were acting on behalf of any higher authority or were they acting on their own authority?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, when the President's Chief of Staff speaks to you, one obviously assumes that he is speaking with authority.

NOTIFICATION OF CIA'S DECISION NOT TO GO FURTHER

Senator PERCY. At the time that it was your decision that the Agency should not go any farther or be brought further into this matter, could you clarify as to whom you notified of that decision.

Mr. HELMS. On which matter, Senator Percy, because—

Senator PERCY. Either or both matters.

Mr. HELMS. Well, on the equipments and support for Mr. Hunt in August of 1971, I spoke to General Cushman who had been dealing with Mr. Ehrlichman on this, and instructed him to go back to Mr. Ehrlichman and say that we did not want to support Mr. Hunt with these equipments any further.

Senator PERCY. In that particular case, was there anyone else in the White House who either you or General Cushman advised directly or indirectly of this matter, the policy decision that you had arrived which, I think, was absolutely right; was there anyone else you advised of this other than Mr. Ehrlichman or was he the sole person who was advised by you or General Cushman?

Mr. HELMS. He was advised—

Senator PERCY. Of this affair?

Mr. HELMS. He was advised by General Cushman and, so far as I know, no one else was advised; as I say, so far as I know.

Senator PERCY. Then you were going to comment on the other matter?

Mr. HELMS. The other matters did not have that kind of a termination to them so that the only time that I dealt with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman on this other matter was on the 23d of June, this one meeting, and I never discussed it with them again.

WITNESS' DEPARTURE FROM CIA

Senator PERCY. There have been some newspaper reports, and I would like to give you the opportunity to amplify on them or clarify them or put them to rest, that your own departure from the CIA was directly linked to your refusal, which I consider right and proper and the only decision you could have arrived at, to cooperate with what you then considered improper and illegal actions for CIA.

Could you comment on whether there was any connection between your leaving CIA and this basic policy decision?

Mr. HELMS. Senator Percy, I do not know. I talked to the President, and I think the conversation is undoubtedly privileged and should remain so.

I can only say that at no time in this conversation was Watergate or anything connected with it ever mentioned.

Senator PERCY. I respect your position on executive privilege concerning your conversations with the President, but because I have had experience with members of the White House staff in which they told me in no uncertain terms that actions were taken as a result of certain votes I cast, did anyone else on the President's staff advise you directly or indirectly or by inference as to why you were leaving the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. Not to the best of my recollection, Senator Percy. When I talked to the President that day, Mr. Haldeman was present in the room but he did not say anything.

Senator PERCY. Do you have anything you would like to say with respect to your own belief as to why you suddenly left the CIA after many years of distinguished service?

Was there a request by you to take an ambassadorial post or did you have a desire to leave the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. I do not know how I can answer that question without repeating the entire conversation that the President and I had.

Senator PERCY. I think that should be a privileged conversation.

WHITE HOUSE EFFORTS TO INVOLVE CIA IN OTHER DOMESTIC SITUATIONS

Have there been any White House efforts to involve the CIA in other domestic situations than those that have already been reported?

Mr. HELMS. Senator Percy, I find this a very difficult question to answer unequivocally.

Inside the Government, there are always meetings and conversations going on about who might do what and who might give assistance here and who might give assistance there, and I think I would therefore best answer the question by saying that I know of no other situation in which the Agency gave the kind of assistance that we have been talking about here.

Senator PERCY. If there had been other situations, would it be likely you would have known of them or by now have been advised of them, considering your long relationship with everyone at the top level in the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. I would have hoped so, but I cannot say for sure.

Senator PERCY. Had the CIA accepted the suggestion from the White House staff that it take the blame for Watergate, what would this have done to the future of the CIA and its role in national security,

if you had continued and your acquiescence had been later exposed, as it might have and probably would have been?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, I faced that matter at the time, and in the conversation I had with General Walters, because he subsequently was called by Mr. Dean, I think, on three occasions, to discuss these matters, and I told him at the outset that he was to agree to absolutely nothing, that there was no way we should get involved in this affair, and that if we were to do so it would not only besmirch the Agency but might finish it as an American institution.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions regarding the colloquy that I had with Mr. Helms, in our executive session, but I forgot to notice what time I started. I have a feeling my 10 minutes are up, and I would like to yield back to you and go back to it later.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and proceed with it.

Senator PERCY. I think in deference to my colleagues I would like to come back after they have finished.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator Humphrey?

STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF CIA: 40 COMMITTEE

Senator HUMPHREY. I just have a couple of questions, Mr. Helms. These questions are directed primarily at getting a more complete discussion on the record as to the structural organization of the CIA and its participants. This committee has had testimony about it, I think it is called the 40 Committee.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. The committee which directs the CIA operations.

Was Attorney General Mitchell a member of that committee?

Mr. HELMS. He was a member of that committee, Senator Humphrey, during the period that he was Attorney General.

Senator HUMPHREY. So the Attorney General, as an officer, sits regularly with that committee?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, that was the way in this administration the composition of the committee was established, but I know that after Mr. Mitchell left office, the succeeding Attorney General never attended any meetings.

Senator HUMPHREY. Was Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman a member of the committee or did they sit with the committee?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, they were not members of the committee, but that is not to say that they never sat. I believe in one crisis meeting, one of them came down one day and having something to do with the press or something of this kind, but they were not regular members, and I do not think they were actually—well, they certainly were not participants.

This committee was chaired by Dr. Kissinger and he represented the President on this.

Senator HUMPHREY. How many times did Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman come, to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. HELMS. Now, I am rethinking this and this may have been a Washington Special Action Group Committee meeting rather than a

40 Committee meeting; I regret my misstatement, but it tended to be the same membership for both committees.

Senator HUMPHREY. What was the Washington Special Action Group?

Mr. HELMS. Well, there were various committees and subcommittees established during this period. One was called the Special Review Group, one was called the Washington Special Action Group, and the particular rubric simply was designed to cover the kind of deliberation they were going to have on the given day on a given subject.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you chair this committee?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I chaired none of them.

Senator HUMPHREY. The committee was chaired by whom?

Mr. HELMS. Dr. Kissinger.

Senator HUMPHREY. Dr. Kissinger?

To the best of your knowledge, did this so-called 40 Committee ever discuss the supply of materials to Mr. Hunt, the supplies that have been alluded to this morning?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; and I would have thought they would have been unaware of it.

Senator HUMPHREY. There was no mention of it, according to your recollection?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. And, Senator Humphrey, you understand that the 40 Committee passes on certain types of operations but not all operations.

CONFLICT OF AUTHORITY IN NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

Senator HUMPHREY. We had a quotation this morning, Mr. Helms, from the National Security Act of 1947, and that act, I think, has some ambiguities to it.

There seems to be on its face some conflict of authority. For example, you were required to—

Correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence. * * *

And then the latter part to which Senator Symington referred—

And *Provided Further*, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure * * *

Now, does that conflict with your responsibility, I mean with the prohibition of no internal security functions?

Mr. HELMS. Well, Senator Humphrey, I am not a lawyer and, therefore, I do not know whether it actually conflicts.

I would simply say that that charge, the last one you read, about protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, has been a very difficult charge on the Agency because it has left a kind of a gray area here.

Senator HUMPHREY. As to whether or not it is your responsibility or that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. HELMS. Well, our responsibility, domestic or foreign, and this whole thing is rather gray.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you not generally assume that the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency are directed toward foreign areas and foreign activities.

Mr. HELMS. I do indeed, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. And domestic or internal security matters are in the hands of the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have a close relationship?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. You try to keep that differentiation or that delineation clear?

Mr. HELMS. As clear as we can and when the lines have gotten wavy, as they sometimes do in human life, we have worked together to try to keep them straight and have an understanding as to who was doing what.

PRESUMPTION OF BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR WHITE HOUSE REQUEST

Senator HUMPHREY. When you get a request from a White House staff member, Mr. Helms, as you have over the years, what is the presumption of that request as to the basis of authority?

Mr. HELMS. The presumption is that it comes from the President.

Senator HUMPHREY. That would be particularly true of the Chief of Staff?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

In other words, Senator Humphrey, most of the telephone calls that the agencies of Government get from the White House are through staff assistants, they are not from the President himself.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is normal operating procedure, is it not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, and it has been under several administrations.

KEEPING CIA OUT OF DOMESTIC POLITICS

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it your judgment that agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, ought to be above participation in involvement in domestic politics?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you take all steps possible, as far as your directorship was concerned, to keep the CIA out of the domestic political arena?

Mr. HELMS. I did, sir, to the very best of my ability.

MR. HUNT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CIA, WHITE HOUSE

Senator HUMPHREY. Was Mr. Hunt a member of the CIA staff when he asked for these materials?

Mr. HELMS. He was not.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it not rather unusual that a man who was not a member of the Central Intelligence Agency, even if sent by the White House, should be accommodated?

Mr. HELMS. It was simply because Mr. Ehrlichman had asked he be assisted for a White House function, and I must say that at that time I recall there was no indication that anybody was going to be guilty of any wrongdoing. Assistance to the Presidency has not been a crime up until comparatively recently. [Laughter.]

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it not rather unusual that a private citizen would be used for such a mission?

Mr. HELMS. I do not know why they hired him, sir. I was not consulted, I was never asked anything about him. We simply heard one day that he had been hired as a special consultant to the White House.

Senator HUMPHREY. So at that particular time, Mr. Helms, he then was—had a direct relationship to the White House as a special consultant?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

I was told this past week that the minutes of a staff meeting which took place on July 8, 1971, and this is a staff meeting which I used to conduct every morning at the Agency, reflected that General Cushman had mentioned at the staff meeting that he had had a telephone call from Mr. Ehrlichman saying:

Mr. Howard Hunt had been hired as a special consultant at the White House and would the Agency please help him if he had any requests to make.

Senator HUMPHREY. Under those circumstances, of course, the situation as to the request is considerably different than had it come from just a private citizen. I am fully aware, Mr. Helms, that you must respond to requests from the White House; I think you know I understand that.

But what I am getting at here is that this Agency, as other agencies, was not responding to a clerk or a stenographer, but was responding to what was considered to be high authority direct from the executive branch of Government, the White House itself; is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct, Senator Humphrey.

PRESUMPTION REGARDING REQUESTS FROM WHITE HOUSE STAFF

Senator HUMPHREY. And it is your understanding over the years when an assistant to the President or a chief of staff to the President, or a counsel to the President, or a security adviser to the President requests information or materials or equipment from the Central Intelligence Agency, that that is a request from the Presidency itself?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Helms, I just want to say I have always had the highest regard for you, as you know, and I continue to have it. I believe that you acted in what was the best interests of this country, but I think we have to assess where the responsibility lies. Any man who has been in the executive branch of the Government knows when a chief of staff or a top official of the White House staff asks an agency of Government for materials or information, that generally it means that it is official, that is the presumption, is it not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

USING INSTITUTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE FOR POLITICAL MANIPULATION

Senator HUMPHREY. I would hope that as we go along that we might be able to get some clarification of law, what checks and balances

we should have to prevent this sort of thing that has cast a shadow over CIA.

I think that this country is in mortal danger when agencies like the Secret Service or the Federal Bureau of Investigation can be used for political manipulation, when the professional competence of the Central Intelligence Agency can in any way be compromised or prostituted. If such action comes from the inner circle of the White House, then they have performed a greater disservice for this country than any other thing they have done. You can always clear up a bad situation with an individual, by firing or a new election, but it takes a long time to rebuild confidence in basic institutions. These are institutions of intelligence and police and law enforcement, and whenever they are used for political purposes, this country is in mortal danger; no citizen is safe. I appreciate the fact that General Walters, yourself and a few others were willing to stand up to pressure.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, did you pass?

Senator PELL. I am waiting for some material from the staff.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

QUESTION OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES

In following up what the Senator from Minnesota stated, of course, the real question which interested us in the previous hearing was how far, if at all, the CIA has become involved in domestic activities.

We have had the experience of the military assuming surveillance, of a very broad program of surveillance, Senator Ervin had pursued it and that was the reason, I think, he wrote me the letter asking that we inquire about the CIA's activity.

This is the broad question that we were interested in, hopefully to protect private citizens from any further surveillance than they are subjected to by the FBI, which has the primary responsibility.

The questions in that hearing, both by Senator Percy and Senator Case and myself, were really directed at that primary question of just what does the CIA, if anything, do in domestic activities. We were not at that time, of course, aware either of what has subsequently come about, and the part, I think, that should be focused on at the moment is just how accurate your responses were.

I want to read as background a couple of questions that Senator Case and I asked you in the meeting that I referred to.

Senator Case asked this question:

On another matter, back to the CIA, if I may, I expect the President can ask the CIA to do anything he wants to do. Of course, whether the CIA does it or not I suppose depends upon many things.

It has been called to my attention that in 1969 or 1970 the White House asked that all intelligence agencies join in the effort to learn as much as they could about the anti-war movement and during this period U.S. Army Intelligence became involved and kept files on U.S. citizens.

Do you know anything about any activity on the part of the CIA in that connection? Was it asked to be involved?

Mr. HELMS. I do not recall whether we were asked, but we were not involved because, it seemed to me that was a clear violation of what our charter was.

Senator CASE. What do you do in a case like that?

Mr. HELMS. I would simply go to explain to the President this did not seem to me to be advisable.

That exchange gives the thrust of what Senator Case was interested in, and I asked a number of questions along that line, and then at the end, after we had had a rather long hearing, I said this:

Is there something that I should have asked you about that I didn't to which you ought to reply?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, let me in an effort to sort of close this, about this, Watergate business, you have asked the relevant questions. I have no more information to convey and I know nothing about it. Honestly I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. And your people, other than that one man who was a consultant--

The CHAIRMAN. I may interject that reference, I presume, to Martinez, I believe--

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, as I recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. [Reading].

Mr. HELMS. We had nothing to do with it, honestly we didn't.

That was, I would say, a fair summary of what we were after, to see whether or not the CIA was involved in domestic activities. We did not know about any of the things really that have been revealed subsequent to that. It would appear clarification is needed as you so positively, unequivocally said you did not have anything whatever to do with the Watergate or with, really we were beyond Watergate, we were talking about all domestic activities. I certainly had in mind the questions by Senator Ervin.

RESOURCES AT COMMAND OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING COMMUNITY

Were you also in any way engaged in surveillance of private citizens? That activity was very offensive to, I think, most people when we discovered that the military was keeping dossiers and making studies of all kinds on innumerable people, hundreds of them. With the enormous resources at the command of the intelligence community, it was getting to be a little beyond reason.

At one point, I think in that testimony it was estimated that the intelligence-gathering community spends over \$6 billion, all over, foreign and domestic. That is an enormous amount of resources at their command.

RELATIONSHIPS OF MR. HUNT, MR. LIDDY WITH CIA

To make that a little more complete, I had asked you earlier in that hearing, it is a little difficult to get this all exactly in the proper order, but I had asked you this:

Was Mr. E. Howard Hunt, Jr., an employee?

Mr. HELMS. He also had been an employee of the agency.

The CHAIRMAN. In a similar situation?

Mr. HELMS. He also, but my recollection is that he resigned rather than retired. I am not sure exactly. It was one or the other.

About when?

About 2, 2½ years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. He had no relationship to the CIA since then?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is G. Gordon Liddy's relationship with the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. None.

At least to me it left the impression that there had been no relationships. Now it appears there has been some.

This is really the kind of inconsistency, at least apparent inconsistency, that I thought should be explained. I do not understand why you would say to us that neither Mr. Hunt nor Mr. Liddy had had any relationship whatever since their retirement.

How do you explain this, Mr. Helms?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, as I recall that meeting on February 7, you were asking certain questions on behalf of Senator Ervin, and they all related to the Watergate break-in. The Watergate break-in was all I was directing my attention to because I believed that is what you were interested in and that is what the questions indicated you were interested in.

QUESTIONS PHRASED TO ELICIT CIA CONNECTION WITH DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

The CHAIRMAN. Let me at the start just say, no. Prior to that I had engaged in quite a long discussion and expressed my doubt about your training of domestic police officers --there is quite a bit in here--I was not directing it just to Watergate. I did not know much about Watergate at that time. I knew very little.

We were asking about the general proposition of any activity of the CIA in domestic affairs. That was the thrust of it.

If you will recall, I went into considerable detail and raised doubts about the CIA undertaking to train or counsel or direct any of the domestic police departments. I thought that was the FBI's responsibility.

The FBI conducts every year rather extensive training for sheriffs and law enforcement officers; I have been aware of that. That was, we thought, part of their responsibilities; I do not recall I ever objected to that.

But to get the CIA into the business--if you will recall I was talking about that. These questions were general. I tried to make it as all inclusive as I could, not just about Watergate because I did not know much, I was not nearly as much concerned about Watergate in February as everybody is now. In all candor, I think my questions were phrased to elicit from you any connection with, not just Watergate, but with any domestic activity.

In order just to anticipate what I am going to ask you about, it is this approach to you about the laundering of the money and the requests about Mexico. But I do not really believe that you can say we were only interested in Watergate.

But proceed.

Mr. HELMS. Sir, in the context of the time that I testified, I did not answer those questions dishonestly nor was I trying to be as narrow as the imputation seems to be.

The only things that have come to light here recently are that Mr. Hunt, as an employee of the White House, was given some equipments but I was never told these were for any illegal or domestic acts. As a matter of fact, it is quite clear from the testimony that has been raised before other committees up to now that nobody knew he was going to be involved in any domestic activity, and this never occurred to me when I was testifying before you as a domestic activity even in the broader context in which you were speaking.

WITNESS' RELATIONSHIP WITH MESSRS. HUNT, LIDDY

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think my questions related just to Watergate. I was asking you your relationship with Hunt and Liddy. Did

you have anything to do with Hunt and Liddy is what I really asked you, and if I read it correctly, you said "No."

Mr. HELMS. But, Mr. Chairman, in the context of the questions I was answering, this had to do with an agency's fiduciary or hiring or employee relations with Hunt and Liddy, and I answered those questions absolutely honestly.

This man was not employed by the Agency at the time he came out to get these equipments. He was employed by the White House.

Now in retrospect and in hindsight one can stretch the word "relationship" very much more widely than I construed it at the time because all the preceding questions had to do with who was on the payroll and who was not on the payroll, and under what circumstances.

USE OF HUNT, LIDDY DISCUSSED WITH DR. KISSINGER?

The CHAIRMAN. At one point, you said that you would report to the President. Could you tell us, did you ever discuss this matter, the use of Mr. Hunt or Liddy, with Dr. Kissinger?

Did you ever have a discussion with him about these matters?

Mr. HELMS. I do not recall any direct conversation with him about Mr. Hunt.

The CHAIRMAN. About any matters.

DR. KISSINGER'S TITLE

Was he not Chairman of the National Security Council? Does he not have—

Mr. HELMS. No, the Chairman of the National Security Council is the President of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. What is his role in the National Security Council, Special Assistant for National Security?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; I believe his title is Assistant for National Security Affairs.

EFFECT OF WHITE HOUSE'S REORGANIZATION DIRECTIVE

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Chair yield for one question in context?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. You were formerly the chairman of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, were you not?

Mr. HELMS. That is the U.S. Intelligence—you mean the U.S. Intelligence Board, or do you mean the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, which was set up under the November 5 decree of—I forget; 1971, I guess, and Dr. Kissinger became Chairman of that.

Senator SYMINGTON. There was a time when the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was head of the Intelligence Committee of the NSC, the NSC being an advisory board to the President. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was relieved of that position and it was given to the Committee of Forty, as I understand it; correct?

Mr. HELMS. The Director of Central Intelligence has always been the chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board. Now under the small

reorganization directive which was put out by the White House, I believe on November 5, 1971, I think that is the date, but please don't hold me to it, there was established a National Security Council Intelligence Committee and Dr. Kissinger was given the chairmanship of that new committee.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you were a member of that committee?

Mr. HELMS. I was, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MATTER NOT DISCUSSED WITH DR. KISSINGER

The CHAIRMAN. Then you did not discuss this with Dr. Kissinger?

Mr. HELMS. Not that I recall, Mr. Chairman.

MATERIALS SUPPLIED TO MR. HUNT

The CHAIRMAN. What puzzles me, too, about this request is for what possible legal purpose could the kind of materials that you supplied Mr. Hunt with be used for? It seems to me, the very nature of the materials indicated it was for some illegal, in a domestic sense illegal, activity. I am just asking you to explain what did that mean to a person like yourself or General Cushman for someone to come to you for burglar tools?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, may I say at the time General Cushman authorized these equipments they were equipments that could have been purchased in any store in the United States that had such equipment. There was no implication whatever that they were to be used either domestically or foreign, specifically.

As I recall from General Cushman's testimony, he was asked for some help, that this man wanted to conduct an interview, it was not indicated whether it was a domestic or foreign interview. In fact, it might even be an implication that since this fellow had been a foreign operative most of his life maybe he was making a trip overseas on behalf of the White House but I must say, and I want to emphasize this, to the best of my knowledge Mr. Hunt was not given by the agency any burglar equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not very expert on these matters, of course; I don't know what the disguises and false things that I saw pictures of in the paper are normally considered. They would not seem to me ordinary equipment to be supplied by you. If they were so readily available, why wouldn't you go down to the hardware and buy them? Why did he get them from you?

Mr. HELMS. I think because he found it was going to be a lot simpler to do it that way.

CONCERN ABOUT CIA EDGLING INTO DOMESTIC FIELD

The CHAIRMAN. I don't believe anybody on this committee wants the CIA to become in any way involved in domestic surveillance, domestic police activities in any fashion. They have too much power, too many resources, too much manpower. It imposes upon the privacy of our citizens too much. That is what is the business of this committee.

On many occasions reports you have given this committee on activity in the Vietnam war have proved more accurate than the De-

fense Intelligence Agency [DIA] or any other agencies; I told you that both public and private on many occasions. All this committee is concerned about is the CIA edging over into the domestic field, even on the President's orders. I agree it puts you in a very difficult situation if the White House requests you to do something, but if it is done contrary to the law, that is that—whether the President asked you to do it or not. That is what these hearings are all about. I suppose we should take curative action if as a result of this there has been an infringement upon domestic affairs by the CIA.

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE CIA

I would say, in all candor, that it is the failure of the Congress, especially the Senate, which twice has been requested to set up a committee to supervise, to have some guidance over the CIA. I think we voted twice in the Senate on that very specific problem: to create a committee comparable to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee; and each time the administration has opposed it vigorously and we have lost. We didn't have enough votes in the Senate, so in that sense it is the Senate's own fault that there has been no real supervisory or reporting committee for the CIA. This testimony, if it does indicate some infringement by the White House upon the CIA, would indicate that is a good reason, a further reason, why a joint committee ought to be set up. That is one of the things legislatively that could come out of these hearings, that the CIA does deserve closer surveillance.

ATTEMPT TO ENLIST CIA TO HEAD OFF FBI INVESTIGATION

It seems from the chronology that in June and July of 1972, just about a year ago, Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman, and Mr. Haldeman tried to enlist you and General Walters in an attempt to use the CIA to head off a FBI investigation of the funds which had been "laundered" through Mexico. Very properly, General Walters, in consultation with you, refused to go along. That is what I am informed; that is correct, is it not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. But may I correct something, Mr. Chairman, that you have just said?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; if it is wrong I hope you will.

Mr. HELMS. At the time of June 23, which was 6 days after the break-in of the Watergate, that General Walters was asked to see Acting Director Gray, of the FBI, to discourage further FBI investigation in Mexico, at that meeting I knew nothing about any funds having been laundered in Mexico. That emerged later.

The CHAIRMAN. When you were called to the office, I believe you said on June 23, 1972, that was 6 days after the break-in, General Walters' affidavit of May 12, 1973, states, and I quote:

It has been decided at the White House that I (General Walters) would go to Acting FBI Director Gray and tell him that now that the five suspects were arrested, further inquiries into the Mexican aspects of this matter might jeopardize some of the CIA's covert activities in that area.

And General Walters did in fact go and convey the message to Mr. Gray. Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. So far as I know it is accurate. I assume he

conveyed it because he told me he did, but I don't know that firsthand.

Senator CASE. And you knew that and he reported to you about it at the time.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, the CIA operations were totally unidentified and I said at the time that I didn't think there was any problem about this.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who decided at the White House that Walters would go to Gray with this message?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. He was simply directed to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know whether it was Mr. Haldeman.

Mr. HELMS. It was Mr. Haldeman who told him to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. It was Mr. Haldeman who told him to do it and you don't know whether he used the name of the President or not.

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; I do not recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you present at the time Mr. Haldeman told Mr. Walters to do this?

Mr. HELMS. I was sitting in the room; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And, well, you just don't recall whether or not Haldeman said this was the President's orders.

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you or General Walters ask him whether the President approved this proposed use of the CIA to head off an investigation of a domestic matter?

Mr. HELMS. Investigation of a domestic matter?

The CHAIRMAN. The laundering of the money is a domestic matter.

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask Mr. Haldeman if he had the approval of the President to do that?

Mr. HELMS. I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did General Walters ask him?

Mr. HELMS. I do not recall that he did.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise Mr. Haldeman that this was an improper use of the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. No, I didn't—I implied that I did not think that CIA operations would be put in jeopardy. Mr. Haldeman made some incoherent remark about the investigation running into the Bay of Pigs and I said I was not concerned about the Bay of Pigs, that was years before, and I had no interest or concern about it any further.

When General Walters and I left this meeting and we were on our way downstairs and he was going off to see Acting Director Gray I told him that I thought that he should limit his remarks to Director Gray to saying if any investigations in Mexico run into CIA operations that in keeping with the delimitation agreement between the CIA and the FBI that he simply notify us that this had occurred. I thought that was a perfectly legitimate reminder to a new Director of the FBI on behalf of the agency.

MEETING OF GENERAL WALTERS, MR. HELMS, WITH MR. HALDEMAN

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to have it unclear, you did or did not advise Mr. Haldeman that this was an improper use of the agency?

Mr. HELMS. I did not use those words.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of words did you use?

Mr. HELMS. I simply told him I didn't think that any CIA operations were involved and we had had nothing to do with the Watergate break-in whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I didn't believe this had anything to do with Watergate; I thought this had to do with the laundering of money. Didn't it?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, as I said a moment ago, I knew nothing about any money being laundered on this occasion. It was later that I learned that money had been laundered in Mexico. There was no discussion of money in any way.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman that there were no Mexican operations which could be jeopardized by the FBI investigation?

Mr. HELMS. I did not say that because there always could have been. They are rather ramified. As far as I knew none had been jeopardized up until then but an ongoing investigation might have run into CIA operations; I had no way of knowing this at the time. I had no records or files with me and it would have been a statement that I shouldn't have made under the circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you at that time or any time request an opportunity to report this or discuss it with the President?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, anybody may.

Senator CASE. Because this is a terribly important question, could you tell us in your own words how this matter came up in the discussion between Haldeman and you and your deputy. What was it that the FBI was doing that Mr. Haldeman asked you to consider as interfering with CIA operations? Please tell us all that you know. This is very crucial.

Mr. HELMS. Senator Case, General Walters and I received a telephone call on the morning, I don't know what time, of June 23. We didn't personally receive it, it came to our office; and, as best I recall these events, we were asked to come down to the White House for a meeting to take place at noon with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, subject unidentified.

Later in the morning we were informed that the meeting had been put off until 1 o'clock. So General Walters and I decided we would have lunch together and then go to the meeting. We arrived at 1 o'clock at the White House, or thereabouts, and went to Mr. Ehrlichman's office where we had been told to go. We waited for a few minutes, then Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman came in, and Mr. Haldeman introduced the conversation by saying that, and I don't recall the exact words so please don't hold me to them, but as best I recall this that the Watergate break-in was being capitalized on by the opposition, that it was causing problems, unidentified, and it had been decided that General Walters was to go to see FBI Acting Director Gray, and in connection with the investigations that the FBI was conducting in Mexico that these should be stopped because they might run into CIA operations down there.

I do not recall whether it was before that day or after that day that the FBI had asked the Agency about a Mexican lawyer, and I don't

remember the man's name exactly, it is something like Ogarro, but please don't hold me to it specifically, it is in the record someplace, and we looked into the question of this lawyer on subsequent days and discovered that we knew nothing about him. He did exist in Mexico but he had no relations with the Agency of any kind.

I repeat that Mr. Haldeman also made some mention about this investigation running into the Bay of Pigs, it was a rather incoherent statement that I did not understand, and I said I was not interested in the Bay of Pigs and it didn't make any difference to me about that.

So this meeting did not last very long. It was made very clear that this was the way it had been decided that General Walters was to go and have this conversation with Gray and that it was not explained to me why I was not asked to do it. It was made very clear that he was to do it.

FBI INVESTIGATION NOT DESCRIBED

Senator CASE. Was the kind of activity that the FBI was conducting and concerned with described by them to you?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; it was not and, Senator Case, I would like to ask the committee to focus on the fact that this was 6 days after the Watergate break-in at which time a lot of the subsequent information that came out was not known and, as a matter of fact, I couldn't even understand why they were concerned about Mexico at the time. That was one of the reasons I modified or tried to modify what I thought General Walters was going to say in an effort to keep him within the bounds of legitimacy.

Senator CASE. You had then no idea what the FBI investigation was yourself.

Mr. HELMS. I did not, sir.

Senator CASE. All right, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to interrupt.

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

Senator PERCY. Senator Case, may I ask at that point, did you at any time, Mr. Helms, as a matter of practice, make memorandums for your own files of such conversations or meetings?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I did not. It was agreed between General Walters and me that he would make the memorandum.

Senator PERCY. As I understand it, General Walters did make a memorandum of that meeting.

Mr. HELMS. I believe that is right.

Senator PERCY. Have you seen that memorandum or did you at any time review that memorandum with him to be certain of the accuracy of it?

Mr. HELMS. I read the memorandum at the time or sometime in that general timeframe, at least after it was written. I did not review it for accuracy with him. I just simply read it and I think that maybe this is something that I should have done to go over every word and every line but I didn't.

Senator PERCY. Was it your impression when you read it that it was generally accurate as you recall the meeting?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator PERCY. And you have said that you do not recall that the name of the President was invoked.

Mr. HELMS. In the memorandum, Senator Percy, I believe he had a phrase that this was being done at the President's wish. I don't recall that this was precisely the case but I didn't cavil with him at the time because, quite frankly, back then there didn't seem to be anything particularly to cavil about. You know, the whole business of a so-called coverup has come up since. It was very hard to interpret that approach on that particular day as having been any coverup. It was a request having been made by the Chief of Staff of the President to take a certain action.

AUTHORITY FOR DECISION

Senator PERCY. But were there requests for further amplification by you or General Walters as to why, so that you would have a better understanding and knowledge of what you were being asked to do?

Mr. HELMS. As I recall it during the meeting, I made an effort to say, "Well, you know, what is the purpose of this," and the question was not answered and it was simply repeated, "It's been decided that General Walters is going to see the Acting Director Gray."

Senator PERCY. In other words, when it was stated, "It's been decided," was it your understanding the decision had been made by the President and therefore this was the authority by which you were being ordered to do this?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, I can only say, sir, since it was his Chief of Staff who was tell me to do it he had proper authority to do it.

WAS NAME, AUTHORITY OF PRESIDENT INVOKED AT MEETING?

Senator PERCY. Can you recall the meeting well enough—and I realize you have had thousands of meetings since then—because of the unusual nature of the request in being asked to come down without being told ahead of time what it was for, and obviously Watergate was on everyone's mind then—and you testified before us 3 days after Watergate and we talked a little bit about it then—do you remember the meeting specifically so that you can categorically state that the name of the President was not invoked, or that the authority of the President was not invoked, by them.

Mr. HELMS. Well, the difficulty is, Senator Percy, that I simply do not recall any more and any other answer would not be an honest answer.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, Senator Case.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

GENERAL WALTERS' MEMORANDUMS

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to get this straight. This hearing involves your good name. I have seen the memorandums General Walters made after he saw Mr. Gray. There are some 11 of them, of various meetings, of conversations with Mr. Dean, et cetera. They should be made public in due course. However, in the memorandum which Senator Percy has referred to, there cer-

tainly is no security involved. Walters was under oath. We got these memorandums, but we had to ask for them. A staff member suggested we ask him if he had any memorandums and he said he did; we asked where they were, and he said in the White House, and we said, "Well, you must have a copy of them, haven't you?" And he said, "No." Mr. Buzhardt, who has been transferred recently from the Pentagon to the White House, along with other efficient people in the Pentagon, cooperated with us. He immediately sent these documents over, memorandums General Walters had made shortly after these meetings.

A Walters memorandum said, "Haldeman turned to me and said it is the President's wish that you go to see Mr. Gray," is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. That is what the memorandum says, yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PEARSON. Mr. Chairman, what were the CIA memorandums doing at the White House?

Mr. HELMS. Senator Pearson, I have been in Iran and I don't know why they were sent to the White House. This is only within recent days that they were sent to the White House, within the last week, I assume.

WITNESS' IMPRESSION OF REQUEST

Senator MUSKIE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Muskie.

Senator MUSKIE. It seems a most curious kind of request, its ambiguity, the refusal or failure to respond to questions to clarify it. Did it strike you as curious at the time?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, Senator Muskie. But I didn't know what was behind it. You know, I have been, as Senator Humphrey has pointed out, dealing with the White House for a long time and sometimes the White House has information and interests that other people don't have and one comes to accept this fact and, at that time, I had nothing else to go on and I assumed they had some legitimate reason for making the request.

Senator MUSKIE. Was it not unusual for the White House to make such an ambiguous request of you?

Mr. HELMS. I would have thought so, yes.

Senator MUSKIE. What did pass through your mind, what was your impression of the request? Did you form any judgment, raise any question?

Mr. HELMS. It was rather one of mystification as to what was going on here.

Senator MUSKIE. Did you relate it to Watergate in your mind?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I did not because I had no basis for doing this. I couldn't figure out what a break-in to the Democratic National Committee headquarters had to do with Mexico, quite frankly.

Senator MUSKIE. So you had no idea at all what kind of FBI activity you were being asked to evaluate.

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. And that is why, Senator Muskie, when I spoke to General Walters after the meeting I said,

I think you should put this to Acting Director Gray since he is a new Director of the FBI within the legitimate limits that the CIA has the right to talk to the FBI, that is, a long standing arrangement if the FBI runs into CIA operations or the CIA runs into FBI operations one side notifies the other.

WITNESS' PRESENCE AT MEETING

Senator MUSKIE. Did you wonder why you were present at the meeting?

Mr. HELMS. I did.

Senator MUSKIE. Your presence seems to have served no purpose.

GENERAL WALTERS' MEETING WITH MR. GRAY

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, would it be out of order to ask Mr. Helms to follow this particular incident down as to his understanding, his recollection of what happened.

General Walters went to see Mr. Gray; he went once. What is Mr. Helms' understanding of what happened then and how many subsequent meetings along the same line were there and who asked them to be continued and so forth. Will you give us your story on that, please?

Mr. HELMS. As best I recall it, General Walters went to see Mr. Gray rather promptly after this meeting we have been talking about. He reported back to me later on that day that he had seen Mr. Gray, that they had a conversation about this, that he had spoken to Mr. Gray about the Mexican thing, as I recall it he had been told to see him by the White House. I think he avoided saying to Mr. Gray who at the White House had told him to come down specifically, senior officials, I think, was the way he phrased it, and that he had spoken about the Mexican operations and that they might run into CIA operations, and Mr. Gray said, "Yes," or something to the effect, "I am familiar with the arrangements that the CIA and the FBI have on their operations and that if we run into any we will certainly let you know."

I believe at that time Mr. Gray mentioned something about money when he said there has been a large sum of money floating around to General Walters.

Now, subsequent to that I never had any further conversations with either Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman on this subject.

GENERAL WALTERS' MEETINGS WITH MR. JOHN DEAN

On the Monday following this Friday, General Walters was asked to come to see Mr. Dean at the White House.

Senator CASE. General Walters reported this to you in accordance with your normal relationship.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. And, as General Walters has testified, because I sat next to him in the Armed Services Committee the other day, so that when he was testifying I was listening, he said that he didn't know who Mr. Dean was, so Mr. Dean said:

Will you come and talk to me about the subject matter of the meeting that you had on Friday with Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman and you can call Mr. Ehrlichman to verify the fact that I am authorized to talk to you about this.

And, according to General Walters, he did call Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Ehrlichman said, "Les, go ahead and talk to Mr. Dean."

So he went to see Mr. Dean and he had a meeting with him. Incidentally, I want to come back to something I said earlier, that it was at this juncture or thereabouts that I spoke to General Walters:

If any efforts are made to involve the Agency in the Watergate break-in, in which the Agency was never involved, I want you to resist them because we must not besmirch the name of the Agency, we must not get it involved in any way in this thing and I want you to stand absolutely firm on this.

When General Walters returned he said that Mr. Dean had talked to him about the Watergate break-in, that some of the participants were becoming, I believe the word was "wobbly," was there any way that the agency could use its covert funds to pay bail for these men or to pay their salaries if they went to jail, and General Walters said absolutely not. It would be improper, and the agency couldn't conceivably do anything like that.

I believe it was at a subsequent meeting with Mr. Dean this came up again and this time General Walters said:

You must understand we don't have covert funds for this purpose and that any use of covert funds that are not specifically stated in the budget must be reported to the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

Apparently from what General Walters says now this rather cooled Mr. Dean's ardor for this approach.

These were feelers that were put out. There was no request ever made of General Walters. These were hypothetical things, could this be done, could that be done, you know, "Could you help out here," and all of these approaches were resisted totally, to the best of my knowledge and, as General Walters reported to me and I believe as stated under oath.

NO FURTHER DISCUSSION ABOUT INVESTIGATION IN MEXICO

Senator CASE. As far as you were told by General Walters or your own as far as your own knowledge takes you, there was no further discussion about the Mexican investigation or the investigation in Mexico.

Mr. HELMS. No. The only thing that happened subsequently that I should say is that when I got the information that we knew nothing about this Mexican lawyer I reported this to Acting Director Gray myself on the telephone.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WITNESS SWORN

The CHAIRMAN. I am just reminded by the Senator from Missouri, Mr. Helms, that not being accustomed to investigations, I forgot to swear you today. Do you mind being sworn now? Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HELMS. I do, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you agree that your answers would not have been any different, that you have already given, had you been sworn?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I thought I was sworn. I thought these carried over from other hearings. [Laughter]

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, I didn't think about it, I confess.

Senator Percy.

REACTION AT CIA BEING ASKED TO ENGAGE IN WATERGATE COVERUP

Senator PERCY. Just a few questions, and then I would like to go back and clarify for the record the testimony we took in executive session.

Could you describe, Mr. Helms, how you reacted when General Walters and CIA officially were asked to engage in an activity which obviously was a coverup for the Watergate affair? What sort of reaction did you and General Walters have? Did you discuss it and did he share your feelings?

Mr. HELMS. These were feelers put out. These were not propositions or proposals made and my reaction to this was—

Senator PERCY. But you had the reaction they were not feelers to see what could be done to get to the bottom of this affair and get the truth out. That was pretty obvious. What sort of a reaction did you have when you got these feelers from high-level people speaking, presumably, as you say, on behalf of the President; that is the presumption of their position—I am not presuming that the President did know—I am saying that is the presumption anyone would have that they were speaking for the President.

Mr. HELMS. Senator Percy, my total preoccupation was to keep the CIA uninvolved in this whole matter and I wanted to see to it that that happened, and I was successful in so doing, and it seemed to me that was my responsibility and, as far as the actual investigation was concerned, we were collaborating with the FBI in every way possible.

Senator PERCY. Excuse me, Senator Case, go right ahead.

WHY DIDN'T WITNESS GO TO PRESIDENT?

Senator CASE. Going back to the question I asked in our earlier testimony what you would do if you were asked to do something improper or harmful to the Agency. You said, I think, that you would go to the President.

I wondered, could you tell us, why you didn't go to the President on the basis of this background that you are describing to us.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. My interest, Senator Case, was in keeping the Agency out of this thing under any and all circumstances, and, frankly, I wanted to stay as head of the Agency, to continue to keep it out of it and I thought I would be more successful than somebody else who might come along later.

Senator CASE. Even in the light of the fact that General Walters said that he had, as I recall it, stated that it was at the request of the President he was doing this. You presumably had seen that memorandum?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir; I had seen the memorandum. I think, I would like, I realize at this point that there are always questions of moral judgments about who should have done what under what circumstances. I was trying to do the best I knew how in the job that I was being paid to do.

I remember some years ago I was asked by the Secretary of State in President Johnson's administration to go down and see certain Senators on Capitol Hill in connection with a certain matter. My first call was on Senator Russell, who was then the chairman of the Armed

Services Committee, and the man who, to whom in the Senate the Agency reported, and I told him what my mission was, and he said, "Well, I guess if you have been told to do this you have got to do it. But I would like to point out to you that more people get in trouble in this town by getting involved in things which are not their legitimate concerns than for any other reason." I took that lesson to heart, and simply went back to the Secretary of State and told him of my conversation with Senator Russell and said, "I think under the circumstance you had better use somebody else," and he agreed.

WERE THERE FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO INVOLVE CIA?

Senator PERCY. Mr. Helms, was there any further pressure put on you after the feeler was categorically turned down by General Walters? Was there any further attempt made to involve the CIA in any indirect or direct way?

Mr. HELMS. To the best of my recollection, it was not, and this, after this period, toward the end of June, 1972, I heard nothing more about the matter.

APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL WALTERS

Senator PERCY. May I ask how the appointment of General Walters happened to be made? Was he your selection and did you seek him out and ask him to come into the Agency as your deputy?

Mr. HELMS. General Walters, his job and mine as Director were Presidential appointments and he was nominated by the President.

Senator PERCY. And you did not initiate his name?

Mr. HELMS. I did not.

Senator PERCY. The name was submitted to you before the nomination was sent down, however, and discussed with you?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Senator PERCY. And his qualifications discussed with you?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Senator PERCY. You assented without any disagreement over it at all?

Mr. HELMS. Well, it was the President's right to make the appointment and his—

Senator PERCY. Would it be your right, if you felt there were someone more qualified, to suggest someone else?

Senator SYMINGTON. Would the Senator yield?

Senator PERCY. I would be happy to yield.

Senator SYMINGTON. It would be his right, but that would have ended his connection with the executive branch, based on my experience in that branch.

Senator PERCY. Well, I am not sure we have evidence to support that judgment. Your experience, Senator Symington, is greater than mine in dealing with the Agency, and with executive relationships to the agencies, but I presume there have been cases of disagreement when names are suggested. But you had no reason to object, Mr. Helms?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. I would have preferred to have had an Agency man put in the job.

Senator PERCY. You would have preferred that.

GENERAL WALTERS' ROLE

I am not in any way disparaging General Walters, who I think has helped immensely in this whole matter in a very straightforward way, but was there any reason why he would be directed to go down and see Mr. Gray, also a White House appointee, rather than the Director of the Agency, on a matter that looked like it might have grave consequences?

Mr. HELMS. I thought it very odd at the time, Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. But your working relationship with General Walters—your agreement that he should write up these memorandums concerning these meetings—is that standard practice or did you just both decide, or one of you decide in this case, it would be well to have immediate impressions put down on paper to confirm these rather unusual requests being made of the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. As best I recollect it it was the latter. I now learned that the memorandum for the record which he wrote about the June 23 meeting was written some days later but since he was involved in seeing Mr. Gray and that he was involved in seeing Mr. Dean and I was not, it seemed only sensible, to have him write them all since they all sort of interrelate.

WITNESS' RELATIONSHIP WITH WHITE HOUSE STAFF

Senator PERCY. When the CIA through you and General Walters flatly refused to go along with these feelers, did you notice any change in relationship between yourself and the members of the White House staff who had made the request of you—Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean?

Mr. HELMS. I did not, because frankly I do not recall any further—I had never had any dealings with Mr. Dean until much later, in fact I don't think I had even met him at the time; and, so far as Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were concerned, I don't know whether I saw them in meetings but I certainly didn't have any private meetings with them subsequent to this which would have indicated their attitude one way or the other.

WITNESS' DEPARTURE FROM CIA

Senator PERCY. Do you have any feeling that your refusal to cooperate had anything to do with your eventually leaving the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, as I said a moment ago, I honestly do not know.

Senator GRIFFIN. Could I ask a question?

Senator PERCY. Of course, Senator.

Senator GRIFFIN. How long after this experience, this meeting with Mr. Ehrlichman and Haldeman, did you learn that you were to become an Ambassador rather than continuing as the head of the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, these meetings took place in June 1972 and my conversation with the President about my leaving the Agency took place, I think, 10 days to 2 weeks after the election in November.

Senator GRIFFIN. And that is how you learned?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, there had been no discussion of this prior to that time.

Senator GRIFFIN. Of that decision. Thank you.

HEARING RECORD OF JUNE 20, 1972

Senator PERCY. Just to refresh our memories, 3 days after the break-in, June 17, 1972, we had an executive session on the ABM treaty and the interim agreement. At the very end of your testimony I asked, and this was June 20, "Do you want to volunteer any information on Mr. Jim McCord?"

You replied, "Yes; I will volunteer anything you would like. I just want to distance myself from my alumnus."

You added further, "I don't have—I can't conceive of what that caper was all about, I really can't conceive it."

So 3 days afterward you clearly put on the record the fact that you had had no knowledge of it and couldn't imagine what it was all about.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that date, pardon me.

Senator PERCY. That was June 20, 1972.

GENERAL WALTERS' SWORN STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Could I read one paragraph from Walters? This is General Walters' sworn deposition:

Senator PERCY. Three days after the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN.

On 23 June 1972 I was ordered by a phone message from my office to be at the White House at about 1300 with Director Helms. I had lunch with Mr. Helms and went to Mr. Ehrlichman's office in the White House. Present were Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Helms and myself.

As I recall it, Mr. Ehrlichman said the Watergate incident was causing trouble, was being exploited by the opposition. It had been decided at the White House that I would go to Acting Director Gray and tell him now that the five suspects were arrested, further inquiries in the Mexican aspects of this matter might jeopardize some of the CIA's covert activities in that area.

This would seem to indicate at that time they did have an idea that the Watergate was causing opposition, causing trouble in the opposition and they didn't know it was connected with it.

Senator PERCY. I think we ought to state clearly that was 6 days after. This was 3 days after. That request was apparently the initial request that was ever made for CIA to get involved.

REQUEST FROM CHICAGO POLICE

But, on February 7, 1973, in the hearings that we had at that time with respect to Mr. Helms' nomination we were very concerned about the CIA being involved in a domestic matter involving the training of police and law enforcement officials.

As I understand what transpired, there actually was a request from the Chicago police initially for technology, information, training that the CIA could provide, and—

Mr. HELMS. Senator Percy, excuse me just a second. What was volunteered by me at the time and what the Chicago Police Department said it would be interested in was to have some advice about how to set up files at the Chicago Police headquarters which would contain information of legitimate police matters. In other words, this police chief had told me at that time there were no central records, that

the Chicago police had or this is as best I recall all of this, but the general thrust was clear, and when a man was arrested in one precinct and subsequently arrested in another precinct these things never came together at police headquarters and, therefore, it seemed high time that police departments set up information files in the central repository so that they would have this information available. And since we have files of this kind and have been setting them up and been using them for years it just seemed like a friendly gesture to tell him how to do it best.

The CHAIRMAN. Why wouldn't the FBI do that? That is exactly what they were set up to do, they have training schools.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, as I testified at the time, this was something I volunteered to help on out of what I thought was the goodness of my heart and in a very public spirited way. It had nothing malign about it. I was not trying to influence the Chicago police, I was just trying to be helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just suggesting as a matter of procedure it is the FBI's responsibility to do it.

Senator PERCY. I think the principle is a longrun principle and what we are all fighting to protect is the integrity of the Agency itself, and to preserve its proper role as defined by Congress in the 1947 statute.

I think that this testimony which was at that time classified secret but which I now understand can be put in the public domain, and Mr. Helms' forthright answers would be of interest.

I said at the time:

I think we must judge this in today's context.

That is the training by the CIA of domestic law enforcement officials.

Five years ago this wouldn't have caused the concern that it does now. We can't overlook the fact that Watergate has created special interest in intelligence and bugging, and so forth. I can say that when it was discovered in Chicago that the Army was gathering intelligence on civilians, following people and covering public meetings at which prominent persons, such as Senator Stevenson were present, there were expressions of outrage from Members of Congress, the general public, and the press. This is the context in which all this falls; so I would like to ask first if you believe in the 1947 statute which states that the CIA shall have no police, law enforcement, or internal security functions. Do you believe in the underlying basis for that law?

Mr. HELMS. I believe in that 100 percent.

I am glad you didn't say 1,000 percent.

Senator PERCY. I can see that there is some conflict with the crime in the streets law—

That was 1968, I believe—

which says national assistance shall be provided. But I would think that whatever technology CIA has in this field would also be available to the FBI, and I would strongly recommend that you pass on to your successor at the Agency the feeling that I would much sooner see this done through the FBI so the CIA really has no direct relationship of that kind in briefing sessions or training sessions because once getting started in such a program, it could grow.

Mr. HELMS. Senator Percy, I will convey this to the new Director and I am sure he will abide by that. We have no desire to get into these things, and now I have heard the desires of this committee I would certainly convey it and I would rely on the—

Senator SYMINGTON. If the Senator would yield, I would like to support the position of the Senator from Illinois.

Senator PERCY. Just for the clarity of the record, as I understand your testimony this was a gratuitous offer on your part to law enforcement officials, but I would like to ask whether at any time any request was made of the Agency or

of you personally by anyone else in the Federal Government for this kind of service?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Senator PERCY. So it was a gesture on your part?

Mr. HELMS. And I am the one who did it. You are talking to the right man.

WHETHER DR. SCHLESINGER IS AWARE OF STRICTURES

Two questions, Mr. Helms: Have you had such a conversation with Dr. Schlesinger? I have not had the opportunity to talk with him about this. Your position was proven by the forthright position you took against the White House idea. But did you have such a conversation with Dr. Schlesinger, and is that his attitude as you understand it?

Mr. HELMS. I did not talk to Dr. Schlesinger directly about this. I conveyed the sense of the committee's statement and the Senator's statement to the General Counsel of the Agency, which was conveyed to Dr. Schlesinger. And a few days before I left to go to my post in Iran, I was informed that Senator Fulbright had written a letter to the Director embodying in his letter these strictures. So I assume that, therefore, the messages had not only gotten through but the new Director would abide by it.

"KIND OF SERVICE" CLARIFIED

Senator PERCY. Because this record, I understand, may be released at some point, just for clarification when I said, "But specifically I would like to ask, was at any time any request made of the Agency or of you personally by anyone else in the Federal Government that this kind of service be provided?," you said, "No, sir."

Would you clarify what kind of service you had in mind when I asked that question.

Mr. HELMS. When you asked that question, I assumed what you were asking me was whether anybody else in the Federal Government had asked the CIA to do anything about holding seminars or training local police or anything of that sort.

Senator PERCY. I think it is important that I didn't have the hindsight or foresight to ask the question then.

Senator CASE.

MISUSE OF AGENCIES

Senator CASE. Thank you, Senator. I just want to say I don't think it is only bad to have the White House or anybody else interfere with the CIA. Certainly that Agency should not be pressured into carrying out domestic operations in violation of its charter. It would be as bad to misuse the FBI. It would be just as bad to misuse the Internal Revenue Service—to use it for purposes not directed to the performance of its functions and for the benefit of any private person. This, it seems to me, is a greater evil, and I wonder if the former Director would agree that this is what really upset many at that time. It wasn't just interference requiring you to get into a domestic matter—it was the use of the Agency for an improper purpose. Is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

STATUTE OF 1947 IS GUIDELINE

Senator PERCY. I have just one last statement, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to put into this record.

I concluded that portion of my questioning with this statement:

I want to see the name of the CIA protected, and I want to prevent this small program from growing into something much larger. It should be cut off cleanly and sharply. The statute of 1947 must be the guideline, and certainly there is no compulsion for Members of Congress to interpret the Crimes in the Street Act as saying that every agency, including the CIA, should be involved.

Mr. Helms said, "Yes, sir, I have the message."

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS, GENERAL WALTERS

I would just like to note that the CIA, through you and General Walters, stood up against a reprehensible request by the White House to use and pervert an agency of the Federal Government that has a sacred trust in connection with national security. I think the two of you standing up against that request deserve the gratitude of all of us and we are grateful because the pressures, we know--and we have felt some of them--are very great when men act and speak in the name of the President of the United States and make a specific request.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

PURPOSE OF HEARING

Senator PELL. The purpose of this hearing, as I understand it, is both connected with your good name and the Agency's good name, and I have been listening and I must say I think both come out pretty well.

PURPOSE OF LENDING CIA EQUIPMENT TO MR. HUNT

I wanted to lay out from a layman's viewpoint the discrepancy that bothered me when I came in here, but I think it has been resolved. We had understood that you had said you had nothing to do with it. You were then talking about Watergate, as I understand it, and not the lending of the magician's equipment or whatever it is to the man who went and broke into Ellsberg's doctor's office.

Mr. HELMS. Senator, I was talking entirely about the Watergate.

Senator PELL. Entirely about the Watergate. When you lent the magician's equipment to Hunt, you did not know for what purpose it was going to be used.

Mr. HELMS. Absolutely not, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. What was the purpose you thought it was going to be used for?

Mr. HELMS. The only thing that I knew was what he had told General Cushman, was that he wanted to conduct some interviews, unidentified, unspecified, location unspecified, and unidentified.

MR. HUNT'S REPUTATION WITHIN CIA

Senator PELL. What was Mr. Hunt's reputation within the Agency or can you comment on this? Was he an honest graduate, an honest alumnus?

Mr. HELMS. So far as we knew at the time.

REQUESTS FOR CIA TO ENGAGE IN DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES

Senator PELL. In connection with the question that Senator Percy asked you, I would like to broaden it a little bit. In the course of your directorship, which involves two administrations, have you ever been asked, and declined the invitation, to engage in any kind of domestic activities of any sort beside the police one you mentioned to Mr. Percy. Besides Mr. Hunt's activities, have there been any other requests that you have turned down from the executive branch of Government to engage in domestic activities?

Mr. HELMS. Well, Senator Pell, in answering that question, I do not recall of any specific requests by an individual to do such things. There have been at various times, and I say at various times because I can't specify it, conversations about whether it would be desirable to have the Agency do certain types of domestic operations which the FBI were not performing very satisfactorily. This has been something that has been totally and 100 percent resisted. These were not specific statements from somebody. These would take place in meetings, "What are we going to do about this, what are we going to do about that," and the intimation this might come in our direction was simply stopped right there as far as I was concerned.

I don't want to, in making this statement want to pinpoint anybody because I don't have anybody in mind. These were general conversations in an atmosphere in which there was great concern in this Government and in the administration about leaks and demonstrations and trouble in the streets and all the rest of these things.

Senator PELL. But these all occurred within the continental shores of the United States and, for that reason, you had the justifiable reason to decline and move in there because the events were outside your ambit.

Mr. HELMS. Absolutely, and I have never been lacking in clarity in my mind since I have been Director that this is simply not acceptable not only to the Congress but to the people of the United States.

Senator PELL. And, to the best of your knowledge, or your recollection in the course of your directorship, have you not only declined any such requests, but have you ever complied such requests when you had doubts about their legitimacy?

Mr. HELMS. That is an awfully hard question to answer, Senator, sir. I don't recall any.

Senator PELL. I see. I thank you.

LAUNDERING MONEY

Senator PELL. As a layman, I wish you would explain the technique involved in laundering money. I see the phrase in the paper, how is it done?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know, sir. I have never been involved in laundering.

RELATIONS WITH WHITE HOUSE

Senator PELL. After you turned down the request to participate in the laundering of the money, how did you find your relations with the White House, the normal communications? Did your channels of communication continue reasonably open or did they freeze up?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I saw no change.

Senator PELL. No change.

Mr. HELMS. That I can recall. I suppose in hindsight if I had actually been sort of checking it each day something might have come to my attention but most of my dealings were with Dr. Kissinger's office on foreign intelligence matters and life went on, as far as I know, the way it had before.

TELEPHONE WIRETAPS

Senator PELL. These taps that were put on some of Dr. Kissinger's people, to the best of your knowledge, were any of them put on people on loan from your agency or your own people?

Mr. HELMS. I knew nothing about these taps, and I have not read the papers all that carefully about them since. If there were any taps put on any people in the Agency I have no idea who they were or who did it.

Senator PELL. It would be within the area of permissible activity for the FBI, would it not?

Mr. HELMS. I believe so, sir. You will recall perhaps, Senator Pell, that in President Johnson's administration an Executive order was issued which said any telephone tapping done by the Federal Government by any agency whatever had to be specifically approved in writing by the Attorney General.

U.S. COMMITMENT IN IRAN

Senator PELL. I thank you very much for coming, and especially if it gives us an opportunity to touch on Iran, as Senator Aiken also noted. I must say the story yesterday indicating our commitment in Iran is now our second largest worldwide, after Germany, gives some of us cause for concern. Perhaps we will have another opportunity to discuss that.

My faith in you and in the integrity of the agency is complete. Thanks.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, sir.

VULNERABILITY STUDY OF FOREIGN EMBASSY

The CHAIRMAN. Could I just follow one question Senator Pell raised. Would you consider a vulnerability study of a foreign embassy a domestic activity?

Mr. HELMS. A vulnerability study of an embassy in Washington?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Is that a domestic activity?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think since these are extraterritorial installations there could be a certain grayness in this area. But the way we have conducted our relations with the FBI over the years or the way the Agency has conducted its relations with the FBI over the years it is an FBI function.

The CHAIRMAN. The answer is, from your point of view, it is domestic, the CIA does not do it.

Mr. HELMS. That is right.

MEANING OF PHRASE "SAFE HOUSE"

The CHAIRMAN. What is the meaning of the phrase "providing a safe house for somebody?" Is that domestic or foreign? It has been in the papers and I wasn't sure what it meant.

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, it is part of the lexicon, I suppose, of the intelligence business. A "safe house" is nothing more nor less than an apartment or a residence which belongs ostensibly to neither of the people who are going to meet there so the fact that they are there is not ostensibly known. In other words, your own house might be used as a safe house if it was decided that two individuals who were to meet there had nothing to do with Senator Fulbright.

The CHAIRMAN. This is something that the CIA does not do. If it is done it is done by somebody else.

Mr. HELMS. We have safe houses because, for example, if a defector is brought to this country and has to be housed while he is being interrogated, the house in which he lives is known as a safe house.

The CHAIRMAN. But to provide a safe house for Mr. Hunt would not fall in that category, would it?

Mr. HELMS. My recollection of what occurred here is he asked to be met in a safe house; in other words, he asked to be met at some place other than the White House or CIA headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the CIA provide the safe house?

Mr. HELMS. I think that is where one of these meetings took place, such a residence.

The CHAIRMAN. Provided by the CIA.

Mr. HELMS. It is one we had control of at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Any other questions?

CIA NOT INVOLVED IN WATERGATE

Senator HUMPHREY. I just want to clarify just a couple of points for the record so we don't have any ambiguity. I think it is pretty clear. But, No. 1, Hunt was in no way connected with CIA at the time that he met with General Cushman, is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, he was identified as having been hired as a consultant to the White House.

Senator HUMPHREY. But again no connection with CIA.

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. The reason I bring this up is in your testimony during your ambassadorial hearing you said the CIA was not involved in the Watergate matter. I just wanted to make it very clear that, as I understand the interpretation of your remarks, none of your personnel, nor you, nor your office were in any way involved in the Watergate matter.

Mr. HELMS. That is correct, Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Just for the record to get it clear.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

WHAT HUNT TOLD CUSHMAN EQUIPMENT WAS FOR

Senator HUMPHREY. Did Hunt tell Cushman what he wanted the equipment for?

Mr. HELMS. General Cushman testified that he told him he wanted it to conduct an interview unspecified, unidentified either as to place or individual or time.

PROTECTING INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES FROM POLITICAL MANIPULATION

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Helms, you have had a long experience in the Federal Government and I think that most of us who have had any association with you have a high regard for you and sincere admiration for your professional competence. That surely is my judgment and I have worked with you over the years. Do you have any suggestion that you can offer as to how we can protect the professional integrity of the Central Intelligence Agency from political manipulation by persons in high public position? It is perfectly obvious that a Member of Congress can't come to you and speak with authority to tell you to do this or do that.

I think you have indicated quite properly here today that the tradition in the agency is that when a top official of the White House staff comes to you—particularly if it is the staff director or counsel to the President—that he speaks from the source of highest authority.

I have been thinking a great deal about these investigative agencies and how to cut them off from the politics and the political manipulation. It borders upon police state activity when they are used for political purposes: to cover up, investigate people for political purposes, keep dossiers on people that can be used in the political arena. There is a great deal of difference between intelligence operations for national security and intelligence operations for the purposes of domestic politics. I have never been able to find a substitute for character—no mechanism, no machinery, no law. Have you any idea how we can prevent people who think they are the extension of the spirit, the soul, the body, and the heart of the President to quit acting like they are President?

Mr. HELMS. Well, Senator Humphrey, obviously I have thought about these things, too. I thought that when the Congress in the National Security Act of 1947 set up the Agency and had it report to the National Security Council, which is to report to the President, that that would give it the sanctuary it needed from all of the, or most of the pressures, around Washington, either from the State Department, the Defense Department, or anybody else who wanted to pressure its estimates, its analyses, and so forth.

I always thought it was the best sanctuary to have it as a part of the Presidency, and I have to say to you, sir, I don't know how you legislate character and honor and decency. It seems to me that the assumption that the White House is an embodiment of those things is something that is sort of rooted in our Constitution, and to try to legislate specifics to take care of unidentified contingencies, it seems to me, is an enormously difficult thing to do.

Senator HUMPHREY. That would be my judgment. Maybe this hearing and other hearings like this will serve as advance warning that the investigative, law enforcement, internal security, police mechan-

isms of the Federal Government are not to be used as political tools. They are not to be used promiscuously upon the citizenry of this country or upon the political institutions.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

I again want to say that your blowing the whistle, and I think you did, on this operation, is highly commendable and should be a great source of comfort to you, sir, for what you have done for your country.

ASSOCIATION OF GENERALS WALTERS, CUSHMAN WITH PRESIDENT

General Walters was placed in the Agency by Presidential appointment as you have said. He has responded very well from what I have read in the testimony, I have not been privy to many of these hearings. I am a freshman Senator so I don't get in on some of these things.

General Walters was well known by the President, is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir; I believe that he had been interpreter at various times not only as Vice President but as President.

Senator HUMPHREY. But in the instance of General Walters, despite the fact that it was his impression that word was coming down from on high he stood by the charter or the law relating to the National Security Agency, relating to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and your admonition, is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, to the best of my knowledge.

Senator HUMPHREY. Has General Cushman had close associations with the President over the years?

Mr. HELMS. It is my recollection that he was his military assistant for 4 or 5 years when Mr. Nixon was Vice President.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is not possible to deduce when the request was made for General Walters to speak to Mr. Gray that these were two well-known close associates of the President and the White House, so it was understandable that this kind of contact would be made?

Mr. HELMS. Quite possible, sir.

WITNESS' CONSULTATIONS WITH DIRECTOR GRAY

Senator HUMPHREY. But you were in no way asked to go personally to Director Gray.

Mr. HELMS. I was not.

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you ever have any personal consultations with Director Gray following this?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, I talked to him on the telephone on several occasions telling him about the results of the investigations that we made overseas in the FBI's behalf. I don't know how many times I talked with him on the phone but quite regularly. It was a good communication as far as I could see; I wanted to be helpful.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you very much.

EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO MR. HUNT

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What specific equipment was provided to Mr. Hunt?

Mr. HELMS. As I understand it, Senator Symington, and I want to say as I understand it because I have been, in the past 4 or 5 days, a little bit confused myself, but it is my understanding that it was a camera, a tape recorder, a wig, and there seems to be some question of what wig was what because I saw or heard the other day that the wig the Agency gave him was black and that the wig he was said to have been seen someplace in or alleged to have been seen someplace was red. I believe that the Agency technicians were a little bit upset over the fact that the red wig was ill-fitting and they contend any wig they would have provided would have fit very well [laughter] and that there was some pocket litter.

Senator SYMINGTON. Professional pride.

Mr. HELMS. I beg pardon?

Senator SYMINGTON. Professional pride.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. What the pocket litter consisted of I am not sure to this day, but as I explained to Senator Fulbright earlier in the hearing, that is the kind of material that people have in their clothing to indicate that they are X rather than Y, letters, maybe a social security card, I don't know what all. But that was all, so far as I know.

Senator HUMPHREY. Would the Senator yield at that point? On the matter of the pocket litter, as you call it, Mr. McCord testified Friday that the Watergate team had false identification documents. Do you know whether these came from any contact with the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. I am told that they did not.

Senator HUMPHREY. Excuse me.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Senator. Was this equipment consistent with the purpose Mr. Hunt said of conducting an interview in disguise?

Mr. HELMS. It could have been—Senator Humphrey, excuse me, but I think also that there was some kind of a device given to Mr. Hunt that had something to do with making his speech different than it would have been otherwise. I don't know—

Senator SYMINGTON. As long as the Senator brought it up, wasn't there testimony from General Cushman that he gave him some kind of funny passport?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall that.

Senator SYMINGTON. It gets complicated—

Mr. HELMS. I would like to say here in response to that, I would like to say the Agency has never forged American passports.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you supply for the record, after checking it, what was supplied?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, could I ask that that be taken out of some other testimony because I have no real facility for asking these questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Fair enough. I will ask the staff to ask General Cushman about it. Was there any wiretapping or illegal entry equipment that was supplied?

Mr. HELMS. Not to the best of my knowledge.

Senator SYMINGTON. Was the tape recorder a small secret tape recorder?

Mr. HELMS. I am told that it was a tape recorder, a Uher, I believe is the name of it, which can be bought in a store. If that is incorrect this is what I understood it was.

Senator SYMINGTON. How big was it?
Mr. HELMS. I don't know.

RESISTANCE TO PRESSURE COMMENDED

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in summary, I believe when the full story of this affair is known, we will all agree that the career professionals in two of our most important agencies, specifically Richard Helms of the CIA, and J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI, did as much as anyone to prevent the shocking attempt by these people in the White House to undermine some of the finest principles this country stands for. This will be brought out in due course, based on various hearings, when the full testimony is released.

I have known General Walters and General Cushman for some time, and think their testimony shows, when they really understood what was going on, despite their being in the chain of command and, therefore, subject to the orders of the people in the White House who, in effect, represented the Commander in Chief, both of them said "This is as far as we can go." That is what General Cushman testified to under oath, that he so told Mr. Ehrlichman. General Walters testified that before he would do what he was being asked by Mr. Dean, he would resign. Am I correct, as you remember the testimony?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, you are, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. Director, because of my faith in you as a public servant, developed over a long period of years, and your resistance to many pressures, including pressures about the size of foreign military establishments. I was anxious to see this hearing in open session because I knew, after discussion with you and listening to all this testimony in executive session, that you would give a fair and honest appraisal of what we are now discussing. I want to associate myself with these other Senators in my confidence in you; and although I have been critical, plenty, of the CIA at times, and of the FBI at times, it makes one feel good to know that you did not participate in this obvious scandal—I think the latter is a fair word—that you refused these staff men who now have been eliminated from the picture.

I commend you. In my opinion, and I have been around the town a long time, you stand high among the public servants I have known.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Senator Symington.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let me just associate myself with the general tenor of those remarks which were stated beautifully and the general feeling and knowledge I feel exactly the same way about, Mr. Helms, your service to the country.

Senator PELL. I do too.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pearson.

"PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILES"

Senator PEARSON. Mr. Helms, are there other terms than "psychological profiles?" Are there other terms which that particular activity is known by on the personality analysis? What are they generally called?

Mr. HELMS. I am not entirely sure, Senator Pearson. I have called them personality profiles, psychiatric profiles, psychiatric studies, psychological studies, I am not sure what the actual term of art is.

Senator PEARSON. How are they prepared by the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. Well, in the normal circumstances the individuals preparing them are in some cases psychiatrists, in other cases I believe psychologists. It is based on information.

For example, if one was going to do one on Fidel Castro all of the information that the Agency had acquired over the years about Mr. Castro would be made available to these individuals and they would attempt to describe the character of Fidel Castro. The purpose of this was to see if there were insights which could be acquired into the thinking and behavior of these individuals that would not show up normally.

Senator PEARSON. What were they used for?

Mr. HELMS. They would be submitted to the interested agencies, White House, State Department, Department of Defense.

Senator PEARSON. Were those prepared for individuals who might not be citizens of the United States as well as U.S. citizens?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, they were uniformly prepared on noncitizens—individuals who were not citizens of the United States, and the only two exceptions of my knowledge were one on Commander Bucher which I believe was done because it was thought that perhaps the profile would predict how Commander Bucher would stand up to his imprisonment and interrogation by the North Koreans. That some insight would be acquired through this. And the other one was the one that I unfortunately and reluctantly finally agreed to have done on Dr. Ellsberg.

PROFILE ON DR. DANIEL ELLSBERG

We provided, the CIA provided, none of the information provided for this profile. All of the information was provided by the White House.

Senator PEARSON. Was the CIA ever advised as to how the information was obtained on Dr. Ellsberg?

Mr. HELMS. As far as I know whatever was turned over was identified as newspaper clippings. I think some of it, I am told now, came from the FBI via the White House and I don't know what all it was. I never have seen it.

Senator PEARSON. Do you know who at the White House turned over any information to the CIA on Dr. Ellsberg?

Mr. HELMS. I believe it was Mr. David Young who did it.

Senator PEARSON. And what was his title and position at the time?

Mr. HELMS. Well, my recollection, which has been refreshed within the last few days because of a note that I wrote him, was Special Assistant to the National Security Council.

Senator PEARSON. Were you ever advised as to what purpose the psychological profile on Dr. Ellsberg would be used for?

Mr. HELMS. I was not, sir. I was rather insistent with Mr. Young that since we had done this most reluctantly that the amount of information available was inadequate, that the professional standing of the people doing it, they themselves felt, was being somewhat jeopardized; that this was not to be identified as a CIA document and that we were never told why they wanted it, but it was agreed by Mr. Young, he understood the problems and he said they desperately

needed the thing because of a multifaceted approach to the Pentagon papers leak and would we please help them out.

Senator PEARSON. Why were you so reluctant about it?

Mr. HELMS. I was reluctant—

Senator PEARSON. Was it an invasion outside your jurisdiction, beyond your statutory authority, or was it another step in a developing pattern that would bring the CIA into the Watergate and cover-up?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, you see at the time that we were doing this the Watergate had never taken place. This all goes back to July and August and September of 1971 and there never had been any break-ins, any burglaries, or any illegal actions of which we were aware. So the reluctances had to do with asking the psychiatrists to write this on the basis of what they conceived to be inadequate material.

HOW TO MAINTAIN CIA IN FREE OPEN SOCIETY

Senator PEARSON. I almost apologize to the committee for taking up this much time in the record regarding this matter, but I was just curious about it. I would like to have you submit or to generally discuss the proposition of what do we do; how in an open and free society do we maintain a Central Intelligence Agency, make it responsive to Congress, but at the same time, provide it with the kind of independence that will not subject people who follow you to the kind of pressures and requests—improper or proper—which would draw you into the American society.

What changes can we make in the statute? Should we pass a proposal that Senator Fulbright made reference to? I am so tired at looking back at this thing now; how do we look forward for just a moment and what do we do about these things?

Mr. HELMS. Senator Pearson, as I mentioned when Senator Humphrey asked me a somewhat similar question a few minutes ago—

Senator PEARSON. I am sorry, I didn't know that.

Mr. HELMS. I really don't know what to do. I must say congressional oversight is one desirable route to go.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, may I interject a question in the line of Senator Pearson's?

Senator PEARSON. I yield.

DID CIA PREPARE PROFILE ON 1968 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES?

Senator PELL. I heard a report that the CIA had prepared a character profile on one or two of the Democratic Presidential candidates in 1968, not on orders, not on requests, but as a voluntary exercise. Do you have any knowledge if that was correct?

Mr. HELMS. I have no knowledge of it, sir, and I never saw any such thing and I can't believe it would have happened.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

MR. YOUNG IDENTIFIED

The CHAIRMAN. One last comment. Mr. Young, I don't quite get who he was. Is he on Dr. Kissenger's staff?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, he was on Dr. Kissinger's staff.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time he made the request?

Mr. HELMS. At the time he made the request he had been transferred from Dr. Kissinger's staff to Mr. Ehrlichman's staff and he was working for Mr. Ehrlichman at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. And they are the only two American citizens, the two you mentioned, that the CIA has ever participated in profiling?

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, this is what I have been informed. I cannot, to you, out of my own personal resources, say that this is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All that you know?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, STAFFS

The CHAIRMAN. During your long service in the CIA, were you ever aware of any electronic surveillance by the CIA or FBI of Members of Congress or of their staffs?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. By either agency, you never were?

Mr. HELMS. As far as the CIA was concerned, to the best of my knowledge, when I was in a position of responsibility, I have never heard of any proposal like this being made, let alone the Agency instituting any such thing and, as far as the FBI is concerned, I had no knowledge of what they did in this field, at least as far as these matters are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. And the CIA has never put telephone taps on any domestic citizens, that you know of?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know that in history this is entirely true. I have heard it said that in times past maybe that a telephone tap had been put on some individual who was thought to be going sour or something of this kind but this has not been within recent times, and the records would have to be consulted on this because I am simply not familiar—

The CHAIRMAN. At least all I can ask you is in your experience you never, while you were there this never happened, you can't speak for anything before that.

Mr. HELMS. This is a matter that I wish that could be discussed in some other forum. I will be glad to discuss it with you privately. We are in a public hearing and there is one episode I will be glad to mention to you privately which took place some years ago, but this had nothing to do with a Congressman or Senator, a newspaperman, a citizen. It had something to do with somebody who was in the Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Mr. Helms, I think you have been very helpful and very forthcoming. I join my colleagues and I stated previously that your judgment, your Agency's judgment which you were expressing, proved to be more accurate than most of the others. This was during the war in Vietnam and you reported to us.

I always recall one incident that caused considerable interest and excitement right at the beginning involving the question of the first strike capability intentions of the Russians versus ourselves. I think it did cause a good deal of talk, and if you will recall, hearings. I

thought at the time that the matter, having come up as it did, endangered your tenure at that time. You know what I am talking about, but in any case, I think your judgment in what you said was correct.

U.S. PAYING FOR MISTAKE

These developments are, of course, extremely embarrassing to the country and I am sure to you and to everybody involved.

You can have developments come about that reflect upon the integrity of our Government generally. However, I am not one of those who despairs about it. I think it is a process of purging, I suppose, and in another sense paying for the neglect of our own institutions and our own Government in favor of foreign adventures which, I think, were misguided. And whenever a country or a person makes a mistake they usually have to pay for it one way or another, and we are paying for it now in many ways.

I thank you very much for coming this morning and wish you well, sir.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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